Rock Island County Sheriff Michael Grchan v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees

Case Date: 05/20/2003
Court: 3rd District Appellate
Docket No: 3-03-0052 Rel

No. 3-03-0052


IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2003

ROCK ISLAND COUNTY SHERIFF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
MICHAEL GRCHAN and ROCK ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit
ISLAND COUNTY, ILLINOIS, ) Rock Island County, Illinois
)
Plaintiffs-Appellees, )
)
                    v. ) No. 02 MR 74
)
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, )
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL ) Honorable Joseph F. Beatty,
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL ) Judge, Presiding
2025, COUNCIL 31, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court:


 

The issue in this case is whether a grievance alleging aviolation of a provision of a public sector collective bargainingagreement is required to be arbitrated. Plaintiffs, Rock IslandCounty Sheriff Michael Grchan and Rock Island County, Illinois(collectively, Rock Island County), filed a complaint fordeclaratory judgment in the circuit court of the FourteenthJudicial Circuit, Rock Island County, Illinois, seeking a rulingthat the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 etseq. (West 2000)) allows plaintiffs to assign correctionalofficers the duties of dispensing medication to inmates. Defendant, American Federation of State, County and MunicipalEmployees, AFL-CIO, Local 2025, Council 31 (AFSCME), representsthe correctional officers who are employed by the plaintiffs. AFSCME filed a motion to compel arbitration of a grievance theyhad previously filed protesting the assignment of dispensingcontrolled substances to inmates as a violation of the parties'collective bargaining agreement. In its motion, AFSCME requestedthat the court stay the declaratory judgment action until thegrievance is decided by the arbitrator. Plaintiffs filed amotion to stay arbitration. The trial court entered an ordergranting the plaintiffs' motion to stay arbitration and denyingAFSCME's motion to compel arbitration. AFSCME then filed anotice of interlocutory appeal. For the reasons that follow, wereverse the judgment of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

AFSCME is the exclusive representative of a bargaining unitof employees that includes the correctional officers employed bythe plaintiffs. The collective bargaining agreement between theparties contains a grievance procedure that includes final andbinding arbitration. The collective bargaining agreement definesa grievance as "a dispute between an employee or the union andthe county concerning the interpretation, application, or allegedviolation of a provision of this agreement." AFSCME filed agrievance alleging that Rock Island County violated article 1,section 2, of the collective bargaining agreement by requiringcorrectional officers to dispense medication to inmates. Article1, section 2, of the collective bargaining agreement providesthat Rock Island County may "make and enforce reasonable rules ofconduct and reasonable regulations." AFSCME notified Rock IslandCounty of its intent to submit this grievance to arbitration inaccordance with the arbitration provisions of the collectivebargaining agreement. Rock Island County refused to submit thegrievance to arbitration. Then, Rock Island County filed acomplaint for a declaratory judgment seeking an order from thecourt that the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS570/100 et seq. (West 2000)) allows the plaintiffs to assigncorrectional officers duties involving the distribution ofmedications to inmates. In response, AFSCME filed a motion tocompel arbitration. Rock Island County filed a motion to stayarbitration. No evidentiary hearing was held. The trial courtentered an order granting Rock Island County's motion to stayarbitration and denying AFSCME's motion to compel arbitration. The trial court found that the sole issue for resolution iswhether Rock Island County's medications policy violates theIllinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq.(West 2000)). The trial court held that this issue is not anarbitrable issue covered under the collective bargainingagreement because it is statutory in basis and thereforespecifically excluded from arbitration.

II. ANALYSIS

The standard of review is de novo. The denial of a motionto compel arbitration is analogous to a denial of injunctiverelief. Notaro v. Nor-Evan Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 268 (1983); FederalSignal Corp. v. SLC Technologies, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 1101,1105, 473 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (2001). Although the standard ofreview of an order granting or denying a motion to compelarbitration generally is whether the trial court abused itsdiscretion (Brooks v. Cigna Property & Casualty Cos., 299 Ill.App. 3d 68, 71, 700 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (1998)), where noevidentiary hearing is held, the decision to deny a motion tocompel arbitration is reviewable de novo. Bass v. SMG, Inc., 328Ill. App. 3d 492, 496, 765 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (2002); FederalSignal Corp. v. SLC Technologies, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1101, 1105-06,743 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (2001). Furthermore, the issues in thepresent case are purely questions of law. They involve theconstruction of several statutes and a collective bargainingagreement; therefore, the appropriate standard of review is denovo. In re Application of the County Collector For Judgment &Order of Sale Against the Lands & Lots Returned Delinquent forNonpayment of General Taxes for the Year 1987 & Prior Years, 278Ill. App. 3d 168, 171, 662 N.E.2d 535, 538 (1996); IllinoisFraternal Order of Police Labor Council v. Town of Cicero, 301Ill. App. 3d 323, 334, 703 N.E.2d 559, 567 (1998).

The trial court incorrectly found that the sole issue forresolution is whether the medications policy violates theIllinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq.(West 2000)). The trial court must have presumed that if thesheriff's job assignments were legal, they must, ipso facto, bein compliance with the collective bargaining agreement. Withoutmaking any comment on the merits of the grievance, we simplypoint out, in the words of Ira Gershwin, "It ain't necessarilyso." A sheriff could order a deputy to spend his shift standingon a corner stirring a bucket of rocks. There is nothing illegalabout that. However, it might very well be a violation of thecollective bargaining agreement between the sheriff and hisemployees. The issue at this stage of the dispute is whether the collective bargaining agreement and the Illinois Public LaborRelations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1992)) requirearbitration of the grievance. They do.

Since this case involves a grievance filed under the termsof a collective bargaining agreement between Rock Island County,public employers, and AFSCME, a labor organization, it is subjectto the terms of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS315/1 et seq. (West 1992)). Pursuant to section 8 of theIllinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/8 (West 1992)),arbitration of a grievance is required unless the partiesmutually agree otherwise. In American Federation of State,County & Municipal Employees v. State of Illinois, 124 Ill. 2d246, 254 (1988), the Illinois Supreme Court found that section 8of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act required all grievancedisputes to be resolved by final and binding arbitration unlessthere is a joint agreement between the employer and the union tothe contrary. Any exclusion from arbitration must be expresslystated in a contract under the Illinois Public Labor RelationsAct. Staunton Community Unit School District No. 6 v. IllinoisEducational Labor Relations Board, 200 Ill. App. 3d 370, 378, 588N.E.2d 751, 757 (1990). In the present case, there was no suchexpressed exclusion; therefore, the trial court erred when itdenied AFSCME's motion to compel arbitration.

We cannot and do not make any comment on the merits of thegrievance. This court's opinion of the merits of the grievanceis immaterial. Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council v. Townof Cicero, 301 Ill. App. 3d 323, 334, 703 N.E.2d 559, 566 (1998). The issue of whether the law requires arbitration must be keptseparate from an analysis of the merits of the underlying claim. A court should not rule on or be influenced by the merits of thedispute. This holds true even if one party's underlying claim isfrivolous. United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.,363 U.S. 564, 568, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1403, 1407, 80 S. Ct. 1343, 1346(1960).

III. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we find the trial court's decision to denyAFSCME's motion to compel arbitration of its grievance erroneous. The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq.(West 1992)) requires that all grievance disputes be resolved byarbitration unless the parties mutually agree otherwise.

Therefore, this case is reversed and remanded to the circuitcourt of Rock Island County to compel arbitration and to issue astay of the declaratory judgment proceedings until arbitration ofAFSCME's grievance is complete.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

McDADE, P. J., and SLATER, J., concur.