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No. 3-01-0120
Consolidated with No. 3-01-0745

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2002

FACTS

On November 26, 1999, defendant was charged by informationwith one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substancewith intent to deliver. Subsequently, the charge was amended tounlawful possession of a controlled substance, a Class IV felony. The indictment specifically alleged that defendant was inpossession of less than 15 grams of cocaine.

The evidence at trial showed that crack cocaine was found inthe defendant's apartment, to which he had sole access. Thedefendant had indicated to the police officer that there werecrumbs of cocaine on a table and had directed the officer to theexact location where the crack cocaine was found.

Defendant appeared on January 18, 2000, and he pled notguilty. The judge set March 16, 2000, as the date for defendantto enter a guilty plea. On that date, however, defendantpersisted in his not guilty plea and demanded a jury trial. Thejudge then set a guilty plea deadline of April 13, 2000.

On April 13, defendant appeared with counsel. He indicatedthat he had not accepted the plea offer from the State because hehoped to negotiate a lesser sentence. The trial judge gave thedefendant until the next day to think about the latest pleaoffer, which had been on the table since March. On April 14,defendant again indicated that he did not wish to accept theState's plea offer.

The jury trial commenced on April 19, 2000. Prior to juryselection, the judge had a hearing on defendant's motion inlimine with regard to his prior convictions and reserved rulingon the request for a "mere fact" presentation of the priorconvictions. At the end of the hearing, the jury was selected.

Before opening statements, defendant asked the judge why hewas eligible for an extended-term sentence. Defendant attemptedto plead guilty but the judge responded that although he wouldaccept an open plea, he was not going to accept any negotiatedpleas at that point because the jury had been selected, and hewas ready to proceed. The judge reminded defendant that he hadhad until April 14 to enter a negotiated plea and, in fact,suggested that defendant could have accepted the plea even a dayor two before trial commenced. It does not appear from therecord that the State had ever withdrawn the plea offer and noobjection was made to defendant's attempt to plead following juryselection.

The trial proceeded before the jury. At the end of theState's case, the judge ruled, with regard to the motion inlimine, that one of defendant's prior convictions for possessionof drugs with intent to deliver could be used for impeachment ifdefendant testified. Defendant then decided not to testify.

Defendant was found guilty of possession of the cocaine andon May 24, 2000, was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Thesentencing order was entered on June 6, 2000, and defendant fileda motion for reconsideration on July 5, 2000, which was denied. His subsequent pro se postconviction petition was dismissed onJanuary 11, 2001. Defendant appeals the conviction and thedismissal of his postconviction petition.

ANALYSIS

Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether thetrial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider aguilty plea solely because it was tendered after the deadline andafter jury selection on the morning of trial, (2) whether thismatter should be remanded for a new trial where the trial court'sdenial of defendant's request for the use of "mere fact" methodof impeachment by prior conviction was in error, and (3) whetherthe trial court's first-stage dismissal of defendant'spostconviction petition should be reversed because the enactmentof Public Act 83-942 (Public Act 83-942, effective, November 23,1983) violates the single subject rule of the IllinoisConstitution. The first issue raised is a matter within thesound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversedabsent a clear abuse of the court's discretion. See People v.Peterson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 38, 725 N.E.2d 1 (1999). Theremaining two issues have previously been addressed in othercases and rejected by this court, and we decline to revisit them.Refusal to Accept Guilty Plea Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretionby refusing to consider his guilty plea solely because hetendered it on the morning of trial after expiration of thecourt's deadline. He argues that it was an abuse of the trialjudge's discretion to refuse the guilty plea only on timelinessgrounds, without considering the merits of the negotiatedagreement.

It is well established that the trial judge is not obligatedto accept a guilty plea and that he may reject such a plea in theexercise of sound judicial discretion. Santobello v. New York,404 U.S. 257, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971); People v.Peterson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 38, 725 N.E.2d 1 (1999). A judge willbe deemed to have abused this discretion when a decisionregarding whether to accept a guilty plea is arbitrary, fanciful,unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the viewadopted by the trial court. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 743N.E.2d 126 (2000).

