People v. Musgrove
Case Date: 05/10/2000
Court: 3rd District Appellate
Docket No: 3-98-0953
People v. Musgrove, No. 3-98-09533rd District, 10 May 2000
JUSTICE HOMER delivered the opinion of the court: After a stipulated bench trial, the defendant was convicted of the offense of escape (720 ILCS 5/31--6(a) (West 1998)), andsentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in: (1) granting the State's motion in liminewhich barred him from presenting the affirmative defense of necessity, and (2) denying his motion to represent himself.After our careful review, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial. FACTS During all times relevant, the defendant was serving a 50-year sentence at Stateville Correctional Center for his 1989convictions for murder, attempted armed robbery, unlawful use of a weapon, and conspiracy. While incarcerated, thedefendant was charged by indictment with the offense of forgery for allegedly engaging in a scheme to defraud inmates atother correctional institutions. The defendant allegedly sent letters to these inmates on altered law firm stationery indicatingthat they had been awarded $2,500 in a class action settlement, which they could collect if they sent $25 to the defendant'spost office box. On April 22, 1997, the defendant was transported to the Will County courthouse by Officer Timms, an employee of theIllinois Department of Corrections (DOC), for an appearance on the forgery charge. As they prepared to leave, thedefendant escaped from the back of the prison van before Officer Timms could close the door. After a brief foot chase,Officer Timms caught the defendant and placed him back into custody. The defendant was subsequently charged byindictment with the offense of escape (720 ILCS 5/31--6(a) (West 1996)). Prior to trial on the escape charge, the defendant indicated that he intended to present the affirmative defenses of necessityand compulsion. He claimed that his life was in danger at Stateville because of the publicity surrounding the forgery case.The State filed a motion in limine, seeking to bar the defendant from presenting those defenses, which the trial courtgranted. There were numerous delays in the proceedings. Thereafter, the defendant, who was represented by the public defender'soffice, requested that he be allowed to represent himself at trial. The trial judge denied his motion, finding that it was madetoo late and would further delay the trial. The case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. After stipulating to the facts, thedefendant was given the opportunity to make an offer of proof on the affirmative defense issues. The defendant showed that after his indictment on the fraud charge, an article appeared in The Joliet Herald Newsidentifying the defendant by name and describing his alleged scheme to defraud fellow inmates. The defendant testified thathe first saw the article when it was posted on the bulletin board in the law library at Stateville in late 1996. Thereafter, heclaims that he began receiving death threats and threats of physical harm from other inmates. He did not specifically knowthe names of the inmates, but knew some by their nicknames, gang affiliations, and job assignments. He stated that inmateshad thrown urine and hot water on him and tried to strike him with broomsticks as he walked by the cells. The defendant'sfellow inmate, Miles Barnes, testified that he was aware that the defendant had been threatened by inmates, but he had noinformation about specific threats. The defendant stated that he first reported the threats to the warden and the assistant Director of Corrections in December1996. In January 1997, the defendant filed a grievance that detailed his safety concerns and requested that the matter behandled as an emergency. The defendant's request for emergency status was denied. In the following months, the defendantwrote numerous letters regarding his safety concerns which he contends garnered no response. He stated that the purposebehind his escape attempt was to get the attention of the Department of Corrections officials. The defendant asserted that hehad no intention of getting away, but he wanted to bring to their attention his serious safety concerns and his need to beprotected and moved from Stateville. Officer Timms testified that he could not recall any conversations he may have had with the defendant prior to the escapeattempt. After his recapture, the defendant told Officer Timms that it was not personal, but that he had to do it because hislife had been threatened. Will County Sheriff's Deputy Rafael Garza, who aided in the recapture, testified that he also heardthe defendant make this statement. When Officer Timms picked up the defendant at the segregation unit at Stateville, where inmates are kept in their cells 23hours a day, he noticed that the prison was on lock down that day. He noted that during lock down no prisoner is allowedoutside of his cell except for visits and emergency medical attention. The defendant acknowledged that the prison had beenon lock down for two days, but he stated that it had no impact on his contact with other inmates. At the conclusion of his offer of proof, the defendant was found guilty of escape and sentenced to six years in prison to beserved consecutively to his current term. The defendant's post-trial motion was denied, and this appeal followed. ANALYSIS While motions in limine are encouraged in criminal cases to exclude collateral or extraneous matters, such