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JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the Court:

FACTS

On January 14, 1998, United Coatings filed a propertyassessment with the PTAB, seeking a reduction in the Board'sassessment for the 1997 tax year for a parcel of industrialproperty located at 2850 Festival Drive, Kankakee, Illinois. Theparcel consists of 44.24 acres and is improved with a one-storysteel frame industrial building covering 273,336 square feet. Atthe time of the assessment at issue the building was about 28years old. At the time of the assessment appeal, the propertywas zoned I-1 (restricted industrial).

The appeal petition stated that the Board had assessed theproperty at $767,886. United Coatings claimed that the propertyshould have been assessed at $699,300. In support of the appeal,United Coatings submitted an appraisal prepared by MidwestAppraisal Company (MAC). In response to the appeal, the Boardsubmitted an appraisal of the subject property prepared byMildice AM Coll Appraisers (Mildice).

On February 15, 1999, United Coatings filed anotherindustrial property assessment appeal with the PTAB, this timeseeking a reduction in the Board's assessment of the property forthe 1998 tax year. The Board had assessed the property at$1,066,560. United Coatings claimed the property should havebeen assessed at $700,000. In support of its appeal, UnitedCoatings submitted the 1997 MAC appraisal. The Board submittedthe 1997 Mildice appraisal.

The two appeals were consolidated before the PTAB. OnSeptember 19, 2000, the Board filed a motion for leave to filenewly discovered evidence. The Board asserted that negotiationsto sell the property (now owned by the Knapp Family Trust) werepending and that the owner and the lessee of the property hadpetitioned the Kankakee County Zoning Board of Appeals to rezonethe property. As a result, the Board sought to admit atranscript of the zoning hearing and correspondence reflectingthe range of the purchase price being negotiated.

On October 5, 2000, the Board filed another motion for leaveto file newly discovered evidence, this time seeking to admit theIllinois Real Estate Transfer Declaration for the sale of theproperty, which had occurred on or about September 20, 2000. ThePTAB denied the Board's motions, finding that the new evidencewas not timely submitted and neither of the parties that hadparticipated in the zoning hearing and signed the transferdeclaration were parties to the 1997 or 1998 assessment appeals.

On January 23, 2001, the Board filed a motion for issuanceof subpoenas. It sought to subpoena Jules Knapp, trustee of theKnapp Family Trust and owner of the subject property; FrankMoravek, president and chief executive officer of Micro InksCorporation (the prospective buyer); and John Pinion, an engineerwho performed environmental site assessment and design activitieson the property prior to June 2000. On January 24, 2001, thePTAB denied the Board's request for issuance of subpoenas.

After some further motion practice, United Coatings and theBoard filed a joint motion for decision without hearing onFebruary 14, 2001. In the motion, United Coatings dropped itsobjection to the admission of transcripts of the zoning hearingand the real estate transfer declaration into evidence. The PTABgranted the joint motion, and the transcripts and transferdeclaration were accepted into evidence.

On May 15, 2001, the PTAB issued its decision. The PTABdetermined that the reductions requested by United Coatings forthe 1997 and 1998 tax years were warranted. In so doing, thePTAB found that the best evidence of the property's fair marketvalue was the MAC appraisal. It noted that the appraisers forboth parties relied most heavily on the sales comparisonsapproach in determining fair market value. In concluding thatthe MAC appraisal's sales comparison approach was the bestevidence of value, the PTAB rejected the Board's argument thatthe comparables used in the MAC appraisal were too old where theyoccurred in 1994 and 1995. The PTAB noted that the Board's ownevidence included sales from 1986 and 1989.

The PTAB further found that the evidence of the subjectproperty's sale price in September 2000 was entitled to littleweight. The PTAB observed that the sale occurred almost 4 yearsafter the 1997 assessment and almost 3 years after the 1998assessment. It also noted that no information was submittedregarding the conditions, concessions and other rights and dutiesin the real estate purchase contract. The PTAB also noted that asignificant change occurred to the property after the assessmentdates in issue. Specifically, the buyer had requested that theproperty's zoning be changed to a more intensive industrialzoning and requested a special use permit. The PTAB found thatthese changes, once made, "could significantly alter the value ofthe subject property" and that, therefore, the subject's valuemay have changed due to the sale and other contingencies.

On May 22, 2001, the Board filed a petition for directreview with this court, seeking review of the PTAB's decision forboth assessment years.

Final decisions of the PTAB are subject to judicial reviewunder the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 etseq.(West 2000)). Under this statute, the factual findings of anadministrative agency are prima facie true and correct and willnot be disturbed by a reviewing court unless they are against themanifest weight of the evidence. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2000);Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 131Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1989).

