Mill Creek Development, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Bd.

Case Date: 10/29/2003
Court: 3rd District Appellate
Docket No: 3-02-0596 Rel

No. 3-02-0596


IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2004

MILL CREEK DEVELOPMENT, INC.,

          Petitioner-Appellant,

               v.

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, and
WILL COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW,

          Respondents-Appellees.

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Petition for Review of the
Order of the Illinois Property
Tax Appeal Board.


No. 00-01148.001-R-3




 

MODIFIED UPON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:




Petitioner, Mill Creek Development, Inc., challenged the year2000 assessment of a 39.03 acre parcel of land in Homer Township. Prior to 2000, the property was classified as farm land and valuedat $7,620.00. In 2000 the county reassessed the property asresidential, and the valuation increased to $534,033.00. The WillCounty Board of Review upheld the assessment and the Property TaxAppeal Board (PTAB) affirmed the county's valuation. We confirm inpart, set aside in part and remand, finding that part of theproperty should have been valued as farm land pursuant to the"developer's relief" section of the Property Tax Code. 765 ILCS200/10-30(a) (2002).

In 1999, Mill Creek was planning to purchase a parcel of farmland and develop it into a residential subdivision. The farm landhad an assessed value of $7,620.00. Mill Creek worked with thecity of Lockport to prepare an annexation agreement, which wasadopted in March 2000. In May of 2000, Mill Creek purchased the39.03 acre tract of land. Shortly after the purchase, Mill Creeksold the southern 24.895 acres to M.C. Custom Homes. M.C. CustomHomes platted, subdivided and recorded the southern portion in July2000. Mill Creek retained ownership of the northern acreage, butdid not plat and subdivide it until June 2001.

On August 18, 2000, the Will County supervisor of assessmentsissued a notice of change of assessment on the property from$7,620.00 to $534,033.00. The notice indicated that the increasewas based on a change of classification and usage because the landwas not farmed in 2000.

Mill Creek petitioned the Will County Board of Review forrelief from the assessment. The Board upheld the assessment; MillCreek appealed the matter to PTAB, which affirmed the board'sdecision. Mill Creek then petitioned this court for administrativereview.

I.

Since this issue is one of statutory interpretation, we reviewit under a de novo standard. See City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at205. However, in arriving at our determination in this case,PTAB's determination will remain "relevant" to our analysis. SeeBranson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995).

Mill Creek argues that it is entitled to relief under section10-30 of the Illinois Property Tax Code, which provides that themere platting and subdividing of vacant land or farm land cannotincrease the assessed valuation of the land. 35 ILCS 200/10-30(a)(West 2001). Mill Creek contends that it has met the conditionsrequired under section 10-30 for relief.

The statute provides, in part, that:

the platting and subdivision of property into separatelots and the development of the subdivided property withstreets, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, sewer, water andutility lines shall not increase the assessed valuationof all or any part of the property, if (1) the propertyis platted and subdivided in accordance with the Plat Act[765 ILCS 205/0.01]; (2) the platting occurs afterJanuary 1, 1978; (3) at the time of platting the propertyis in excess of 10 acres; and (4) at the time of plattingthe property is vacant or used as a farm. 35 ILCS 200/10-30(a).

PTAB concedes that the land meets all of the conditions exceptone: that the property be vacant or farm land when platted andsubdivided.

The sole issue in this case is whether section 10-30 appliesto this parcel. The southern portion of the parcel in question wasplatted and subdivided in June 2000, but the northern portion wasnot platted and subdivided until June 2001. Because the twoportions were recorded in different years, we will discuss theeffect of section 10-30 on each one separately.

A. The Southern Portion

Statutory construction requires courts to ascertain and giveeffect to the purpose and intent of the legislature. In re C.W.,199 Ill. 2d 198, 211 (2002). Two rules of construction guide ourdetermination. First, while interpreting statutes, we must avoidany construction which would produce absurd results or render thestatute meaningless. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). Second, when choosing between two statutes in direct conflict, "themore recent enactment generally will prevail." Jahn v. Troy FireProtection District, 163 Ill. 2d 275, 282 (1994).

PTAB argues that a property's assessed value is determined onJanuary 1 of the assessment year, and that mid-year changes inproperty status are not considered until January of the followingyear. In re Application of Rosewell, 120 Ill. App. 3d 369, 373(1983). Here, however, Will County changed the status ofplaintiff's property in August 2000 from farm land to residential,and then assessed the property as residential for all of 2000.

That mid-year status change was treated as effective for the entiretax year of 2000. The notice of assessment change sent to MillCreek by the county read, "[t]his notice is *** to inform you thatthe current year assessed value of the property *** is beingchanged."

