In re Stephanie P.
Case Date: 06/27/2003
Court: 3rd District Appellate
Docket No: 3-01-1043 Rel
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APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2003
JUSTICE BARRY delivered the Opinion of the court: The trial court found that the respondent mother, Lisa I.,was neglecting her children, Stephanie P. and Janie I., becauseof an injurious environment. The court initially placed thechildren under the guardianship of the Department of Children andFamily Services (DCFS). Later, the court allowed DCFS toterminate its guardianship and gave custody of the children totheir respective fathers. On appeal, the respondent argues thatthe trial court (1) erred by terminating DCFS' guardianshipwithout first conducting an investigation into the fathers'criminal backgrounds; and (2) abused its discretion by allowingDCFS to terminate its guardianship over the children. We affirm. BACKGROUND On March 17, 2000, the State petitioned the trial court tofind that the respondent's children were neglected because of aninjurious environment. The court determined that there wasprobable cause, made the children wards of the court, and gavetemporary custody and guardianship of the children to DCFS. The court conducted adjudicatory hearings from January 29through May 1, 2001. An investigator for DCFS testified that onFebruary 29, 2000, the respondent had offered cocaine to thechildren's 15-year-old babysitter after the babysitter asked tobe paid. The babysitter initially refused the cocaine. Therespondent then threatened to tell the babysitter's friends thatshe "was a drug addict and say things about her" if she did notingest the cocaine. After the babysitter ingested the cocaine,the respondent called 9-1-1 and said that the babysitter hadstopped breathing. In fact, the babysitter had not stoppedbreathing, but had choked because her nose was bleeding. TheDCFS investigator testified that the respondent participated inother drug activities in the home in the presence of thechildren. On May 1, 2001, the court issued its written adjudicationorder finding that the children were neglected because of aninjurious environment. In its factual basis for the finding ofneglect, the court noted the cocaine ingestion by the babysitter. The court ordered guardianship and custody of the children totemporarily remain with DCFS pending the final disposition of thecause. Catholic Charities (CC) filed a dispositional report onJune 19, 2001, concerning the children. Regarding Janie I., thereport noted that her father, Alfredo I., had initiated divorceproceedings against the respondent. Alfredo I. had receivedoutpatient drug treatment for marijuana use and had completedparenting classes. CC recommended that DCFS retain custody ofJanie I., but with a transition toward giving custody to AlfredoI. The record indicates that Stephanie P.'s father, Robert P.,was arrested for cocaine possession in September 2000. CC'sreport indicated that Robert P. was attending Narcotics Anonymousand Alcoholics Anonymous meetings on a regular basis to maintainhis sobriety. He had successfully completed drug treatment andcounseling. CC recommended that Robert P. be given custody ofStephanie P., with guardianship to remain with DCFS for sixmonths. The court's written order followed CC's recommendationsconcerning the children, their fathers, and DCFS. On September 4, 2001, CC submitted another report to thecourt. The report stated that since the previous report, DCFShad given custody of Janie I. to Alfredo I. CC recommended thatcustody of both children remain with their respective fathers,but that guardianship remain with DCFS for three months. Thereport stated that the respondent informed the CC worker that shehad been arrested for possession of a controlled substance onJuly 26, 2001. The trial court's written order of September 4, 2001,continued the matter for a permanency hearing on December 18,2001. On the date of the permanency hearing, DCFS filedpetitions to be discharged from its guardianship of Stephanie P.and Janie I. The court's docket sheet indicates that the courtheld a hearing on December 18, 2001, in which all of the partieswere present. The docket sheet states, "Custody to fathers. Orders of discharge entered." The appellant has supplied transcripts of numerous hearingsin this case, but has not supplied a transcript or other recordof the December 18, 2001, hearing. The record includes thecourt's written orders of December 18, 2001, in which the court(1) granted DCFS' petitions for discharge from its guardianshipof the children; and (2) terminated the court's wardship of thechildren. The respondent appealed. ANALYSIS I. Investigation into Criminal Backgrounds The respondent argues that the court erred by terminatingDCFS' guardianship over her children without first conducting aninvestigation into their fathers' criminal backgrounds. When the trial court terminates a previously orderedguardianship, the termination must comply with section 2--28 ofthe Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq.(West 2000)). 705 ILCS 405/2--31(2) (West 2000). Section 2--28(1) of the Act states that if the court previously found that achild's neglect was the result of the acts, omissions, or boththe acts and omissions of a parent, the court is to conduct aninvestigation as provided for in section 2--28(5) concerning thefitness of that parent to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/2--28(1) (West 2000). According to section 2--28(5) of the Act, "Whenever *** the minor was adjudicated neglected,abused, or dependent as a result of physical abuse, thecourt shall cause to be made an investigation as towhether [the parent seeking restoration of custody] hasever been charged with or convicted of any criminaloffense which would indicate the likelihood of anyfurther physical abuse to the minor." 705 ILCS 405/2--28(5) (West 2000). In this case, DCFS petitioned to terminate its guardianshipover the children. According to section 2--31(2), the trialcourt could not terminate DCFS' guardianship without complyingwith section 2--28. The respondent contends that section 2--28(1) required the trial court to conduct an investigation intothe fathers' criminal backgrounds under section 2--28(5) beforeterminating DCFS' guardianship. The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effectto the legislature's intent by first looking to the plainlanguage of a statute and giving that language its ordinarymeaning. Where the language of a statute is clear andunambiguous, a court of review must give it effect as written,without reading exceptions, limitations, or conditions into thestatute. Because interpretation of a statute is a question oflaw, our review of this issue is de novo. Swank v. Department ofRevenue, 336 Ill. App. 3d 851, 785 N.E.2d 204 (2003). Here, the plain language of section 2--28(5) only requiresan investigation into a parent's criminal background where thecourt previously found that a child was neglected as a result ofphysical abuse. The children in this case were not found to beneglected because of physical abuse, and therefore therequirements of section 2--28(5) would not appear to apply. Therespondent, however, focuses on the language of section 2--28(1). According to the respondent, section 2--28(1) requires aninvestigation under section 2--28(5) whenever the court foundthat a child was neglected "due to the acts or omissions or bothof [a] parent." 705 ILCS 405/2--28(1) (West 2000). First, the respondent has taken language from section 2--28(1) out of context. Section 2--28(1) states that the courtshall not restore custody to a parent, without an investigationunder section 2--28(5), where the court previously found thechild to be neglected "due to the acts or omissions or both ofsuch parent." 705 ILCS 405/2--28(1) (West 2000). The record inthis case does not indicate that the children were found to beneglected at all, much less because of acts or omissions, as tothe respective fathers who were seeking restoration of custody. Second, the respondent asks us to read an exception intosection 2--28(5) because of the language in section 2--28(1). However, we will not read into the language of section 2--28(5)an exception that is not indicated by the plain language of thatstatute. See Swank, 336 Ill. App. 3d 851, 785 N.E.2d 204. Theplain language of section 2--28(5) does not indicate such anexception here. Therefore, we rule as a matter of law that thetrial court did not err by terminating DCFS' guardianship overthe respondent's children without first conducting aninvestigation under section 2--28(5). II. Termination of DCFS' Guardianship The respondent contends that the court abused its discretionby allowing DCFS to terminate its guardianship over her children. It is the appellant's burden to present a sufficientlycomplete record of the trial court proceedings to support a claimof error. In the absence of such a record, a court of reviewwill presume that a trial court's order was in conformity withthe law and had a sufficient factual basis. Any doubts arisingfrom the incompleteness of the record will be resolved againstthe appellant. Whitmer v. Munson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 501, 781N.E.2d 618 (2002). In the instant case, a docket sheet entry indicates that thetrial court held a hearing on December 18, 2001. During thathearing, the court granted DCFS' petitions to be discharged asguardian over the respondent's children. The respondent has notsupplied this court with a transcript or other record of thathearing. As a consequence, we presume that the trial court'sorder terminating DCFS' guardianship had a sufficient factualbasis and followed the law. Because the respondent failed toprovide us with a sufficient record, we resolve this issueagainst her. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of theWill County circuit court. Affirmed. LYTTON, J. and McDADE, P.J., concurring. |
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