Find Legal Information

In 1989, the Illinois legislature enacted the Illinois UniformConviction Information Act (Act) (20 ILCS 2635/1 et seq. (West2000)). It declared that conviction information maintained by theIllinois Department of State Police (the Department) would be madeavailable to the public. 20 ILCS 2635/2(A) (West 2000). Thepurpose of the Act is to establish a uniform policy for access anddissemination of conviction information, set guidelines that wouldsupport effective law enforcement, ensure the accuracy ofconviction information, and provide individuals with a form ofredress for grievances if inaccurate or incomplete information wasdisseminated about them. 20 ILCS 2635/2(B) (West 2000).

Plaintiffs Adan and Mary Ramos filed an action against theCity of Peru pursuant to the Act. In May of 1996, Adan had beenarrested by the Peru police department on domestic battery charges. While he was being processed for that arrest, a photograph wastaken of him. On July 20, 1999, a Crime Stoppers' advertisementappeared in the LaSalle News-Tribune. The advertisement namedRicardo N. Ramos as a person wanted for the offense of aggravatedcriminal sexual abuse. Directly above the name of Ricardo N. Ramoswas the photograph of Adan Ramos.

The Ramoses filed a complaint against the city, asserting aviolation of the Act (20 ILCS 2635/1 et seq. (West 2000)),defamation, and false light invasion of privacy. A separatepersonal injury claim for Mary was included in the complaint.

The trial court dismissed the Uniform Conviction InformationAct claim pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)). It found that the purposeof the Act was to create liability for information that isdisseminated from the Department of State Police's centralrepository only and not for information released from the files oflocal police departments. Because the Ramoses failed to allegethat the photograph of Adan was disseminated from the files of theDepartment, the court dismissed the claim.

The defamation, false light, and personal injury claims weredismissed pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(West 2000)). The court determined that section 2-107 of the LocalGovernmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (TortImmunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-107 (West 2000)) barred all threeclaims and that there was no legal basis for Mary's personal injuryclaim because the publication was not directed at her.

In this appeal we are asked to determine whether the trialcourt properly dismissed the Ramoses' claims. This court appliesa de novo standard when reviewing a lower court's dismissal ofclaims pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code. Provenzalev. Forister, 318 Ill. App. 3d 869, 743 N.E.2d 676 (2001).

A. Conviction Information Act

The Ramoses contend that the trial court erred when itdetermined that the Uniform Conviction Information Act did notapply to information released from the files of local policedepartments. The city disputes this contention and responds thatsection 23(C) of the Act (20 ILCS 2635/23(C) (West 2000))specifically exempts the Ramoses' claim. In the alternative, thecity argues that if this court determines that the Act applies tothe files of local police departments, the trial court's decisionshould be affirmed because (1) the Ramoses failed to properlyallege a violation of the Act and (2) the photograph of Adan didnot constitute "conviction information" as defined by the Act.

When interpreting a statute, the court's primary objective isto ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. When determining legislative intent, the court must construe thelanguage of the statute according to its plain and ordinarymeaning. In re C.M., 282 Ill. App. 3d 990, 669 N.E.2d 707 (1996). If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute'splain meaning will be given effect. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d91, 720 N.E.2d 225 (1999).

Section 14 of the Act is entitled "Judicial Remedies" andstates in relevant part:

"(B) An individual aggrieved by a violation of thisAct by a State Agency or unit of local government shallhave the right to pursue a civil action for damages orother appropriate legal or equitable remedy ***.

(C) Any civil action for damages alleging thenegligent dissemination of inaccurate or incompleteconviction information by a State agency or by a unit oflocal government in violation of this Act may only bebrought against the State agency or unit of localgovernment and shall not be brought against any employeeor official thereof." (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 2635/14(West 2000).

In our view, this language is unambiguous. The Act clearlycontemplates that aggrieved individuals may pursue judicialremedies against state agencies and units of local governments suchas the City of Peru. It applies to conviction information⁽¹⁾ that isreported to or collected, maintained, or disseminated by theDepartment.⁽²⁾ 20 ILCS 2635/4 (West 2000)). Thus, convictioninformation that is reported to the Department by units of localgovernment is included. See 20 ILCS 2635/5 (West 2000). Thephotograph in this case falls under the definition of convictioninformation; therefore, it is included under the Act. Any otherinterpretation of the language of section 14 would not conform withthe Act's purpose to ensure the accuracy and completeness ofconviction information and provide individuals with redress ofgrievances in the event that inaccurate or incomplete informationis disseminated about them. 20 ILCS 2635/2(B) (West 2000).

The city responds that the Ramoses' claim is exempt pursuantto section 23(C) of the Act (20 ILCS 2635/23(C) (West 2000)) andthat the legislature never intended that the local files ofcriminal justice agencies be subject to the Act's provisions. Wedo not agree. Section 23(C) states:

"Nothing in this Act shall be construed asrestricting or prohibiting the dissemination of criminalhistory record information⁽³⁾ to a requesting criminaljustice agency or peace officer or the dissemination oflocal criminal history record information maintained bycriminal justice agencies on behalf of units of localgovernment to members of the general public requestingsuch information." 20 ILCS 2635/23(C) (West 2000).