motions shouldbe used with caution so that they do not unduly restrict the opposing party's case or deprive a defendant of a legally viabledefense. People v. Berquist, 239 Ill. App. 3d 906, 908, 608 N.E.2d 1212, 1214 (1993). A reviewing court will reverse thetrial court's decision to grant a motion in limine if the decision was an abuse of discretion. People v. Batchelor, 202 Ill. App.3d 316, 325, 559 N.E.2d 948, 955 (1990). Section 7--13 of the Criminal Code of 1961 describes the necessity defense as follows: "Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the accused was without blamein occasioning or developing the situation and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public orprivate injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct." 720 ILCS 5/7--13 (West1998). Necessity involves a choice that can only be made between two admitted evils, other options being unavailable. Even slightevidence of the forcing of this choice is sufficient to make the defense an issue for the trier of fact. People v. Branham, 217Ill. App. 3d 650, 651, 577 N.E.2d 803, 805 (1991). The following factors have been deemed valuable in assessing claims of necessity in escape cases: "'(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in theimmediate future; (2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make anyresult from such complaints illusory; (3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts; (4) There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison personnel or other 'innocent' persons in the escape;and (5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when he has attained a position of safety from theimmediate threat.'" People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 342, 362 N.E.2d 319, 323 (1977), quoting People v. Lovercamp,43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1974). All of these factors need not be present to establish necessity, and the absence of one or more does not necessarily prohibitthe assertion of the defense. Rather, these factors are most useful in assessing the weight and credibility of the defendant'sclaim. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d at 342, 362 N.E.2d at 323. The instant defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to present evidence to a jury on thedefense of necessity. After our careful review, we agree. Because there is very little information about the underlying forgery charge in the record, the defendant pleaded not guiltyto the charge, and the charge remained pending at the time of the instant trial, we are unable to conclude that the defendantwas to blame in occasioning or developing this situation. Further, the defendant has presented some evidence indicating thathe reasonably believed that his actions were necessary to avoid great injury. Specifically, the defendant testified that he received numerous threats of death and bodily harm from other prisoners in themonths leading up to his escape attempt. He said that he feared for his life every waking minute and believed that an attackwas imminent based upon the threats, gang activity, and level of hostility in Stateville. He testified that he made numerouscomplaints to DOC officials about the threats and assaults, but no action was ever taken to ensure his safety. The defendantadmitted that he never told the judge about the threats during his numerous court appearances on the forgery charge, butbased upon his knowledge of the procedures for complaints and grievances in the prison system, he believed that the judgecould have done nothing about the situation anyway. Further, the record shows that the defendant used minimal force in making his escape. Once recaptured within minutes ofhis escape, the defendant told Officer Timms that he had to make the escape because his life was threatened. The defendantstated that he had no intention of getting away, he just wanted to bring attention to his concerns for his own safety. In response, the State argues, inter alia, that as an inmate of the segregation unit at Stateville, the defendant is confined tohis cell 23 hours a day and has no cell mate, implying that there was no opportunity for the defendant to be threatened orharmed while incarcerated. However, the defendant testified that there were numerous opportunities for inmates to threatenand harm him as he walked past the cells and spent time in the library and prison yard. The State's assertions challenge theweight, credibility, and overall sufficiency of the evidence which are issues to be resolved when the evidence is presented attrial. See Unger, 66 Ill. 2d at 342, 362 N.E.2d at 323. After our careful review of the record, we determine that there was sufficient evidence to permit the defendant to proceed totrial with his claim of necessity. People v. Blake, 168 Ill. App. 3d 581, 587, 522 N.E.2d 822, 826 (1988) (even slightevidence of the defense is sufficient to make it an issue for the jury). Because the trial court erred in granting the State'smotion in limine, we reverse the defendant's conviction and sentence and remand the cause for a new trial. In light of our decision, we need not address the defendant's remaining argument regarding the trial court's denial of hismotion to represent himself at trial. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed and the cause is remanded for a newtrial. Reversed and remanded. SLATER, PJ., and HOLDRIDGE, J., concurred. |
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