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"When Cowey conveyed to the Chicago Coal Company he was engaged in mining coal in the immediate vicinity ofappellees' land, then owned by him. Coal was the only known mineral under the surface which had any commercialvalue. Cowey knew appellees' land was underlaid with some gravel and limestone. On parts of the land the limestonewas on the surface, and on the rest of it was covered with loam, sand and gravel from a few inches in depth to a depth,in places, of fifty or sixty feet. Where the loam was of sufficient depth the land was available for cultivation in cropsand was productive. Cowey knew the limestone was so near the surface that it could not be mined by undergroundmethods without the practical destruction of the agricultural surface. To our minds it would be unreasonable to say hisintention was to reserve only the agricultural surface above the limestone and convey to the grantee the limestone,with the right to remove it, and thereby destroy all he had reserved. The granting clause of the deed conveys only thecoal, 'together with the right to mine the same,' and the quit-claim clause of 'all minerals of every description'underlying the land described cannot reasonably be construed to embrace minerals other than such as could beremoved by mining operations underground, which would not destroy the surface for agricultural purposes. It isaltogether reasonable to presume that Cowey and his grantee had no thought of limestone, sand and gravel asminerals. They knew those were on or near the surface and were of an entirely different nature from coal and oil,--theminerals specifically mentioned in the deed and which could be mined by underground methods. Two years afterCowey made the deed to the Chicago Coal Company he conveyed the land in controversy to Kinder and Burrell,reserving 'all bituminous or stone coal and other minerals, as well as all petroleum oil, in, upon or underlying saidpremises above described, together with the right to mine and raise the same.' By that reservation the grantor meantand intended to except from the grant what he had conveyed to the Chicago Coal Company, and the words 'the rightto mine and raise the same,' show the reservation was intended to be limited to minerals which could be mined andraised by underground workings without destruction of the surface." Kinder, 310 Ill. at 134-35, 141 N.E. at 540.

While Kinder would appear to favor Illinois Cement's position that they own the limestone, SOLVE argues, and the trialcourt found, that Kinder is distinguishable from the instant case. SOLVE asserts that the following differences betweenKinder and the case at bar favor a result contrary to Kinder: (1) the Kinder deeds contained the language "the right to mineand raise the same"; (2) substantial amounts of limestone were visible on the surface of the land in Kinder; and (3) becauselimestone was not a commercially valuable commodity in 1867, the grantor presumably did not consider limestone amineral.

SOLVE contends that the language "the right to mine and raise the same" evidenced an intent by the grantor to limit thegrant to minerals that could be mined and raised by underground mining without destruction of the surface. SOLVE arguesthat because no such limitation is present in the instant case, there is no basis not to interpret "other minerals" as includingall minerals, including limestone.

We agree that the Kinder court relied on the "right to mine and raise" language as a factor supporting its decision. However,we do not believe such language was critical to the court's decision, nor do we find the absence of such languageparticularly significant. While SOLVE characterizes the language as a "limitation," it could be seen simply as recognition ofthe rights of the owner of the mineral estate to enjoy that which he has acquired (see Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington &Franklin Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47 N.E. 2d 96 (1943) (when a mineral estate is severed from a surface estate, the means ofobtaining the minerals pass with the grant by implication; no express covenant is necessary)) or as an expansion of thoseimplied rights. On the other hand, one could argue that leaving out such language is evidence of an intent to limit themineral owner's rights and protect the surface estate to the maximum extent possible. Thus, we find that the presence orabsence of such language is not dispositive of the grantor's intent.

SOLVE further argues that because limestone was visible on the surface in Kinder, it was obvious that mining the limestonewould destroy the surface. This led the supreme court to conclude that the grantor could not have reasonably intended toconvey the limestone, thereby destroying the surface which he had reserved. Conversely, in this case the limestone wascovered by overburden ranging from 3 to 60 feet. However, the absence or presence of limestone on the surface is relevantonly to the extent that it aids in discerning the grantor's intent. While the presence of limestone on the surface allowed theKinder court to surmise that Cowey did not intend to convey the limestone, its absence in this case does not support theopposite conclusion. It is true that because limestone is not present on the surface of the property we cannot presume, as theKinder court did, that the grantor knew that mining it would destroy the surface. Neither, however, can we know whether hewas aware of its existence. Essentially, the absence of limestone on the surface tells us nothing about Colling's intent oneway or the other.

SOLVE also maintains that the Kinder court's conclusion that Cowey and his grantee did not consider limestone a mineralwas based on the fact limestone had no commercial value in 1867. However, by 1907 limestone was being used extensivelyin the manufacture of Portland cement. See Kinder, 310 Ill. at 129-30, 141 N.E. at 538. While that may be true, it is of littlehelp in determining Colling's intent. First, it cannot be ascertained if Colling knew of the existence of the limestone.Second, if he knew of it, was aware of its value, and intended to keep it, why did Colling fail to specifically reserve thelimestone, as he did the coal?

In summary, while it is true that the instant case is distinguishable from Kinder, those differences do not dictate a contraryresult. Rather, Kinder requires each case to be decided upon the language of the grant or reservation, the surroundingcircumstances, and the intention of the grantor, if it can be ascertained. Kinder, 310 Ill. at 134, 141 N.E. at 540. In this casethere is no evidence of Colling's intent beyond the language of the reservation, "coal and other minerals." That language isambiguous, and the "surrounding circumstances" are not helpful in resolving that ambiguity.

Illinois Cement asserts that established principles of contract construction support its position. We agree. Under the doctrineof ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of specific things of a particular class, the general wordsare to be construed as applying only to things of the same general class as those enumerated. New Hampshire Insurance Co.v. Hanover Insurance Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 701, 696 N.E. 2d 22 (1998). In Kinder the court stated that limestone, sand andgravel "were of an entirely different nature from coal and oil." Kinder, 310 Ill. at 134, 141 N.E. at 540. Coal is a source ofenergy that can be mined without disturbing the surface. Limestone is not combustible and cannot be mined withoutdestroying the surface. Moreover, decisions of other jurisdictions that have considered the question have held that a grant orreservation of "minerals" does not include limestone. See, e.g., Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P. 2d 549 (Okla. 1975); Little v.Carter, 408 S.W. 2d 207 (Ky. 1966); see also Downstate Stone Co. v. United States, 712 F. 2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1983)(reservation of "all minerals" did not include limestone); 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals