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The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether defendant,Harold Carroll, was in custody, and therefore entitled to Mirandawarnings, at the time he gave a taped confession. The Stateappeals from the trial court's order granting defendant's motion tosuppress the confession. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. In so doing, we hold: (1) the proper test for determining whetheran accused is in custody for purposes of Miranda is objective,i.e., whether a reasonable person in the accused's position wouldconsider himself to be in custody; and (2) a reasonable person indefendant's position would have considered himself to be incustody.

Defendant was charged by indictment with murdering hisbrother, Connie Carroll. Prior to trial, defendant moved tosuppress certain oral statements and the taped confession. A briefsummary of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing is asfollows:

In June of 1998, Rock Island police received information fromdefendant's family members that defendant had implicated himself inthe death of Connie Carroll which occurred in 1962. The deceasedwas found dead in his car which was parked with the motor runningin the family's garage. The garage door was closed.

On September 10, 1998, Rock Island police officers MichaelNoon and David Sullivan (officers) traveled to Quincy, Illinois, tothe elderly care facility at which defendant resided. Defendantagreed to the officers' request to accompany them to the QuincyPolice Department (department). The officers informed defendantthat he was not under arrest, nor in custody, and that he was freeto leave at any time.

The officers then took defendant to the department in anunmarked squad car. Defendant sat, unhandcuffed, in the back seatwith the doors unlocked. Upon arriving at the department, theofficers led defendant through the main personnel room, which hasa door with an automatic lock, and into an 8' by 12' interview roomwith no windows.

Once inside the interview room, the officers again tolddefendant that he was not under arrest and that he was free toleave at any time. The officers then began questioning defendantconcerning his brother's death. At no time did the officers informdefendant of his Miranda rights. During the course of theinterview, defendant made four different statements. First,defendant stated that he thought he had been taken to thedepartment as a result of his ongoing separation from his wife and,specifically regarding the officers' questions, that he would neverhave injured his brother. Second, defendant stated that he and hisbrother had quarreled on the night he died and that his brother hadbeaten him. Third, defendant stated that he struck his brother andleft him in the garage and that someone else must have shut thedoor.

Each one of these first three statements was met withincredulity by the officers. Finally, defendant stated that hestruck his brother, started the car and closed the garage door. This initial interview lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes.

Following defendant's admission, the officers asked defendantto provide a taped statement. They again informed defendant thathe was not under arrest, nor in custody, and that he was free toleave at any time. The officers did not inform defendant of hisMiranda rights. A taped statement was then taken from defendantconcerning his involvement in his brother's death. Afterwards,defendant was photographed and taken back to his residence.

Dr. Eric Ritterhoff and Dr. Kirk Witherspoon testified onbehalf of defendant. Each physician found that defendant was verysusceptible to suggestion. Dr. Witherspoon further stated thatdefendant was mildly to moderately retarded and that he wouldquestion the reliability of any confession given by him. Defendantdid not testify at the hearing.

At the close of evidence, the trial court articulated the twoissues presented for consideration: (1) whether defendant was incustody; and (2) whether defendant's statements were voluntary. The court found that defendant was not in custody when he gave hisfour oral statements. The court further found that all ofdefendant's statements had been voluntary. Thus, the court did notsuppress defendant's oral statements. However, the court foundthat, following the fourth statement, defendant should have beeninformed of his Miranda rights because, upon admitting to the crimeof murder, a reasonable person would believe that he was incustody. Accordingly, the court suppressed defendant's tapedconfession.

The State filed a certificate of impairment pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) and nowappeals the suppression of the tape. The trial court's decision ona motion to suppress will not be reversed unless it is manifestlyerroneous. People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 675 N.E.2d 910 (1996).

A suspect's entitlement to Miranda warnings is triggered whenshe is subjected to custodial interrogation. People v. Melock, 149Ill. 2d 423, 439, 599 N.E.2d 941, 948 (1992). When determiningwhether an interrogation is custodial, a court must consider all ofthe circumstances surrounding the questioning, such as: (1) thetime, place, length, mood and mode of interrogation; (2) the numberof police officers present; (3) any indicia of arrest or evidenceof restraint; and (4) the extent of knowledge of the officers andthe focus of their investigation. People v. Brown, 136 Ill. 2d 116,124-25, 554 N.E.2d 216, 220 (1990). While examining these factors,along with the credibility of the witnesses, the court must make anobjective determination as to what a reasonable person, innocent ofany crime, would perceive if he were in defendant's position.People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 417-18, 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1009(1989).

Contrary to this precedent, the State initially argues thatdefendant's subjective belief is somehow relevant in determiningwhether the interrogation was custodial. Noting that defendant didnot testify at his suppression hearing, the State maintains that hewas required to produce affirmative evidence that he believed hewas in custody in order to trigger the protections afforded byMiranda. This proposition is supported by a line of at least threefourth district cases: People v. Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d 461, 565N.E.2d 1349 (1991); People v. Goyer, 265 Ill. App. 3d 160, 638N.E.2d 390 (1994); and People v. Lewis, 269 Ill. App. 3d 523, 646N.E.2d 305 (1995). However, we reject the subjective test proposedby these cases as it contradicts the vast majority of legalprecedent and other authority which states that the test forcustody is strictly an objective one. See, e.g., People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 440, 599 N.E.2d 941, 948 (1992)(the courtexpressed its continued agreement with the use of the objectivetest); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 319-22, 128L. Ed. 2d 293, 296-98, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1527-29 (1994)(the initialdetermination of custody depends on the objective circumstances ofthe interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by eitherthe interrogating officers or the person being questioned); seealso People v. Holmes, 255 Ill. App. 3d 271, 284, 626 N.E.2d 412,422 (1994)(specifically rejecting a subjective test in favor of theobjective test); see also 2 R. Steigmann, Illinois Evidence Manual