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The defendant, Simon Barash, was charged with cannabistrafficking (720 ILCS 550/5.1 (West 2000)) and unlawfulpossession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(g)(West 2000)). He filed a motion to bar prosecution and dismissthe indictment based on constitutional and statutory grounds ofdouble jeopardy. The motion was denied, and the defendant filedan interlocutory appeal alleging that the Illinois prosecution isbarred under section 13(b) of the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS550/13(b) (West 2000)). After our careful review, we reverse.

On December 19, 1998, the defendant was driving a blackCadillac eastbound on Interstate 80 through Bureau County. Atapproximately 5:38 p.m., Illinois State Police Master SergeantJohn Balma attempted to pull over the car driven by the defendantas well as a green Cadillac traveling in front of the defendant'scar because he believed the vehicles were obstructing traffic. Both the defendant's black Cadillac and the green Cadillac hadMichigan license plates and were registered to the sameindividual. Both cars pulled over to the side of the highway,but the defendant pulled back onto the highway after Balma pulledin front of his car and approached the green Cadillac only. WhenBalma saw the defendant pull back onto the highway, he radioedheadquarters to look out for the defendant's car because hebelieved the defendant had purposely fled the traffic stop.

Subsequent to the traffic stop, Balma conducted a search ofthe green Cadillac and found 260 to 270 pounds of marijuana inthe trunk. The driver of the green Cadillac, Russell Diehl,allegedly told Balma that the defendant was a friend of his. After transporting Diehl and the green Cadillac to the IllinoisState Police District 17 Headquarters, Balma and State TrooperMichael Ross went to look for the defendant's car.

Approximately an hour and a half after the initial stop, thedefendant's car was pulled over by State Trooper Jeff Grey onInterstate 80, approximately 24 miles from where the car wasoriginally pulled over by Balma. The defendant and hispassenger, Pricilla Tipton, produced identification when theywere asked to do so by Grey. Grey then reported to districtheadquarters that he had stopped the defendant's car. AfterBalma and Ross arrived at the scene, the defendant and Tiptonwere placed in Grey's squad car and driven to District 17Headquarters.

Ross drove the defendant's car to district headquarterswhere an inventory search was performed. No drugs were found inthe car. A white envelope was found in the glove box, whichcontained a cellular phone number belonging to the driver of thegreen Cadillac.

At district headquarters, members of the District 17 DrugTask Force interviewed the defendant and the other individuals incustody. After the defendant was questioned, Ross transportedthe defendant and Tipton to the Bureau County jail, where theyspent the weekend.

The Bureau County State's Attorney filed charges against thedefendant for cannabis trafficking on the following Monday, butthose charges were dismissed on the same day. After the chargeswere dismissed, the defendant and Tipton were taken to District17 State Police Headquarters, where the defendant was interviewedby Inspector Girton and Inspector Lawson of the Drug Task Force.

The next day, the defendant called Inspector Girton,requesting a ride to the airport. After Girton drove thedefendant to the bank to cash some checks, Inspector Lawson askedfor a tape recorded statement from the defendant. The defendantagreed and gave a tape recorded statement at District 17Headquarters. Following that statement, Lawson and Girton drovethe defendant and Tipton to Midway Airport.

Nine months later, the Attorney General's office presentedthe defendant's case before a statewide grand jury. The grandjury returned a two-count indictment against the defendant forthe offenses of cannabis trafficking and unlawful possession ofcannabis with intent to deliver.

On January 27, 2000, an Arizona grand jury returned amultiple-count indictment against many individuals, including thedefendant. On November 29, 2000, the defendant pled guilty inArizona to count I of the indictment, illegally conducting anenterprise, a Class 3 felony. The factual basis for the pleaconsisted of the events that occurred on December 19, 1998, inwhich the defendant admitted participating in transporting 260 to270 pounds of marijuana into Illinois for the purpose of sellingit in Michigan.

On December 14, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to barprosecution in Illinois and to dismiss the indictment based onconstitutional and statutory double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant filed an interlocutoryappeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(f) (188 Ill. 2d R.604(f)).

The defendant's sole contention is that his prosecution inIllinois for cannabis trafficking and possession of cannabis withthe intent to deliver is barred because of his prior convictionof illegally conducting an enterprise in Arizona. In support ofhis argument, the defendant relies on section 13(b) of theCannabis Control Act, which states, "A conviction or acquittal,under the laws of the United States or of any State relating toCannabis for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this State." 720 ILCS 550/13(b) (West 2000). Resolution of this issuerequires us to determine whether the defendant (1) was convicted,(2) of a cannabis-related offense, (3) for the same actprosecuted in Illinois.