Development of farm land will ordinarily cause an assessor tochange the status of the land to residential. A property'sassessed value is determined on January 1 of the assessment year,and any changes in status are applied from that date. In reApplication of Rosewell, 120 Ill. App. 3d 369, 373. Thus, propertywhich is residential when platted and subdivided is subject to theincreased assessment from January 1 forward. However, section 10-30 indicates that the platting, subdividing and development of farmland or vacant land stays any increased assessment until actualconstruction of a residence is completed, or commercial or businessuse begins. 35 ILCS 200/10-30(a)-(c).

PTAB argues that section 10-30 does not apply because the landwas reclassified by the assessor in the same calendar year that itwas platted and subdivided. According to PTAB, when the propertywas reassessed, the land officially became residential, not farmland for the entire year 2000. Then, one of the criteria listed in10-30, that the land be vacant or farm land when platted andsubdivided, was not met. We disagree.

Under PTAB's interpretation of the statute, the Will Countyassessor can reclassify land after it has been platted andsubdivided and deny a developer any benefit under section 10-30. Since the reclassification reached back to January 1, the developerwould be in a race to the courthouse that it could never win. Thisconstruction of section 10-30 strips the statute of any meaning orimport.

The statute says that platting and subdividing land shall notincrease the assessed valuation if "at the time of platting theproperty is vacant or used as a farm." 35 ILCS 200/10-30(a).Consequently, we hold that, although the assessor reclassified the land to residential in the same year that it was platted andsubdivided, the tax valuation must remain at its prior assessmentlevel until development has occurred pursuant to section 10-30(c).Any other result renders section 10-30 meaningless, defeating thelegislative intent of the statute. See Paciga v. Property TaxAppeal Board, 322 Ill. App. 3d 157 (2001) (finding that section 10-30 was passed to protect developers from increased tax valuationsuntil they have time to develop the land and profit from the saleof individual lots).

In this case, the land was farmed through 1999. Mill Creekpurchased the property in May 2000 and sold it to M.C. CustomHomes, which recorded its plat in July 2000. Thus, when theassessor changed the status of the property in August 2000, thesouthern portion had already been platted and subdivided. Sincethe portion of the property platted in 2000 meets all the criteriain section 10-30, it must be assessed at the farm land valuation. In order to give any effect to the statute, Mill Creek cannot beheld liable for increased taxes resulting from the change inassessment.

PTAB argues that our decision improperly forces theretroactive application of 10-30, because it inevitably moves thedate of platting and subdividing to January 1 of the current year.We believe, however, that the statute simply applies when itsconditions are satisfied. The only relevant date with respect tosection 10-30 is the date upon which the land is platted andsubdivided. If, on that date, the four criteria in the statute aremet, the developer will be eligible for the statutory relief.

PTAB cites us to section 9-65 of the tax code, which mandatesthat when property is platted and subdivided, it does not replacethe individual acreage on the assessor's books until January 1 ofthe following tax year. 35 ILCS 200/9-65 (2000). Thus, section 9-65 would prohibit Mill Creek from recognizing the benefit ofsection 10-30 until January 1 of 2001.

We disagree with this argument. Though section 9-65 governsthe placement of new subdivisions on the assessor's tax rolls, ithas no bearing on the relief accorded by section 10-30. Section10-30 provides relief for the developer if the property meets thecriteria on the day it is platted and subdivided, not on the daythe subdivision appears on the tax rolls.

B. The Northern Portion

The whole parcel was reclassified as residential in August2000. While the southern portion was platted in July 2000, thedeveloper did not plat and subdivide the northern portion of theland until June 2001.

The key to obtaining relief under section 10-30 is plattingand subdividing farm land or vacant land. Both portions of the landwere reclassified as residential in 2000. The southern portion wasstill farm land when it was platted, and the statute applies;however, when the northern portion was platted and subdivided in2001, it was residential, not farm land. Since it was residentialwhen platted, the northern portion does not fall under thestatute's protection. The northern portion is subject to theincreased assessment.

This result is consistent with legislative intent as it protects those developers who timely plat and subdivide property for residential development. Developers who plat and subdivide land beyond the year in which it is reassessed risk losing the benefit afforded by the statute. Thus, while timely developers are protected, assessors are not indefinitely or unfairly prevented from reclassifying property and collecting increased taxes.

II.

Mill Creek also challenges the assessed value of the property. At the administrative hearing, PTAB affirmed the county'sassessment. When reviewing an administrative decision, we acceptthe agency's findings as prima facie true and correct, and we willnot disturb that decision unless it is against the manifest weightof the evidence. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of ProfessionalRegulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).

In determining the assessment, the board of review usedcomparable local market values to establish a range of propertyvalues. The assessed value of Mill Creek's property fell withinthat range. Indeed, the assessed value was actually $2,728.56 peracre less than the purchase price. Our careful review of therecord reveals that PTAB's determination was thorough and accurate; Mill Creek has failed to show that the decision was against themanifest weight of the evidence.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board is confirmed inpart, set aside in part, and the cause remanded.

Confirmed in part, set aside in part and remanded.

SCHMIDT, J., and SLATER, J., concurring.