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"knowingly exerted unauthorized control over the property of Indian Point Township, a body politic, said propertybeing certain checks and money of Indian Point Township, having a total value in excess of $100,000.00, in that saiddefendant knowingly used the aforesaid checks and money in such a manner so as to deprive Indian Point Townshippermanently of the use of said property ***."

The indictment does not allege any additional acts on the part of defendant. The State, nonetheless, cites People v.McLaurin, 184 Ill.2d 58, 703 N.E.2d 11 (1998), claiming that multiple convictions are appropriate because defendantcommitted multiple acts.

In McLaurin, the State alleged that the defendant entered the victim's home and set a fire, which led to the victim's death.184 Ill.2d at 104-105, 703 N.E.2d at 33. A jury convicted the defendant of several offenses, including intentional murderand home invasion. On appeal, the defendant argued that "his convictions for intentional murder and home invasionresulted from the same physical act, that is, the setting of the fire." The supreme court rejected this argument, explainingthat "the offense of home invasion involved an additional physical act of entering the dwelling of the victim." McLaurin,184 Ill.2d at 103-105, 703 N.E.2d at 32-33.

The crucial difference between McLaurin and the present case derives from the substance of the charging document in each.In McLaurin, the State alleged multiple physical acts, i.e. entering the victim's home and starting a fire which resulted indeath. 184 Ill.2d at 104-105, 703 N.E.2d at 33. By charging the defendant with the additional act of entering the victim'shome, the State was able to obtain an additional conviction for home invasion. McLaurin, 184 Ill.2d at 104-105, 703 N.E.2dat 33.

In this case, the State also charged defendant with separate crimes. However, both counts of the indictment are based on thesame act of converting "certain checks and money *** having a total value in excess of $100,000.00." Although the Stateclaims that defendant's knowledge of wrongdoing as a public official is an additional act, it constitutes neither a physicalact (see McLaurin, 184 Ill.2d at 104-105, 703 N.E.2d at 33) nor an overt or outward manifestation capable of supporting adifferent offense. See King, 66 Ill.2d at 566, 363 N.E.2d at 844-845. Accordingly, we reject the State's argument. SeePeople v. Arbo, 213 Ill. App.3d 828, 835, 572 N.E.2d 417, 422 (1991); People v. Hajostek, 49 Ill. App.3d at 151-152, 363N.E.2d at 1211. Defendant's conviction for official misconduct is vacated. See People v. Garcia, 179 Ill.2d 55, 71, 688N.E.2d 57, 64 (1997).

II.

Defendant further argues that his sentence for theft is excessive. He claims that his poor health, lack of criminal history,dedication to public service and rehabilitative potential require a lesser sentence.⁽¹⁾

A reviewing court will not engage in the reweighing of sentencing factors. People v. Streit, 142 Ill.2d 13, 19, 566 N.E.2d1351, 1353 (1991). We presume that the trial court considered all mitigating evidence before it, absent a contrary indicationother than the sentence. People v. Cagle, 277 Ill. App.3d 29, 32, 660 N.E.2d 548, 550 (1996). A sentence will not be alteredon review unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Cagle, 277 Ill. App.3d at 30, 660 N.E.2d at 549.

The sentencing range for defendant's theft conviction is four to fifteen years. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 1994). Thetrial court sentenced him to five years imprisonment. In sentencing defendant, the trial court considered defendant's lack ofcriminal record, time spent in public office and deteriorating health. The court specifically stated that but for defendant'spoor health, it may have considered imposing a stiffer sentence. Based on a review of the record, we cannot say thatdefendant's five year sentence is an abuse of discretion. Defendant's five year sentence for theft is affirmed.

Defendant's conviction for official misconduct is vacated. The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed inpart and vacated in part.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

SLATER, P.J., concurring, HOLDRIDGE, J., partially concurring/partially dissenting.

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in the majority's holding that defendant's sentence for theft was not excessive. However, I disagree with the findingthat defendant's conviction for official misconduct should be vacated and I dissent from that portion of this disposition.

Multiple convictions and concurrent sentences are allowed where, as here, the defendant commits several acts, despite theirinterrelationship. People v. McLaurin, 184 Ill.2d 58 (1998). The term "act" as the majority notes, includes "any overt oroutward manifestation which will support a different offense." People v. King, 66 Ill.2d 551, 566 (1977). Officialmisconduct and theft are separate offenses, with the defendant's knowledge of his wrongdoing as a public official incommitting theft being the additional "act" necessary support the charging of different offenses. People v. King, 66 Ill.2d551, 566 (1977).

As I find that the offenses of official misconduct and theft were separate, I would affirm the defendant's convictions forboth official misconduct and theft.

1. Defendant also contends that his sentence for official misconduct is excessive and that the trial court improperlyconsidered compensation as an aggravating factor in relation to the official misconduct conviction. However, we need notaddress these issues, since we have vacated defendant's conviction for official misconduct.