While the language of section 23(C) allows for thedissemination of criminal history record information to the public,the language does not provide that units of local government willnot be held accountable for damages resulting from the negligentdissemination of inaccurate or incomplete criminal history recordinformation. To find otherwise would go against the Act's mandatethat individuals be afforded the maximum feasible protection totheir rights of privacy and enjoyment of their good name andreputation. See 20 ILCS 2635/23(A) (West 2000).

Although the city claims that the trial court's decisionshould be affirmed because the Ramoses did not properly allege aviolation of the Act and failed to specifically identify which partof the Act was violated, we disagree. Based on our review of thecomplaint, we find that the Ramoses have sufficiently alleged acause of action for violation of the Act. We further disagree withthe city's claim that the photo of Adan did not constitute"conviction information" as defined by the Act. As statedpreviously, conviction information includes "all prior andsubsequent criminal history events directly relating to suchjudgments, such as, but not limited to" the notation of arrest andcharges filed, the sentence and fine imposed, and all relatedprobation, parole and release information. (Emphasis added.) 20ILCS 2635/3(F) (West 2000). The words "but not limited to" reflecta broad definition of conviction information that would certainlyinclude the photograph in this case.

Because the Ramoses have properly stated a cause of actionpursuant to the Uniform Conviction Information Act, we reverse thetrial court's decision.

B. Tort Immunity Act

The Ramoses assert that the trial court erred when itdismissed their defamation, false light, and personal injury claimsbased on section 2-107 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-107(West 2000)). Section 2-107 of the Act provides that a localpublic entity is not liable for injury caused by any action of itsemployees that is libelous or slanderous or for the provision oforal or written information. 745 ILCS 10/2-107 (West 2000). TheRamoses claim that section 2-107 applies only to discretionary actsand not to ministerial ones. Because the act of turning over thephotograph to Crime Stoppers was ministerial and not discretionary,the Act did not bar their claims.

When construing the Tort Immunity Act, the primary goal is toascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d335, 692 N.E.2d 1177 (1998). Exceptions, limitations, orconditions that conflict with the express legislative intent shallnot be read into the Act. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 340, 692 N.E.2dat 1180.

A plain reading of section 2-107 confirms that the trial courtdid not err when it determined that the Ramoses' defamation, falselight invasion of privacy, and personal injury claims were barredby the Tort Immunity Act. Although the discretionary/ministerialdistinction still exists under several provisions of the Act, thedistinction applies only to those sections of the Act in which thedistinction is explicit. See 745 ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201 (West 2000);Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 687 N.E.2d1042 (1997); In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 680N.E.2d 265 (1997). Because there is no explicit language insection 2-107 that provides that the government will not be immunefor ministerial acts, the discretionary/ministerial distinctiondoes not apply. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trialcourt dismissing these claims.

C. Personal Injury Claim

The Ramoses contend that the trial court improperly dismissedMary's personal injury claim on the basis that there is norecognizable cause of action for a third-party based on thedefamation of another. They assert that Mary's claim was for herown injuries that occurred when she was subjected to needlesscomments and questions from others regarding the photograph. Thosecomments, according to the Ramoses, caused Mary grief, humiliationand embarrassment. The Ramoses suggest that this action is akin toa loss of consortium claim.

We do not agree with the Ramoses' contention. A cause ofaction for injuries resulting from a defamation accrues only to theperson against whom the injurious publication was directed. Insullv. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill.1959). Although Mary is seeking separate damages for her owninjuries under the guise of her own personal injury claim, theunderlying basis of liability is still the alleged defamation bythe city based upon the improper dissemination and publication ofher husband's photo. Moreover, the Ramoses offer no legal supportfor their position that Mary is entitled to recover for her owninjuries due to a defamation directed toward her husband or fortheir contention that this case should be treated like a loss ofconsortium claim.

In sum, we hold that the Act covers local units of governmentand their dissemination of materials that are defined as convictioninformation under the Act. Accordingly, we reverse the trialcourt's decision dismissing the Uniform Conviction Information Actclaim and affirm on the remaining issues.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof La Salle County is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

LYTTON, P.J., and SLATER, J., concur.

1. "Conviction information" is defined as data reflecting ajudgment of guilt or nolo contendere and includes all prior andsubsequent criminal history events directly relating to suchjudgments, such as, but not limited to: (1) the notation ofarrest; (2) the notation of charges filed; (3) the sentenceimposed; (4) the fine imposed; and (5) all related probation,parole, and release information. 20 ILCS 2635/3(F) (West 2000).

2. "The Department" refers to the Illinois Department of StatePolice. 20 ILCS 2635/3(I) (West 2000).

3. "Criminal history record information" is defined as the"data identifiable to an individual and consisting of descriptionor notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, informations,pretrial proceedings, trials, or other formal events in thecriminal justice system or descriptions or notations of criminalcharges (including criminal violations of local municipalordinances) and the nature of any disposition arising therefrom,including sentencing, court or correctional supervision,rehabilitation and release." 20 ILCS 2635/3(G) (West 2000).