We find that the defendant's guilty plea in Arizona is aconviction under Arizona law. See State v. Superior Court, 138Ariz. 4, 6, 672 P.2d 956, 958 (1983) (explaining that"conviction" means the time when the person has been found guiltyor has pled guilty even though there has been no sentence orjudgment entered by the court). We further find that thedefendant's conviction relates to cannabis because the defendantpled guilty to illegally conducting an enterprise based on hisacts of possessing and trafficking marijuana. Consequently, theonly issue remaining is whether the defendant's conviction inArizona involved the same act as the charges for which thedefendant was indicted in Illinois.

The decision in this case hinges on the interpretation ofsection 13(b) of the Cannabis Control Act. Since statutoryconstruction is a question of law, this court will conduct a denovo review. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 21, 743 N.E.2d 126,138 (2000).

In order for section 13(b) of the Cannabis Control Act toserve as a bar to the defendant's prosecution in Illinois, thedefendant's Arizona conviction must have been for the "same act"as the charges brought against the defendant in Illinois. 720ILCS 550/13(b) (West 2000). The State contends that the Arizonaconviction and Illinois crimes are not for the same act becausedifferent elements must be proven for those crimes. Thedefendant does not dispute that the crimes involve differentelements but argues that the conviction in Arizona and thecharges in Illinois are based on the same act of possessing andtrafficking marijuana in Illinois.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertainand give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v.Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483, 487, 739 N.E.2d 493, 495 (2000). Thebest evidence of legislative intent is the language used in thestatute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinarymeaning. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d at 487, 739 N.E.2d at 495. Adictionary may be used as a resource to determine the ordinaryand commonly accepted meaning of words. Melliere v. LuhrBrothers, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d 794, 797, 706 N.E.2d 40, 42(1999). Black's Law Dictionary defines "same" as "[i]dentical,equal, equivalent" and defines "act" as "a performance" or "adeed." Black's Law Dictionary 25, 1340 (6th ed. 1990). Based onthese definitions, if the defendant's conviction in Arizona isfor the identical deed with which the defendant was charged inIllinois, the Illinois charges cannot stand.

The intent of the legislature in enacting section 13(b) ofthe Cannabis Control Act can be further ascertained by examiningthis court's interpretation of a parallel provision in theControlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2000)). See People ex. rel Power v. One 1979 Chevrolet Camaro, 96 Ill.App. 3d 109, 420 N.E.2d 770 (1981). Section 409 of theControlled Substances Act provides in part, "a conviction oracquittal, under the laws of the United States or of any Staterelating to controlled substances, for the same act is a bar toprosecution in this State." 720 ILCS 570/409 (West 2000). Indiscussing section 409 of the Controlled Substances Act, thiscourt explained that the objective of that provision was toprevent multiple criminal drug prosecutions against an accused inIllinois based upon the "same criminal conduct for which theaccused had already been convicted or acquitted in either aFederal or other sister State court." One 1979 Chevrolet Camaro,96 Ill. App. 3d at 112, 420 N.E.2d at 772. Because the languageof section 13(b) of the Cannabis Control Act is nearly identicalto that of section 409 of the Controlled Substances Act, thecourt's reasoning in One 1979 Chevrolet Camaro is applicablehere. As section 409 of the Controlled Substances Act seeks toprevent multiple drug prosecutions against an accused based onthe same criminal conduct, section 13(b) of the Cannabis ControlAct seeks to prevent multiple prosecutions of a defendant forcannabis based on the defendant's same criminal conduct.