An administrative decision is not against the manifestweight of the evidence where the record contains some competentevidence to support the agency's finding. LaSalle Partners, Inc.v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 269 Ill. App. 3d 621, 632 (1995). Only where all reasonable and unbiased persons would agree thatthe decision is erroneous and that an opposite conclusion isclearly evident, is the decision against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. LaSalle Partners, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 632.

In Illinois, property is to be assessed at 33 1/3 % of its"fair cash value." 35 ILCS 200/9-145 (West 2000). The term"fair cash value" is defined as what a willing buyer will pay awilling seller in an arm's length transaction. 35 ILCS 200/1-50(West 2000). Further, "[f]air cash vale is synonymous with fairmarket value and is defined as the price a willing buyer wouldpay a willing seller for the subject property, there being nocollusion and neither party being under any compulsion." Ellsworth Grain Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 172 Ill. App.3d 552 (1988). There are three basic methods of valuation:market comparisons, income analysis, and reproduction costs lessdepreciation. Ellsworth Grain, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 557. Wherethere is evidence of comparable sales, the market approach shouldbe used. Board of Review of the County of Alexander v. PropertyTax Appeal Board, 304 Ill. App. 3d535, 538 (1999).

In the instant matter, the crux of the Board's appeal is thePTAB erred in not considering conclusive the sale price of thesubject property in 2000 in determining the fair market value forthe 1997 and 1998 tax years. According to the Board, "[a]n arm'slength sale of the subject property is not only relevant indetermining the fair cash value, it is almost conclusive." See,People ex rel. Korzen v. Belt Railway Company of Chicago, 37 Ill.2d 158, (1967). Furthermore, the Board notes, a sale of theproperty that occurred after the relevant tax assessment date maybe considered, unless it is too elusive as to the value on theassessment date. Rosewell v. 2626 Lakeview Limited Partnership,120 Ill. App. 3d 369 (1983). Relying upon Rosewell, the Boardmaintains that PTAB erred in not giving conclusive weight to the2000 sale of the property.

We disagree. The Board reads Rosewell too broadly. Rosewell simply holds that assessing officials are not precludedas a matter of law from considering a future sale in determiningvalue. Rosewell, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 375. Rosewell notes that"[v]alues which are future in character may not be taken intoconsideration, however, where they are so elusive and difficultto ascertain that they have not affected the present market valueof the property." Rosewell, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 375. Rosewellseems to say that while evidence of a future sale should notnecessarily be excluded, it should never be considered asconclusive evidence of value at a previous point in time.

Here, the Board simply placed the 2000 sale into evidencethrough the transfer declaration, without any further evidenceconcerning the nature of the transaction. The Board asked PTABto assume that the transaction was arm's length and that therewere no other conditions or concessions to the sale. As to thecontemporaneous nature of the 2000 sale to the 1997 and 1998 taxyears, we note that the re-zoning and special use applicationgranted immediately prior to the sale may have had a significantimpact on the subsequent purchase price. The Board comments thatthe re-zoning and special use provisions were minor in nature. However, this was a question of fact for the PTAB to decide. National City Bank v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 331Ill. App. 3d 1038 (2002).

Ultimately, the decision of PTAB to place greater weightupon the MAC appraisal than the subsequent 2000 sale price indetermining fair market value for the 1997 and 1998 tax years wasnot against the manifest weight of the evidence. Theinterposition of the re-zoning and special use call into questionthe value of the subsequent sale, while the quality andthoroughness of the MAC appraisal would support its use by PTABin determining the value of the property in the relevant years. We thus find that PTAB's decision is supported by the manifestweight of the evidence.

The Board also maintains that PTAB committed reversibleerror in denying its request to issue subpoenas to Jules Knapp,Frank Moravek and John Pinion to testify at the hearing on theassessment appeals. We disagree. Absent some indication that arestriction on evidence has a prejudicial impact upon anadministrative proceeding, any error in that regard does not riseto the level of reversible error. Citizens Against RegionalLandfill v. Pollution Control Board, 255 Ill. App. 3d 903, 909(1994). In its motion for subpoena, the Board noted that thesubpoena's were necessary as PTAB had denied its request to enterthe transcripts of the zoning board hearing into evidence. Subsequently , PTAB allowed the transcripts to be admitted. Since the subpoenas were sought as an alternative to theadmission of the transcripts, we find no prejudice in denying theissuance of subpoenas once the transcripts were admitted.

For the reasons stated above, the decision of the PropertyTax Appeal Board is affirmed.

Affirmed.

MCDADE, P. J., and SLATER, J., concur.