Piasecki v. Liberty Life Assurance Co.
Case Date: 04/10/2000
Court: 3rd District Appellate
Docket No: 3-99-0159
Piasecki v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., Nos. 3-99-0159, 3-99-0160 cons.3rd District, 10 April 2000
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court: After Donald and Eileen Piasecki (decedents) died in a motor vehicle accident, the co-administrators of the decedents'estates entered into a structured settlement agreement with the original defendants, Nussbaum Trucking, Inc. and CharlesWard (defendants). Two of the decedents' sons, John and David Piasecki (Piaseckis), assigned their future payments underthe settlement agreement to Stone Street Capital, Inc. in exchange for lump sum payments. The defendants' insurersobjected. The trial court allowed the assignment. We reverse. The co-administrators of the decedents' estates entered into a structured settlement agreement with the defendants arisingout of a wrongful death claim. Under this agreement, the defendants would provide the decedents' three sons an initial lumpsum payment, followed by a stream of quarterly future payments. The settlement barred the payees from assigning theirinterests in the future payments. The settlement agreement also contained a qualified assignment clause under which the defendants and their insurer,Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, could assign their liability for making the periodic payments to Keyport Life InsuranceCompany; a separate assignment was executed. The settlement agreement also allowed Keyport to contract with LibertyLife Assurance Company of Boston to fund the payments. In 1998, the Piaseckis assigned their periodic payments to Stone Street in exchange for lump sum payments. They soughtapproval of the assignments from the trial court under section 155.34 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155.34(West 1998)), but Liberty Life and Keyport (together, the insurers) were not notified of these proceedings. The trial courtapproved the assignments. After receiving notice of the orders allowing the assignments, the insurers filed petitions to vacate and to intervene. Thetrial court granted the petitions. The Piaseckis then filed amended petitions to assign. The trial court found theantiassignment clauses "unenforceable" and again granted the Piaseckis' petitions to assign. When construing a contract, a reviewing court must determine and effectuate the meaning of the plain and ordinarylanguage of the parties' contract de novo. Gray v. Mundelein College, 296 Ill. App. 3d 795, 803 (1998). Paragraph 4 of the settlement agreement states, in relevant part: "Plaintiffs [Piaseckis] acknowledge that the Periodic Payments cannot be accelerated, deferred, increased ordecreased by the Plaintiffs or any Payee; nor shall the Plaintiffs or any Payee have the power to sell, mortgage,encumber, or [sic] any part thereof, by assignment or otherwise." The settlement agreement also allowed Liberty Mutual to "make a 'qualified assignment'" to Keyport for the future periodicpayments. The qualified assignment included similar antiassignment language: "None of the Periodic Payments may beaccelerated, deferred, increased or decreased and may not be anticipated, sold, assigned or encumbered." The qualifiedassignment also indicates that the Piaseckis did not have "any rights of ownership or control over the 'qualified fundingasset' or against the Annuity Issuer [Liberty Life]." The Piaseckis contend that the antiassignment clause is unenforceable in Illinois because it is against public policy in that itconflicts with Restatement (Second) of Contracts |
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