Comparison of the Illinois double jeopardy statute andsection 13(b) of the Cannabis Control Act also reveals theweakness of the State's claim that the same elements must bepresent in the crime charged and the crime formerly prosecuted. See 720 ILCS 5/3--4(c) (West 2000). Section 3--4(c) of theCriminal Code of 1961 (Code) states that a prosecution is barredif the former prosecution "[r]esulted in either a conviction oracquittal, and the subsequent prosecution is for the sameconduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact notrequired in the other prosecution, or the offense was notconsummated when the former trial began." (Emphasis added.) 720ILCS 5/3--4(c) (West 2000). On its face, section 3--4(c) of theCode bars prosecution for a subsequent crime arising out of thedefendant's same conduct only if the former crime shares the sameelements as the subsequent crime. Section 13(b) of the CannabisControl Act, on the other hand, does not contain such restrictivelanguage. If the legislature had intended section 13(b) of theCannabis Control Act to be as restrictive as section 3--4(c) ofthe Code, the legislature would have so provided. See People v.Woods, 193 Ill. 2d at 487, 739 N.E.2d at 495 (explaining that thebest evidence of legislative intent is the language used in thestatute itself). When reviewing a statute, a court is limited byrules of statutory construction and cannot add words to a statuteor change its meaning, nor can a statute be construed so as tointerject provisions not found in the statute no matter howdesirable or beneficial they may be. One 1979 Chevrolet Camaro,96 Ill. App. 3d at 111, 420 N.E.2d at 772.

Based on the language of section 13(b) of the CannabisControl Act, it is not necessary for us to determine if the crimethe defendant committed in Arizona contains exactly the sameelements as the crimes for which he was indicted in Illinois. All that is necessary is to determine whether the defendant'sconviction in Arizona was for the same acts for which he ischarged in Illinois. Based on the factual basis of thedefendant's guilty plea in Arizona, the acts serving as the basisfor the Arizona conviction and the Illinois charges are the same. The factual basis for the defendant's plea of guilty in Arizonais as follows:

"MR. DEBUS [defense counsel]: That on December18th [sic], of 1998, some time around 5:30 p.m., Mr.Barash was traveling in a lead car. A Russell Diehlwas traveling in the following car, I think it's kindof typical in some of these situations. Mr. Diehl, Ithink D-i-e-h-l, was stopped by an Illinois StateTrooper, they were on Highway 80, Mr. Balma, B-a-l-m-a,his car was searched and 260 -- 270 pounds of marijuanawas found.

Mr. Barash left the scene, was not apprehended atthat time, was later apprehended. The marijuana was,marijuana that Mr. Barash knew about, and wascooperating in the transporting of it by being the leadcar with Mr. Diehl being the following car.

It was that particular transaction that was partof a greater conspiracy over the time period describedin this count with Mr. Diehl, and that's one event thatwe believe is sufficient for a factual basis for thecharge of Count 1, illegally conducting an enterprise.

THE COURT: In other words, during this period oftime there was an enterprise ongoing which was totransport marijuana from Arizona back to Michigan, as Iunderstand, to Illinois, is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That's correct.

THE COURT: You and Mr. Debus outlined one suchevent in that enterprise where you were in the leadcar; was that all true?

THE DEFENDANT: That is true, was true, other thanI was actually driving behind Mr. Diehl.

THE COURT: All right. But the idea, both of youwere together in transporting the marijuana?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Where were you stopped?

THE DEFENDANT: On Interstate 80. I'm not exactly-- it was in a county called Burrow [sic] County.

MR. DEBUS: In Illinois.

THE COURT: In Illinois. All right. The marijuanacame from Arizona?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, the marijuana came up inArizona.

* * *

THE COURT: The marijuana was going to be sold?

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

THE COURT: Money made on this transaction?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, yes there was, Your Honor."

As the factual basis reflects, the defendant's guilty pleain Arizona for illegally conducting an enterprise was based onthe same acts for which the defendant was charged with cannabistrafficking and unlawful possession of cannabis with the intentto deliver in Illinois. The Illinois charge of cannabistrafficking requires that the defendant knowingly caused morethan 2,500 grams of cannabis to be brought into the State ofIllinois with intent to deliver the cannabis in this or any otherstate. 720 ILCS 550/5.1 (West 2000). The crime of unlawfulpossession of cannabis with intent to deliver requires that thedefendant knowingly possessed more than 5,000 grams of cannabiswith the intent to deliver. 720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West 2000). Thedefendant's guilty plea in Arizona is based specifically on theacts of the defendant (1) knowingly possessing and causing (2)260 to 270 pounds of cannabis (over 5,000 grams) (3) to bebrought into Illinois (4) with the intent to deliver it inMichigan (another state). Those acts are the same acts for whichIllinois is seeking to prosecute the defendant.

Because the Arizona conviction was based on the same actswith which the defendant was charged in Illinois, his prosecutionin Illinois is barred by section 13(b) of the Cannabis ControlAct. Consequently, the judgment of the circuit court of BureauCounty is reversed.

Reversed.

LYTTON and McDADE, J.J., concurred.