People v. Blair
Case Date: 04/24/2001
Court: 3rd District Appellate
Docket No: 3-99-0925 Rel
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April 24, 2001
JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court: After a stipulated bench trial, defendant, Gary L. Blair,was convicted of 16 counts of possessing child pornography (720ILCS 5/11--20.1(a)(6) (West 1992)). On appeal, defendantcontends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, we reverse defendant's convictionsoutright. At the outset, we acknowledge that defendant raises otherclaims of error. However, in light of our disposition ofdefendant's claim concerning the denial of his motion tosuppress, it is unnecessary for us to address the other issues heraises and we decline to do so. On the afternoon of July 14, 1998, deputy sheriffs from theRock Island County Sheriff's Department placed defendant underarrest for disorderly conduct in connection with his videotapingchildren at Niabi Zoo. Later that day, while defendant remainedin custody, deputy sheriffs Steven Dean and Jeffrey Chrisholmtraveled to defendant's residence in Whiteside County. At the residence, they were greeted by Howard Blair,defendant's father. Dean and Chrisholm identified themselves aspolice officers, informed Blair about his son's arrest, and askedto come in to speak to Blair about his son. Once inside, Deanand Chrisholm asked if they might look at defendant's belongings. Blair gave permission but informed the officers that defendant'sbedroom was locked and that he did not have a key to the room. Blair also noted that he lacked a key to certain lockers owned bydefendant that were located in the basement. The search eventually led to a small room in the basementwhere the officers came upon a computer. Blair informed theofficers that the computer belonged to his son. At the hearingon defendant's motion to suppress, Blair testified that he had noownership interest of any kind in his son's computer. DeputySheriff Chrisholm turned on the computer. Dean testified that itwas his belief that Chrisholm asked Blair's permission toactivate the computer. However, in their testimony, both Blairand Chrisholm denied that any such permission was requested orobtained. At the suppression hearing, Chrisholm described hissubsequent actions in the following manner: "I *** went to the area where the internet was andI went to the tool bar on the top which showed favoredbookmarks and I went down favored [bookmarks] and Iclicked that area on. Upon clicking that area on I sawnumerous references to teenagers and so forth whichmade me believe that there was [sic] some items in thecomputer which contained some types of childpornography." Dean and Chrisholm then seized the computer. The elder Blair didnot recall the officers asking permission to remove the computer,but conceded that his memory of the event was not good. Dean,Chrisholm, and another police officer who had arrived on thescene, all testified that Blair gave them permission to take thecomputer. A subsequent search of the computer revealed the presence of16 files capable of displaying a video or still image depictingeither a lewd exhibition of a minor or a minor engaged in asexual act. As a result, defendant was charged by informationwith 16 counts of possessing child pornography. In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial courtfound that Howard Blair had given valid consent to search thecommon areas of the residence he shared with his son and that hisgeneral consent extended to permission to activate his son'scomputer and inspect its contents. The trial court also foundthat Blair had the requisite authority to consent to a seizure ofthe computer. After the trial court's ruling, defendant agreedto a stipulated bench trial but specifically reserved his rightto appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Our federal and state constitutions guarantee the right tobe free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.,amends. IV, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, |
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