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C. Substantive Due Process

Respondent also complains that the Act violates substantivedue process because "mental disorder" is too broad, vague andmanipulable, and because "substantial probability" is glaringlyvague and uncertain. Identical statutory language was challengedin Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 138 L.Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct.2072 (1997), and the United States Supreme Court found no violationof substantive due process. Respondent urges that we maynonetheless find the Illinois Constitution to provide moreexpansive protection. See People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211,217, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (1995).

We decline to do so. In order to interpret an Illinoisconstitutional provision more expansively than its federalcounterpart, we must find in the language of our constitution, orin the debates and committee reports of the constitutionalconvention, something which will indicate that the provisions ofour constitution are intended to be construed differently than arethe similar provisions in the federal constitution. Mitchell, 165Ill. 2d at 217, 650 N.E.2d at 1017. Respondent fails to offer anyauthority to support his contention that the Illinois due processclause is to be interpreted more expansively than its federalcounterpart. Consequently, his substantive due process claim mustfail.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Next, respondent argues that the evidence presented wasinsufficient to establish that he is a sexually violent person. Under the Act, in order to prove the respondent was a sexuallyviolent person, the State was required to prove that he (1) hadbeen convicted of a sexually violent offense; (2) was within 90days of discharge from the DOC; (3) has a mental disorder; and (4)is dangerous to others because the mental disorder creates asubstantial probability that he will engage in future acts ofsexual violence. 725 ILCS 207/15 (West 1998).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard ofreview is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorableto the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found theessential elements of the offense to have been proved beyond areasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985).

The respondent admits he was convicted of a sexually violentoffense and that he was within 90 days of discharge from the DOC. Two experts testified that respondent has a mental disorder whichmakes it substantially probable that he will commit sexuallyviolent acts in the future. Dr. Leavitt testified thatpsychological screening tools suggested a high probability thatrespondent would commit future acts of sexual violence. We findthat a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonabledoubt that respondent is a sexually violent person as defined bythe Act.

III. Motion in Limine

Respondent next contends that the trial judge erred bypermitting the State to introduce a portion of a videotapedstatement made by respondent and by permitting the State tointroduce the testimony of respondent's victim regarding the 1995offense. It is the function of the trial judge to weigh theprobative value and potential prejudicial effect of evidence, andthe decision of the trial judge will not be reversed absent anabuse of discretion. People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 317, 637N.E.2d 992, 1012 (1994).

Respondent argues that the trial judge abused his discretionin admitting both the videotaped statement and the testimony ofrespondent's niece because the prejudicial nature of that evidencefar outweighed any probative value. Respondent argues that boththe video evidence and his niece's testimony were probative only ofthe fact that he had been convicted of a sexually violent offense. Because he was willing to stipulate to the conviction and becausehis conviction of that offense was a matter of record, respondentargues that the testimony and the video were cumulative and servedonly to inflame the passions of the jury.

The State argues that, since the rules of evidence in criminalactions apply to this civil proceeding, the State is allowed toprove every element of the crime charged and every relevant fact,even if a party agrees to stipulate to a fact. People v. Hobley,159 Ill. 2d 272, 316, 637 N.E.2d 992, 1012 (1994). Thus, the Stateargues, regardless of respondent's willingness to stipulate to thefact of the conviction, the State was entitled to introduceevidence to prove that necessary element.

Initially, we note that the record on appeal does not includethe video. Therefore, this court is unable to evaluaterespondent's claim that because the video portrays him as veryupset and angry, it was prejudicial to him. The appellant bearsthe burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record of theproceedings at trial, and, in the absence of a complete record, itwill be presumed that the trial court's order was in conformitywith the law and had a sufficient factual basis. People v. Benson,256, Ill. App. 3d 560, 563, 627 N.E.2d 1207, 1209 (1994).

On the other hand, we agree with respondent that the trialcourt erred in permitting the testimony of K.W., the victim of the1995 crime for which respondent was incarcerated. While the Stateis obliged to prove that a respondent has been convicted of asexually violent offense, that element of the State's petition issufficiently proven by the introduction of a certified copy of therespondent's conviction. Therefore, the testimony of a victimdescribing the details of such crime would be admissible only ifrelevant to the remaining isssues of whether the person has amental disorder and is dangerous to others because the person'smental disorder creates a substantial probability that he or shewill engage in acts of sexual violence. See 725 ILCS 207/15(b)(4),(5) (West 1998). It is clear when applying this standard that theprobative value of K.W.'s testimony was outweighed by its potentialprejudicial effect. Therefore, we conclude that the trial courtabused its discretion in admitting K.W.'s testimony.

