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No. 3--03--0821

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2004

The plaintiff, the Director of the Department of Corrections(DOC), sued the defendant, Lonnie Booth, an inmate in the DOC, torecover the costs of the defendant's incarceration. The circuitcourt judge entered an order for summary judgment in favor of theplaintiff for $40,656.89 plus costs, but held that section 12--1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12--1001(h)(4) (West 2002)) exempted $7,500 from the award. Theplaintiff appeals, contending that the exemption should not applyin this case. We affirm.

The defendant was incarcerated in April 2001. In May 2001,he received a settlement from personal injury litigation in theamount of $41,715.57 after attorney fees and costs.

In January 2003, the plaintiff filed suit against thedefendant, seeking to recover $40,656.89 as reimbursement for thecost of the defendant's incarceration. After the defendantfailed to appear at a hearing on a motion for attachment, thecircuit court entered an order in favor of the plaintiff for$40,656.89. In response, the defendant moved for declaratoryjudgment, contending that his settlement money was exempt undersection 12--1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Theplaintiff moved for summary judgment, contending that no materialfacts were in dispute and that the plaintiff had a statutoryright to reimbursement pursuant to section 3--7--6 of the UnifiedCode of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3--7--6 (West 2002)).

The circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion and enteredjudgment for $40,656.89, but held that section 12--1001(h)(4)exempted $7,500 from the award. The plaintiff appeals,contending that section 3--7--6 does not provide for anyexemptions to DOC suits for recovery of incarceration costs.

This case presents an issue of statutory construction. Whenconstruing a statute, we are to determine and give effect to thelegislature's intent. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667N.E.2d 1305 (1996). In doing so, we look to the plain languageof the statute; if the statute's plain meaning is clear andunambiguous, we are to apply the statute without using furthertools of statutory construction. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667N.E.2d 1305. Because statutory construction is a question oflaw, we review the circuit court's order de novo. Robinson, 172Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305.

Initially, we note that the defendant did not file anappellee's brief with this court. Generally, we will not act asan advocate for an appellee who fails to file a brief. See FirstCapitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d128, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). However, when a record is simple andthe claimed error can easily be decided without the aid of anappellee's brief, we should decide the appeal's merits. FirstCapitol Mortgage Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493. Webelieve we can decide the merits of this appeal without the aidof an appellee's brief.

Section 3--7--6(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730ILCS 5/3--7--6(a) (West 2002)) provides that inmates shall beresponsible to the DOC for the cost of their incarceration. Section 3--7--6(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS5/3--7--6(d) (West 2002)) provides that, upon authorization fromthe Director of the DOC, the Attorney General can instituteproceedings to reach an inmate's assets in order to cover thecost of incarceration. Assets are defined as:

"[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, real orpersonal, belonging to or due to a committed or formerlycommitted person including income or payments to the personfrom social security, worker's compensation, veteran'scompensation, pension benefits, or from any other sourcewhatsoever and any and all assets and property of whatevercharacter held in the name of the person, held for thebenefit of the person, or payable or otherwise deliverableto the person. Any trust, or portion of a trust, of which aconvicted person is a beneficiary, shall be construed as anasset of the person, to the extent that benefits thereunderare required to be paid to the person, or shall in fact bepaid to the person. At the time of a legal proceeding bythe Attorney General under this Section, if it appears thatthe committed person has any assets which ought to besubjected to the claim of the Department under this Section,the court may issue an order requiring any person,corporation, or other legal entity possessed or havingcustody of those assets to appropriate any of the assets ora portion thereof toward reimbursing the Department asprovided for under this Section. No provision of thisSection shall be construed in violation of any State orfederal limitation on the collection of money judgments." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3--7--6(e)(3) (West 2002)).

Furthermore, section 4--101(11) of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/4--101(11) (West 2002)) provides that theAttorney General may attach the property of an inmate in casesbrought under section 3--7--6 of the Unified Code of Corrections. An exemption exists, however, for an amount no greater than$7,500 from a payment received by the debtor due to personalbodily injury. 735 ILCS 5/12--1001(h)(4) (West 2002).

The plaintiff contends that the last sentence in sSection 3--7--6(e)(3) means that denying an exemption, such as the one insection 12--1001(h)(4), in cases involving the attachment ofprisoner assets does not violate any state or federal statute. The plaintiff essentially argues that section 3--7--6(e)(3)authorizes the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General toreach as far as possible into prisoners' assets because thenormal restrictions on attachments do not apply to prisoners. Wedo not believe the legislature intended this reading of section3--7--6(e)(3).

The plain language of section 3--7--6(e)(3) does indeedauthorize the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General toreach far into prisoners' assets; however, the last sentenceforbids the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General fromviolating any state or federal law limiting a creditor's abilityto collect in the process. Because the exemption in section 12--1001(h)(4) clearly applies to the defendant's personal injurysettlement award, and because section 3--7--6(e)(3) clearlyrequires that the Attorney General honor such exemptions, wedecline to construe section 3--7--6(e)(3) as denying prisonersthe protections afforded to debtors in section 12--1001(h)(4). We therefore hold that the circuit court properly construedsection 3--7--6(e)(3) when it applied the section 12--1001(h)(4)exemption in the case below.

The plaintiff also argues that a tool of statutoryconstruction--when two statutes deal with a similar legal issue,the more specific statute controls--mandates that we vacate theportion of the circuit court's order exempting $7,500 from theaward. Because the plain language of section 3--7--6(e)(3) isclear and unambiguous, we need not resort to further tools ofstatutory construction and we need not consider this argument. See Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305.

The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

O'BRIEN and BARRY, JJ., concur.