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December 7, 2001

FACTS

On April 26, 1998, Terrell was a passenger in a vehicle drivenby Penrod but owned by Roberson. Penrod, who had becomeintoxicated at Kingsway, lost control of the vehicle and drove thewrong way on Interstate 74 in Tazewell County, Illinois. Thevehicle crashed into the wall of a bridge, flipped over the bridge,and fell to the street below, killing Terrell instantly. At thetime of her death, Terrell was survived by one adult and two minorchildren, all of whom lived with her.

The estate filed an action for wrongful death against Penrod,Roberson, Kingsway, and Cole Mine Tavern. Its complaint allegedthat Terrell's death was caused by the negligence of Penrod andRoberson and that Kingsway and Cole Mine Tavern violated the Act byselling the liquor to Penrod that caused his intoxication. Eventually, the action was settled as to Penrod and Roberson. Because the parties stipulated at a bench trial that Cole MineTavern was not the cause of Penrod's intoxication, it was dismissedwith prejudice. Kingsway remained as the only defendant.

As to Kingsway, the trial court concluded that the estatecould not bring its loss of society claim against it because theLiquor Control Act did not provide that cause of action forinjuries sustained prior to July 1, 1998. As a result, the courtawarded the estate $5,198.00 for Terrell's funeral and burialexpenses. On March 9, 2001, the estate filed its notice of appeal. Three days later, Kingsway filed a posttrial motion, requestingthat the court set off all of the damages because the settlementwith Penrod included damages for Terrell's funeral and burialexpenses. The trial court granted Kingsway's motion, reducing itsaward to zero.

ANALYSIS

The issue on appeal is whether the court erred in determiningthat the Liquor Control Act bars the estate's loss of society claimagainst Kingsway. This court reviews questions of statutoryconstruction de novo. Babbitt v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 212Ill. App. 3d 204, 571 N.E.2d 506 (1991).

Before addressing the substance of this issue, however, wefirst must consider Kingsway's claim that this court lacksjurisdiction over this appeal. Kingsway asserts that under SupremeCourt Rule 302(a)(2) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2)), its filing of aposttrial motion after the estate filed its notice of appealprecludes this court's jurisdiction.

Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2))provides in relevant part:

"When a timely post-judgment motion hasbeen filed by any party, whether in a jurycase or a nonjury case, a notice of appealfiled before the entry of the order disposingof the last pending post-judgment motion shallhave no effect and shall be withdrawn by theparty who filed it, by moving for dismissalpursuant to Rule 309. This is so whether thetimely post-judgment motion was filed beforeor after the date on which the notice ofappeal was filed. A new notice of appeal mustbe filed within the prescribed time measuredfrom the entry of the order disposing of thepost-judgment motion, as provided insubparagraph (a)(1) of this rule."

To qualify as a posttrial motion under Rule 303(a)(2), the motionmust request one of the statutorily authorized types of relief,consisting of rehearing, retrial, modification, or vacation of thejudgment. Giammanco v. Giammanco, 253 Ill. App. 3d 750, 625 N.E.2d990 (1993). Even if the motion requests the court to modify thejudgment, it must be "directed against the judgment" in order toconstitute a posttrial motion for Rule 303 purposes. Giammanco, 253Ill. App. 3d at 755, 625 N.E.2d at 995.

In Star Charters v. Figueroa, 192 Ill. 2d 47, 733 N.E.2d 1282(2000), our supreme court considered whether a request for a setoffmust be filed within the statutory 30-day time limit after entry ofjudgment applicable to posttrial motions. The court found that arequest by a defendant for a setoff to reflect the amounts paid bysettling defendants seeks to satisfy, not to modify, the judgmententered by the trial court. Figueroa, 192 Ill. 2d at 48, 733 N.E.2dat 1283. According to Figueroa, a request for setoff is more akinto a supplementary or enforcement proceeding, which is within thecourt's inherent powers, than an issue arising as a result oftrial. Figueroa, 192 Ill. 2d at 49, 733 N.E.2d at 1283.

