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JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the Court:

The defendant, Sylvan Wither, was charged with unlawfulpossession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (720ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 1998)) and unlawful possession of acontrolled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(A) (West 1998)). Hefiled a motion to suppress alleging that the search of hisvehicle incident to his arrest was unlawful. The trial courtgranted the defendant's motion, and the State appeals. Weaffirm.

On October 23, 1999, Officer Robert Nichols, a Galesburgpolice officer, observed the defendant driving without a reardriver's license illumination light. Officer Nichols stopped thecar and asked the defendant for identification. The officerdiscovered that the defendant's license had been suspended. Hearrested the defendant and handcuffed him. Officer Nichols thenpatted the defendant down and escorted him to the squad car.

During the arrest, Officer Dan Hostens arrived on the sceneand informed Officer Nichols that he arrested the defendant ontwo prior occasions for possession of a controlled substance andpossession of cannabis. Based on this information, OfficerNichols called for the canine unit. Officer Nichols testifiedthat the purpose of requesting the canine unit was to determinewhether the defendant had any illegal substances in the vehicle. Approximately five minutes elapsed before the unit arrived. Thedog searched the compartment of the defendant's car and alertedat the steering column. The officers removed the steering wheeland recovered a baggie containing a white powdery substance andan off-white chunk substance.

After considering the evidence presented at the suppressionhearing, the trial court ruled that the search exceeded the scopeof a lawful search incident to arrest. The court opined that anypretense of an attempt to make a lawful search incident to arrestvanished when the officers did not search the vehiclecontemporaneous to the arrest. Thus, it concluded that thesearch was unconstitutional.

On appeal, the State argues that the search of thecompartment of the car was a lawful search incident to arrestunder New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (1981). As a result, the State concludes that themotion to suppress should have been denied.

A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's factualfindings on a motion to suppress unless they are manifestlyerroneous. People v. Perez, 288 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 681 N.E.2d173 (1997). However, a trial court's ultimate determinationregarding the reasonableness of a warrantless search is subjectto a de novo review. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 134L. Ed. 2d 911, 166 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).

Generally, a warrantless search or seizure is per seunreasonable unless it comes within one of the few recognized andlimited exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971). One such exception is asearch incident to a lawful arrest. United States v. Robinson,414 U.S. 218, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973). A searchincident to arrest is lawful because of the need to remove anyweapons that might be within the defendant's immediate controland the need to prevent the destruction or concealment ofevidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685,89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969). These principles apply equally tosearches of an automobile. See People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d498, 639 N.E.2d 1278 (1994). Thus, when an officer has made a"lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, hemay, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search thepassenger compartment of that automobile." New York v. Belton,453 U.S. 454, 460, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 775, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864(1981).

Here, the defendant does not challenge the lawfulness of theofficer's stop or the arrest that followed. Given the lawfulnessof the arrest, it was, as a matter of course, permissible forNichols to search the defendant's vehicle immediately followingthe defendant's arrest. See Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d768, 101 S. Ct. 2860; Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 639 N.E.2d 1278. Such a search would have been reasonable based upon a need todisarm or to preserve evidence. However, Nichols did not searchdefendant's vehicle contemporaneous to his arrest. Instead, heplaced the defendant in the squad car and waited for the canineunit to arrive. Five minutes later, the canine unit searched theautomobile compartment for the specific purpose of detecting anillegal substance. The search cannot be viewed as incidental tothe arrest or justified by any exigent circumstance. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to suppresswas proper.

The judgment of the circuit court of Knox County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

McDADE, J., concurs.

I agree with the majority that the trial court properlysuppressed the evidence found by the officers upon removing thesteering wheel of defendant's car. The search which occurred wasnot contemporaneous to the arrest and was thus not justified underthe Belton exception. However, to the extent that the majority'sopinion may be read as holding that the instant search would havebeen a lawful Belton search if it had simply occurred immediatelyfollowing defendant's arrest, I must disagree.

The law is clear that, although an officer may search thepassenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers thereinwithout a warrant during an automobile search incident to anarrest, "the exemption does not extend to dismantling portions ofthe vehicle." People v. Gonzalez, 316 Ill. App. 3d 354, 362-63, 736N.E.2d 157, 164 (2000)(quoting United States v. Patterson, 65 F.3d68, 71 (7th Cir. 1995)). In order to remove the steering wheel inthis case, it was necessary for the officers to have had probablecause that there were drugs in the steering column. See Gonzalez,316 Ill. App. 3d at 363, 736 N.E.2d at 164; Patterson, 65 F.3d at71. Such probable cause arose from the canine alerting at thesteering column. However, by that point, the search was no longerjustified under the Belton exception.