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No. 3--01--0727

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2003

PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:

Michael Ratliff-El filed a complaint for mandamus relief(735 ILCS 5/14--101 et seq. (West 2000)) naming Kenneth R.Briley, warden of the Stateville Correctional Center, as thedefendant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion todismiss under section 2--615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/2--615 (West 2000)). On appeal, Ratliff-El argues thatthe trial court erred by dismissing his complaint because itstated a cause of action for mandamus relief. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Ratliff-El is a prisoner at Stateville. In his complaint,Ratliff-El contended that the defendant had a clear duty tofollow the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Act) (5 ILCS100/1--1 et seq. (West 2000)) during adjustment committee andgrievance proceedings at Stateville. As a result of suchproceedings, Ratliff-El had been disciplined with revocation ofgood time credits. Ratliff-El submitted that he was entitled tomandamus relief because the defendant had failed to follow Actprocedures. He also alleged that the defendant's failure tofollow Act procedures violated his "rights."

The defendant filed a section 2--615 motion to dismissRatliff-El's mandamus complaint for failure to state a cause ofaction. In his motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that theAct does not apply to adjustment committee and grievanceproceedings conducted by the Department of Corrections (DOC). The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss andRatliff-El appealed.

ANALYSIS

Motion to Dismiss Mandamus Action

A. DOC Duty to Follow Act Procedures

Ratliff-El argues that a state agency must follow Actprocedures in "contested cases." He reasons that because the DOCis a state agency, and adjustment committee and grievanceproceedings meet the statutory definition of "contested cases,"the defendant has a clear duty to follow Act procedures in DOCadjustment committee and grievance proceedings. He contends thatthe trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion todismiss his mandamus cause of action.

The defendant asserts that the APA contains a"grandfathering" clause (5 ILCS 100/1--5(a) (West 2000)) whichexempts a state agency from using Act procedures when the agencyhad adjudicatory hearing rules in place on July 1, 1977. Thedefendant contends that the DOC had such adjudicatory hearingrules in place prior to July 1, 1977. The defendant submits thatbecause the Act does not apply to DOC adjustment committee andgrievance proceedings, the defendant has no duty to follow Actprocedures. The defendant concludes, therefore, that Ratliff-Eldid not state a cause of action for mandamus relief. We agreewith the defendant.

A section 2--615 motion to dismiss attacks the legalsufficiency of a complaint and presents the issue of whether thecomplaint states a cause of action upon which relief can begranted. 735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 2000); Weiss v. WaterhouseSecurities, Inc., 335 Ill. App. 3d 875, 781 N.E.2d 1105 (2002). The standard of review for granting a section 2--615 motion todismiss is de novo. Krilich v. American National Bank & TrustCo. of Chicago, 334 Ill. App. 3d 563, 778 N.E.2d 1153 (2002).

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may beused only to compel a public official to perform anondiscretionary ministerial duty. Caruth v. Quinley, 333 Ill.App. 3d 94, 775 N.E.2d 224 (2002). A complaint seeking a writ ofmandamus must allege facts that establish (1) a clear right tothe relief requested; (2) a clear duty of the defendant to act;and (3) the clear authority of the defendant to comply with thewrit. Southern & Central Illinois Laborers' District Council v.Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1112,772 N.E.2d 980 (2002).

Section 1--5(a) of the Act states as follows:

"[The Act] applies to every agency as defined in[this Act]. Beginning January 1, 1978, in case ofconflict between the provisions of [the Act] and theAct creating or conferring power on an agency, [thisAct] shall control. If, however, an agency *** hasexisting procedures on July 1, 1977, specifically forcontested cases ***, those existing provisions control,except that this exception respecting contested cases*** does not apply if the Act creating or conferringpower on the agency adopts by express reference theprovisions of [this Act]. Where the Act creating orconferring power on an agency establishesadministrative procedures not covered by [this Act],those procedures shall remain in effect." 5 ILCS100/1--5(a) (West 2000).

It is uncontested that (1) the DOC is an "agency," and (2)adjustment committee and grievance proceedings are "contestedcases," as defined by the Act. See 5 ILCS 100/1--20, 1--30 (West2000). The DOC had procedures in place on July 1, 1977,specifically for "contested cases." See, e.g., Adm. Reg., Dept.of Corrections