Find Legal Information

Nos. 3-01-0126, 3-01-0127, 3-01-0316, 3-01-0386

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2002

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:

In these consolidated cases, the trial court found O.H.,L.M., B.M. and B.L., all of whom are minors, delinquent and madethem wards of the court. Following separate sentencing hearings,the trial court sentenced each to a term of probation and orderedeach to complete his or her placement at a residential facilityto be designated by the Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS). DCFS now appeals those orders, claiming thecourt was without jurisdiction to require such placements. Weaffirm.

FACTS  

In separate delinquency proceedings, O.H. was convicted ofretail theft and residential burglary; L.M. was adjudicateddelinquent for the offense of resisting a peace officer; B.M.was convicted of burglary; and B.L. was found delinquent forviolating his probation terms by testing positive for cannabis.In each case, the court appointed DCFS as guardian, sentenced theminor to a term of probation, and directed DCFS to place each ina residential facility.

Following the entry of the circuit court's orders, DCFSfiled a motion in each case to vacate the court's probation orderasserting that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Allof the motions were denied.

DCFS appeals the circuit court's orders in all four of theaforementioned cases. The appeals have been consolidated for thepurposes of deciding whether a trial court has subject matterjurisdiction to direct a delinquent ward's placement after it hasappointed DCFS as the ward's guardian. We find that it does.

ANALYSIS

Appellate Jurisdiction

The State begins by asserting that this matter must bedismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction. DCFS' appeal wasfiled pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301),which provides for appeals from final judgments in civil matters. The State maintains that this appeal is a criminal matter fallingwithin the ambit of Rule 604 (188 Ill. 2d R. 604) and interpretsthat rule to mean that only defendants and the State possessstanding to appeal. Because DCFS was neither, the State submitsthat DCFS lacked the requisite standing to raise its claim.

We review questions concerning rule construction de novo. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 692 N.E.2d 1150 (1998).

We agree with the State that this appeal is a criminalmatter. Rule 660(a) states that, unless otherwise specificallyprovided, appeals from final judgments in delinquent minorproceedings will be governed by the rules applicable to criminalcases. 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(a). Here, all the minors involvedwere adjudicated delinquent by the trial court, and thesentencing orders from which these appeals were taken are final.

However, our jurisdiction to hear this matter does notderive solely from a party's invocation of the correct supremecourt rule. Pursuant to Rule 603, our appellate jurisdiction hasarisen because an appeal has been taken in a criminal matter. Rule 603 specifically directs all appeals in criminal cases,other than where a statute has been held invalid or where a deathsentence has been imposed, be taken to the appellate court. 134Ill. 2d R. 603; In re J.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d 175, 717 N.E.2d 468(1999). Because those exceptions do not apply in these cases andbecause the State has not been prejudiced by DCFS's selection ofRule 301 rather than Rule 604, we hold that appellatejurisdiction has been properly invoked.

Contrary to the State's contention, Rule 604 does not limitstanding to defendants and the State. Although that rule dealswith criminal appeals, it is not a comprehensive rule designed togovern the entirety of all criminal appeals. The rule isentitled "Appeals from Certain Judgments and Orders," and itspurpose is to set out appeal rules that defendants and the Statemust follow in designated situations. 188 Ill. 2d R. 604. Itdoes not address appeals filed by nonparties.

There is common law support for the fact that nonparties incriminal matters also have standing, so long as they hold adirect, immediate and substantial interest in the subject matterthat would be prejudiced by the judgment or benefitted by itsreversal. People v. Pine, 129 Ill. 2d 88, 542 N.E.2d 711 (1989)(the Secretary of State, a nonparty, possessed standing to appealthe trial court's order directing it to issue a judicial drivingpermit for defendant because pursuant to section 6-206.1 of theIllinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95