Based on the reasoning set forth in Figueroa, we hold thatthis court has jurisdiction because Kingsway's motion for a setoffdoes not constitute a modification of the judgment which isdirected against the verdict. Instead, the motion for setoff seeksto satisfy the judgment entered by the trial court. BecauseKingsway's request for a setoff did not constitute a posttrialmotion that was directed against the verdict, Supreme Court Rule303(a)(2) was not applicable, and the estate did not have towithdraw its notice of appeal and refile.

With the jurisdictional issue decided, we turn to the issue ofwhether the Liquor Control Act bars the estate's claim for loss ofsociety. The estate argues that the trial court erred inconcluding that the Act does not provide a cause of action for lossof society for occurrences prior to July 1, 1998. Instead, itsuggests that the Act was amended to set a cap on damages for lossof society claims stemming from incidents after that date. Whilethe estate advances other arguments in the alternative, since weare persuaded by the estate's claim under the Act, we will addressonly that argument.

Section 21 of the Act provides in pertinent part:

"For all causes of action involving personsinjured, killed, or incurring property damageafter September 12, 1985 but before July 1,1998, in no event shall the judgment orrecovery for injury to the person or propertyof any person exceed $30,000 for each personincurring damages, and recovery under this Actfor loss of means of support resulting fromthe death or injury of any person shall notexceed $40,000. For all causes of actioninvolving persons injured, killed, orincurring property damage on or after July 1,1998, in no event shall the judgment orrecovery for injury to person or property ofany person exceed $45,000 for each personincurring damages, and recovery under this Actfor either loss of means of support or loss ofsociety resulting from the death or injury ofany person shall not exceed $55,000." 235ILCS 5/6-21 (West 2000).

The fundamental principles in construing a statute arewell settled. Above all other rules of statutoryconstruction, this court must ascertain and give effect to thelegislature's intent in enacting the statute. Bruso v. AlexianBrothers Hospital, 178 Ill. 2d 445, 687 N.E.2d 1014 (1997). The legislature's intent is best demonstrated by the languageof the statute itself. Bonaguro v. County Officers ElectoralBoard, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994). If thelegislature's intent is clear from the statute's plainlanguage, the court must confine its inquiry to aconsideration of that language and must not look to extrinsicaids. Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d230, 664 N.E.2d 61 (1996). Where the language of a statute isambiguous, a court may resort to other means of statutoryinterpretation, such as legislative history, in order todetermine the legislature's intent. Armstrong v. HedlundCorp., 316 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 738 N.E.2d 163 (2000).

We hold that the language of section 6-21 of the LiquorControl Act creates a cause of action for loss of society thatwas effective at the time Terrell lost her life. Our holdingon this issue is one dictated by the statute's plain language. The Act did not always include a cause of action for loss ofsociety. See Farmers State Bank & Trust Co. v. Lahey'sLounge, Inc., 165 Ill. App. 3d 473, 519 N.E.2d 121 (1988)(finding no recovery under the Act for loss of society). Theamendment allowing an action for loss of society becameeffective July 14, 1997, nine months prior to Terrell's death.In the same amendment, the legislature placed caps on recoveryfor loss of society damages but those caps did not go intoeffect until almost a year later, which was two months afterTerrell's death. That the legislature chose to cap damagesafter the effective date of the amendment has no bearing onthe creation of the loss of society cause of action, however,nor does it make the statute ambiguous.

Because we do not find the statute ambiguous, we are notfree to go to the laws of construction and review thelegislative record. See Ceas Mortgage Co. v. Walnut HillsAssociates, Ltd., 312 Ill. App. 3d 242, 726 N.E.2d 695 (2000)(determining that when a statute's language is clear, it isgiven effect without resorting to other aids forconstruction). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court'sdecision to dismiss the estate's claim for loss of societyunder the Act.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuitcourt of Tazewell County is reversed, and this cause isremanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.

HOMER, P.J., and HOLDRIDGE, J., concur.