However, we find this error harmless in light of theoverwhelming evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Dr. Bucktestified that respondent continues to deny responsibility for anyof his sexual misconduct. In his interview with Dr. Buck,respondent discussed three sex related offenses for which he had been convicted. Respondent called the victims of these offenses"whores" and "bitches." He told Dr. Buck that he hoped he hadruined his victims' lives. Respondent also told Dr. Buck that thevictims of his sexual crimes were to blame for his incarcerationbecause they called the police when respondent felt they did notneed to do so. Both Dr. Leavitt and Dr. Buck agreed thatrespondent is properly diagnosed with paraphilia, alcohol abuse,antisocial personality disorder, and borderline intellectualfunction. Dr. Leavitt testified that three separate screeningtools used by psychologists to predict recidivism indicated a highrisk that respondent would reoffend if released into society. Given the overwhelming weight of the evidence, the error inadmitting K.W.'s testimony was harmless.

IV. Dispositional Hearing

Respondent argues that, after the jury found respondent to bea sexually violent person, the trial judge should have conducted aformal dispositional hearing before deciding to summarily commitrespondent to the DOC. Respondent complains he was denied theopportunity to present his case that he would be an appropriatecandidate for conditional release. The State argues the statute isclear that the trial court may conduct such a dispositional hearingif the court lacks sufficient evidence to determine immediatelyfollowing trial whether to commit the respondent to the DOC orallow him conditional release. Statutory construction presents aquestion of law which this court decides de novo. Advincula v.United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1015(1996).

Section 40 (b)(1) of the Act provides, in relevant part:

"The court shall enter an initial commitment order underthis Section pursuant to a hearing held as soon aspracticable after the judgment is entered that the person*** is a sexually violent person. If the court lackssufficient information to make the determination [whetherinstitutional care in a DOC facility or conditionalrelease is appropriate] immediately after trial, it mayadjourn the hearing and order the [Department of HumanServices] to conduct a predisposition investigation or asupplementary mental examination, or both, to assist thecourt in framing the commitment order." (Emphasis added.)725 ILCS 207/40(b)(1) (West 1998).

The parties dispute whether respondent was entitled to adispositional hearing prior to his commitment; however, theparties blur the distinction between the predispositioninvestigation or supplementary mental examination which the courtmay in its discretion order with the dispositional hearing whichthe court is required to hold.

Immediately following the verdict, the trial judge noted thata hearing needed to be held to determine whether respondent shouldbe ordered committed to a secure facility or allowed conditionalrelease. Respondent indicated that he would prefer that the trialcourt wait for Dr. Leavitt to draft a report regarding histreatment recommendation prior to deciding respondent'sdisposition. The trial judge, however, indicated that he felt hehad enough information upon which to base his decision. He askedthe attorneys if either side had any additional evidence theywished to introduce and respondent was asked if he wished totestify. When both of these questions were answered in thenegative, the judge announced his decision to commit respondent toa secured facility. The trial judge further indicated that,should Dr. Leavitt's report suggest a contrary disposition orshould respondent have evidence he wished to introduce at a latertime, respondent should file a motion to reconsider.

Respondent did file a motion to reconsider; however,respondent did not suggest that Dr. Leavitt's report suggested acontrary disposition or that respondent had evidence which hewished to introduce. Rather, respondent asserted that the trialcourt "should have conducted a formal dispositional hearingincluding a report from the Department of Human Services and/orsupplemental mental examination pursuant to section 207/40 (b)(1)"of the Act.

Taken in this context, respondent appears to be appealing thetrial court's decision not to request either a predispositioninvestigation or a supplementary mental examination. Because thearguments before this court refer to a "dispositional hearing,"however, we consider also whether respondent was denied adispositional hearing.

We first find that, under the plain language of the Act, thetrial court is required to conduct a hearing before entering itscommitment order. After careful review of the record, we are notpersuaded that respondent was denied this hearing. Immediatelyfollowing the verdict, the trial court gave respondent theopportunity to present evidence or testimony with respect to thecommitment order. Respondent declined this opportunity. Theattorneys on both sides argued as to what each felt would be anappropriate disposition. Under the circumstances, we disagreewith respondent's contention that he was denied a dispositionalhearing.

We further find that, under the plain language of the Act,the trial court may in its discretion request a predispositioninvestigation or supplementary mental examination if it lackssufficient information to make its decision. Given the evidencethat respondent did not take advantage of treatment opportunitieswhile incarcerated, felt that treatment would be useless since hewas drunk when he committed his crimes and did not remember themanyway, and failed to attend counseling when required as acondition of his mandatory supervised release following his 1995sentence, we are persuaded the trial judge had sufficient evidenceto conclude that respondent would not have been an appropriatecandidate for conditional release. Consequently, the trial courtdid not err in failing to request the discretionarypredispositional investigation or supplementary mentalexamination.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Rock Island County is affirmed.

SLATER, PJ, and HOLDRIDGE, J., concurred.