The defendant's argument centers around whether it is anabuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to even entertainhis guilty plea solely on the basis of the expiration of a court-imposed deadline. This is a question of first impression inIllinois, and in considering the issue, we have looked at howother jurisdictions have analyzed it.

There are two basic lines of authority on this issue. Statev. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 2001), provides a clear example ofone line of reasoning. In that case, the court held that it wasan abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to acceptdefendant's tender of a guilty plea solely on the basis oftimeliness. The court reasoned that a missed deadline alonewould not support a refusal to accept a guilty plea, but thatthere must be additional reasons. While the court did notelaborate on what the additional reasons must be, it did concludethat inflexible plea deadlines themselves eliminate the court'sexercise of discretion.

The refusal to consider the plea in Hager was premised onthe fact that it was tendered on the day of trial and the jurypool was already present. In reaching its decision, the Hagercourt also noted that "[a]t times, the very presence of a jury onthe morning of trial can engender a desire from the defendant toplead guilty that cannot be replicated at any prior time in theprocess. Thus, the jury's function to help resolve cases can beperformed at times by its mere presence on the morning of trial." Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 836.

The other line of authority is clearly explained in Peoplev. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807 (Colo. 2001). In that case, the courtheld that plea bargain cutoff deadlines may be enforced where theparties have actual notice of the court's practice and where thecourt permits exceptions for good cause. The Jasper courtreasoned that the plea deadlines are part of the court'smanagement authority and recognized that there is no absoluteright to have a guilty plea accepted. The court stated that

". . .the setting of deadlines for pretrial matters constitutesan integral part of the trial court's case management authority." Jasper, 17 P.3d at 811.

After careful consideration of both lines of cases, we findthe Hager court's reasoning more persuasive.

We are, however, not sure the refusal in this case wouldhave passed the limitations in Jasper either. We have found noevidence in the record that exceptions to deadlines are permittedfor good cause. We also note that the court's "policy" isunclear inasmuch as it was willing to deviate for an open plea,but not for one that was negotiated.

Certainly, the courts need to be able to manage theirdockets to maximize access and minimize costs. However,rejecting a guilty plea solely because it was not tendered beforethe court-imposed deadline does not seem to be in the bestinterests of justice or of public policy concerning resolution ofcases.

The only reason for strictly enforcing the deadline would besome attempt to manage the docket and conserve judicialresources. However, as noted by the Hager court, ". . .efficiency must always be compatible with fairness, and fairnessmust consider the fundamental principles which drive our systemof justice and the rights and liberties of each individual. There are many procedures courts could employ that would quicklyeliminate backlogs and enable our legal system to run with theefficiency of an assembly line, but they are not implementedbecause they would offend the principles fundamental to oursystem of justice." Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 835.

In addition, there is an interest in promoting settlement ofcases. Plea negotiations lead to the prompt and finaldisposition of many criminal cases. In addition, they give theState leverage in prosecuting crimes. Strictly enforcing court-imposed deadlines goes against these interests.

In this case, although the defendant had ample time toevaluate and accept the State's plea and he only delayed hisdecision hoping to negotiate a lesser sentence, the plea shouldhave been considered on its merits. According to the record, theonly reason given for the trial judge's strict enforcement of thedeadline was that the attempt to tender the plea was made afterthe jury had been selected.

As we have previously stated, however, the judge indicatedthat he would have accepted an open plea at that time. We cannotdiscern, and the State has not presented, any difference in addedcosts or taxing of resources that would justify addressing anopen plea and refusing to even consider one that has been fullynegotiated. Therefore, we find that the judge abused hisdiscretion in refusing to even consider the negotiated pleasolely on timeliness grounds.

We emphasize in stating our decision that we are not holdingthat defendant has a right to have a guilty plea accepted, evenwhen its terms are completely agreeable to defendant and to theState. Rather, we are holding that it is an abuse of discretionfor the court to refuse to exercise discretion in determiningwhether the plea should be accepted or rejected on its meritssimply because an arbitrary deadline has passed.

