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Petitioner Stanley Lanphier filed this negligence actionagainst respondent Gilster-Mary Lee Corporation (Gilster) torecover for injuries he received while working at a Gilster plant. Lanphier had been assigned to work at Gilster by a temporaryemployment agency named Defender Services. He was injured andpermanently disabled his first day on the job at Gilster when hefell 30 feet down a manlift shaft.

The trial court relied on this court's prior decision inWasielewski v. Havi Corp., 188 Ill. App. 3d 340, 544 N.E.2d 116(3rd Dist. 1989) to dimiss Lanphier's action under section 2-619 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619) (West2000)) because it determined that Lanphier qualified as a loanedemployee under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) and thus wasprohibited from pursuing a negligence claim against Gilster. See820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2000)). Lanphier appealed. We reverse andhold that a temporary worker's status as a loaned employee is aquestion of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. To theextent that our holding is inconsistent with this court's priorruling in Wasielewski, Wasielewski is overturned.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properlydetermined that Lanphier was a loaned employee as a matter of lawunder the Workers' Compensation Act. Lanphier asserts that he was an employee of Defender, not Gilster, and is therefore notprecluded under the Workers' Compensation Act from bringing anegligence action against Gilster.

Our standard of review is de novo on questions of law anddismissals under section 2-619 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(West 2000)). Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 693 N.E.2d 333(1998); Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 687N.E.2d 1042 (1997).

The Workers' Compensation Act provides protection for workersfor accidental workplace injuries by imposing liability withoutfault on the employer. See Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139Ill. 2d 455, 564 N.E.2d 1222 (1990). In return, the injuredemployee is prohibited from bringing a common law action againstthe employer. Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 462, 564 N.E.2d at 1225. Section 1(a)(4) of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS305/1(a)(4) (West 2000)) extends the Act to employees who are onloan from one employer to another employer. When an employer lendsan employee to a second employer and the employee is injured whileperforming duties for the second employer, both employers arejointly and severally liable to the employee, regardless of whichone carried workers' compensation coverage on the employee. 820ILCS 305/1(a)(4) (West 2000); Silica Sand Transport, Inc. v.Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. App. 3d 640, 554 N.E.2d 734 (1990). Once a borrowed employment relationship exists, both employersshare immunity for tort damages for an employee's work-relatedinjuries and the employee's exclusive remedy is under the Act. See820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2000); Barraza v. Tootsie Roll Industries,Inc., 294 Ill. App. 3d 539, 690 N.E.2d 612 (1997).

Although the question of whether a borrowed employmentrelationship exists is generally a question of fact, section1(a)(4) specifically defines an employer that is in the business offurnishing workers to other employers and who pays those workerseven though they are doing the work of the second employer as a"loaning employer." See Willfong v. Dean Evans Co., 287 Ill. App.3d 1099, 679 N.E.2d 1252 (1997);. Based on that definition, theWasielewski court reasoned that if the first employer qualified asa loaning employer under section 1(a)(4) of the Act (820 ILCS305/1(a)(4) (West 2000)), it logically followed that the secondemployer must be a borrowing employer and that the employee must bea loaned employee. See Wasielewski, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 342, 544N.E.2d at 118. It therefore held that the employee was an loanedemployee as a matter of law and that his exclusive remedy for aworkplace injury was through the Workers' Compensation Act. SeeWasielewski, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 342-43, 544 N.E.2d at 118; 820ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2000).

Other courts have disagreed with the Wasielewskiinterpretation. In Crespo v. Weber Stephen Products, Co., 275 Ill.App. 3d 638, 656 N.E.2d 154 (1st Dist. 1995), after rejecting thereasoning set forth in Wasielewski, the court determined that anemployee's status was a question of fact. In that case, a laborerassigned by a temporary employment agency to a second employer'sshop was injured when his hand was crushed by a punch press. Aftersettling a workers' compensation claim with the employment agency,the laborer filed a negligence action against the second employer.Crespo, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 640, 656 N.E.2d at 155. The courtdetermined that the purpose of defining "loaning employer" in theWorkers' Compensation Act was to establish the secondary liabilityof the loaning employer and to relieve the employee from having toestablish the factual basis of employment with the loaningemployer. Crespo, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 642, 656 N.E.2d at 157. Thecourt also determined that the definition of "loaning employer" wasnot meant to define borrowing employers or loaned employees.Crespo, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 642, 656 N.E.2d at 157. Instead, thecourt employed the traditional two-prong analysis used in A.J.Johnson Paving Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 82 Ill. 2d 341, 412N.E.2d 477 (1980) to determine whether the employee was a "loanedemployee" and limited to recovery under the Workers' CompensationAct. The first prong examined whether the second employer had theright to direct and control the employee. The second prong askedwhether an employment contract, express or implied, existed betweenthe employee and the second employer. Crespo, 275 Ill. App. 3d at641, 656 N.E.2d at 156.

More recently, the court in Chaney ex rel. Chaney v. YetterManufacturing Co., 315 Ill. App. 3d 823, 734 N.E.2d 1028 (4th Dist.2000) followed the reasoning set forth in Crespo and determinedthat a machinist who was injured while on assignment by anemployment agency to a manufacturing plant was a loaned employeeunder the two-prong analysis used in Crespo. The court rejectedthe assumption that the statutory definition of a loaning employerautomatically established as a matter of law the statuses ofborrowing employer and loaned employee and applied the Crespo two-prong analysis. Chaney, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 828, 734 N.E.2d at1032.

We find the reasoning in Crespo and Chaney persuasive and holdthat an employee's status is a question of fact to be determined bythe trier of fact. Section 1(a)(4) of the Workers' CompensationAct (820 ILCS 305/1(a)(4) (West 2000)) does not define loanedemployee. We believe the two-prong analysis set forth in Crespo isthe appropriate test and the status of an employee's relationshipwith its employer should be made by applying the Crespo analysis. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision grantingGilster's motion to dismiss and remand for a determination ofLanphier's status at the time of the accident based on the two-prong analysis. To the extent that Wasielewski is inconsistentwith this opinion, it is overturned.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court

of Kankakee County is reversed and remanded to the circuit courtfor further hearings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

LYTTON, P.J., and SLATER, J., concur.