Karsner v. Lechters Illinois Inc.

Case Date: 06/11/2002
Court: 3rd District Appellate
Docket No: 3-00-0907 Rel

No. 3--00--0907


IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2002

 

JAMES KARSNER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
     Plaintiff,  ) for the 21st Judicial Circuit,
) Kankakee County, Illinois
     v. )
) No. 98 L 150
LECHTERS ILLINOIS, INC., )
an Illinois Corporation, and ) Honorable
LECHTERS, INC., a New Jersey ) Fred S. Carr, Jr.
Corporation, ) Judge, Presiding
     Defendants  )

)
(Lechters, Inc., )
     Defendant and Third-Party )
     Plaintiff-Appellant; )
Navajo Express, Inc., )
     Third-Party Defendant; )
Navajo Shippers, Inc., )
     Third-Party Defendant- )
     Appellee). )

 


JUSTICE BRESLIN delivered the opinion of the court:


 

Plaintiff James Karsner filed an action against defendantsLechters Illinois, Inc., and Lechters, Inc. (collectively,Lechters), for injuries he sustained while unloading a trailercontaining Lechters' merchandise. Lechters filed a third-partyindemnity action against James' employer, Navajo Express, Inc., andits parent company, Navajo Shippers, Inc. (collectively, Navajo). The trial court granted Navajo's motion to dismiss Lechters'action, and Lechters appealed. We affirm and hold that unlessthere is clear and explicit language in an indemnification contractto the contrary, the contract will not be construed as indemnifyinga party against its own negligence because such a construction isagainst established public policy.

FACTS

On November 25, 1999, James drove to a Lechters store locatedin Aurora, Illinois, and picked up a trailer full of merchandisethat had been loaded onto the trailer by Lechters at a warehouse inNew Jersey. The following day, James transported the trailer toanother Lechters store located in Bradley, Illinois. While he wasunloading the trailer, a box fell from the top of a stack of boxes,struck James in the head, and injured him.

James filed an action against Lechters, claiming that itnegligently loaded the trailer. In turn, Lechters filed a third-party action against Navajo, claiming that Lechters was entitled tocontribution and indemnification from Navajo and that Navajo failedto obtain liability insurance coverage as required by a contractbetween the parties.

The contract, which was drafted by Navajo, contained thefollowing clause:

"Carrier shall indemnify and hold Lechters harmless fromand against any and all claims, actions [sic] damages,liability and expense, including attorneys fees, inconnection with loss of life, personal injury, and/ordamage to property arising from or out of the pick-up,transportation and delivery of the property of Lechtersby carrier, and the use of any motor vehicle or otherequipment by Carrier in connection therewith."

The contract required that Navajo maintain liability and propertyloss insurance and that Lechters be named as an additional insured.

Navajo moved to dismiss Lechters' complaint. At a hearing,the trial court entered an order requiring that the parties briefthe issue of choice-of-law first. Although the court never made adetermination as to which state's law was applicable, the courtsubsequently determined that either Illinois or New Jersey lawwould be appropriate. The court also determined that thecontractual language purporting to indemnify Lechters was "notsufficiently specific under either Illinois or New Jersey contractlaw as to indemnifying Lechters, Inc. for its own negligence." Asa result, the court granted Navajo's motion to dismiss. Lechtersappealed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Lechters asserts that the trial court incorrectlydetermined that the indemnification clause was not sufficientlyspecific to require Navajo to indemnify Lechters for its ownnegligence. This court reviews a trial court's construction of acontract de novo. Molter Corp. v. Amwest Surety Insurance Co., 267Ill. App. 3d 718, 642 N.E.2d 919 (1994).

At oral argument, the parties agreed that the indemnificationlaws of Illinois and New Jersey are essentially the same and thatthis court should apply Illinois law to this case. We agree withthe parties and thus will apply Illinois law to our analysis. SeeDearborn Insurance Co. v. International Surplus Lines InsuranceCo., 308 Ill. App. 3d 368, 719 N.E.2d 1092 (1999) (determining thatin the absence of a conflict, Illinois law applies as the law ofthe forum).

In Illinois, it is well settled that indemnity contracts areto be strictly construed against the indemnitee. McNiff v. MillardMaintenance Service Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 715 N.E.2d 247(1999). Thus, an indemnification contract will not be construed asindemnifying against a party's own negligence, unless suchconstruction is required by clear and explicit language in thecontract, or such an intention is expressed in unequivocal terms.McNiff, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 1077, 715 N.E.2d at 249. Theintention to indemnify another for its own negligence is unusualand extraordinary, and there can be no presumption that anindemnitor intends to assume the responsibility unless the contractby express stipulation provides for such beyond a doubt. SeeWestinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe BuildingCorp., 395 Ill. 429, 70 N.E.2d 604 (1946). When interpretingindemnity contracts, the agreement between the parties must begiven a fair and reasonable interpretation based upon aconsideration of all the language and provisions in the contractHader v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 207 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 566N.E.2d 736 (1991).

Based upon a fair and reasonable reading of the language inthis contract, we hold that the indemnification provision is notspecific enough to indemnify Lechters against its own negligence. The provision fails to contain any clear or explicit languagecommunicating the parties' intention in this regard. Although thecontract states that Navajo shall indemnify and "hold Lechtersharmless from and against any and all claims, actions [sic]damages, liability and expense," this language is insufficient to

give Lechters indemnity for its own negligence. See Westinghouse,395 Ill. at 433, 70 N.E.2d at 607 (providing that the language"hold *** harmless from any damages, claims, demands or suit by anyperson or persons arising out of any acts or omissions" was notclear and specific language rendering the subcontractor liable forthe general contractor's own negligence). See also McNiff, 303Ill. App. 3d at 1076, 715 N.E.2d at 248 (providing that the phrase,"indemnify *** from and against any and all *** liabilities," wasinsufficient to provide indemnification for the indemnitee's ownnegligence).

This decision is bolstered by our concern that aninterpretation which requires Navajo to indemnify Lechters forLechters' own negligence contravenes established public policy. Not only have Illinois courts been reluctant to enforce provisionspurporting to indemnify a party for its own negligence, Illinoisstatutes express similar reservations. For instance, theConstruction Contract Indemnification for Negligence Act providesthat no construction contract shall allow for the indemnificationof a person's own negligence because such a provision is "void asagainst public policy and wholly unenforceable." 740 ILCS 35/1(West 2000). The Managed Care Reform and Patient Rights Actprovides that no person or health care provider may be indemnifiedfor its own negligence in the performance of his, her or itsduties. 215 ILCS 134/95 (West 2000). These statutes show that, inthe absence of an express agreement, it is against Illinois publicpolicy to require indemnification for a person's own negligence.

To hold that Lechters is not liable for its own negligence inloading the boxes in its trailer directly negates Lechters'incentive to responsibly load the trailer to avoid accidents. Wedo not support such a result. Therefore, the trial court'sdismissal of Lechters' third-party action against Navajo isaffirmed.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Kankakee County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOMER and McDADE, JJ., concur.