The remaining two issues have previously been addressed bythis court. We see no reason to revisit them at this time, andwe decline to do so.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the refusal of the court to considerthe defendant's plea based on timeliness alone was an abuse ofdiscretion and is reversed. This matter is remanded to the trialcourt for further proceedings.

I specially concur with the majority because the trial court'sactions indicate that it did not exercise its discretion inaccepting or refusing the plea. The dissent claims that we shouldnot disturb the trial court's exercise of his discretion, but thisclaim assumes that the court had exercised its discretion in thefirst place. When a judge draws a strict time line after which hewill not accept a guilty plea, it is an arbitrary, not adiscretionary, act. As the Hager court said, "a fixed pleadeadline is the very antithesis of discretionary decision making." State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Iowa 2001). If the trialjudge had listened to the terms of the plea and refused it on themerits, he would have been exercising his discretion. Because thecourt refused to hear the plea, we owe it no deference on thisissue.

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:

We cannot reverse the trial judge's decision unless he abusedhis discretion. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971); People v. Peterson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 38(1999). According to our supreme court, "[this] standard has beenrecognized as the most deferential standard of review availablewith the exception of no review at all. " People v. Coleman, 183Ill. 2d 366, 387 (1998), citing M. Davis, A Basic Guide toStandards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. Rev. 469, 480 (1988). Anabuse of discretion occurs only if the judge's decision isarbitrary, fanciful, or no reasonable person would agree with it. See People v. Hall, 195 Ill. App. 2d 1 (2000).

Yet the majority reasons that the judge's decision isreversible because it "does not seem to be in the best interests ofjustice or of public policy concerning resolution of cases." Wrongstandard. The majority rides the coattails of State v. Hager, 630N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 2001), without specifically explaining how thejudge's decision meets the true criteria for an abuse ofdiscretion. All the majority really explains is why it disagreeswith the judge's policy regarding negotiated guilty pleas. Butsuch disagreement hardly signals an abuse of discretion. Reasonable minds can differ on this issue, as evidenced by the lineof cases upholding rejections of guilty pleas on timelinessgrounds. See United States v. Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir.1991); People v. Cobb, 139 Cal. App. 3d 578 (1983); People v.Jasper, 17 P.3d 807 (Colo. 2001); People v. Grove, 566 N.W.2d 547(Mich. 1997); and State v. Brimage, 638 A.2d 904 (N.J. 1994). Bythe very definition of the standard, an abuse of discretion cannotexist under such circumstances.

Docket management is a legitimate concern resting within atrial judge's sound discretion. In the instant case, the judgesaid he had a policy of not accepting negotiated pleas aftercommencement of trial proceedings. His policy was geared towardconserving judicial time and resources. I realize that the judgecould have saved the time and expense of a trial by acceptingHenderson's plea. However, Henderson caused the State to expendresources for selection of a jury that was never used. This factdistinguishes the instant case from Hager, where the defendanttendered his plea before jury selection. Henderson's disregard forthe court's rules caused a waste that was missing in Hager. Bytaking a stand, the judge sent a message calculated to inhibit suchwaste in the future. He also attempted to foster respect forrules. Lack of such respect is what causes a need for guilty pleasin the first place.

These concerns explain why--in the exercise of his sounddiscretion--the judge decided to reject Henderson's guilty plea. The majority's assertion that the judge failed to even initiate anexercise of his discretion is conclusory at best. Also misplacedis the majority's focus on how the judge apparently would havehandled an untimely open plea. Regardless of that hypotheticaloutcome, the judge's decision to reject Henderson's negotiated pleais simply not reversible unless it fails the abuse of discretionstandard.

Although persons may disagree on the soundness of the judge'sapproach, how can the majority believe that no reasonable personwould agree it? How do the judge's actions satisfy the definitionsof arbitrary and fanciful? The majority has not satisfactorilyexplained how, and I do not believe it can. I thus dissent.