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The respondent, Todd Martin Sawicki, appeals from the judgment of dissolution ofhis marriage to the petitioner, Susan Gail Sawicki. On appeal, Todd contends that thetrial court erred when it: (1) awarded Susan 50% of the marital portion of his disabilitypension; (2) calculated the marital share of his disability pension; (3) failed to allocatethe cost of the joint and survivor annuity to Susan; (4) failed to reduce any portion of thedisability pension awarded to Susan when his supplementary pension terminates; (5)directed a retroactive award of disability benefits to Susan; (6) set child support; and (7)failed to reopen the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse inpart and remand.

Susan and Todd were married on July 26, 1985. They had one child during theirmarriage, a son, T.C., who was born on February 4, 1988. On June 8, 2000 Susan filed apetition for dissolution of marriage. The trial court awarded Susan $500 per month fortemporary maintenance and child support.

On June 5, 2002, after protracted litigation, the trial court ruled on custody andvisitation issues. It awarded the parties joint legal custody of their son and gave Susanprimary physical custody. Todd was awarded extensive visitation rights with his son,including three weekends per month, one evening per week and the majority of thesummer months. Todd is not appealing the custody award.

The trial court held additional hearings on the division of property and remainingissues. It was established that Susan was 47 years old and had a ninth grade education. Before she married Todd, she worked at several minimum wage jobs, including factorywork, bartending and as an apprentice painter. She also held a minimum wage job duringthe early years of her marriage to Todd. When she became pregnant with T.C., she quither job to stay home. She remained a homemaker for the remainder of the marriage.

Todd was 52 years old at the time of trial. He worked as a construction laborer for27 years before he was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. His condition has left himphysically disabled and unable to perform as a construction laborer. In 1999, he retiredfrom his job with Ladd Construction and began receiving disability benefits. Since thattime he has performed odd jobs such as stringing concrete and installing carpet. According to Todd, he can function, although he cannot be "shovel and ditch guy."

Todd's pension is a defined benefit plan in which the amount of the benefitreceivable per month is dependent upon the number of pension credits earned multipliedby the applicable contribution rates. Based upon the pension credits earned by Toddprior to and during his marriage, his disability pension would have been paid him$3,702.35 per month. However, on February 1, 2000 Todd elected a 50% joint andsurvivor annuity for Susan. That annuity reduced the current gross amount payable to$2,795.27 per month. The annuity would provide Susan $1,397.64 per month if Toddpredeceases her.

The evidence established that Todd is also entitled to a $300 per month temporarysupplemental benefit which will terminate when he reaches the age of 65 or earlier undercertain circumstances. Prior to the entry of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order(QDRO), Todd was receiving $3,095.27 per month gross ($2,795.27 + $300). Todd alsoreceives a veteran's pension of $103 per month.

Todd began covered employment under the Central Laborers Pension Fund in1972, thirteen years before he married Susan. He was a participant in the plan for morethan 27 years before he began to collect disability benefits. At the time he becamedisabled, Todd had earned 39.65 pension credits. He had earned 15.25 of those creditsprior to his marriage to Susan.

Kevin Mason, a certified public accountant, testified on Susan's behalf regardingthe value of the disability pension. According to Mason, 87.6% of the disability pensionshould be considered marital property. Mason arrived at that figure by using the accruedbenefit as of the date of the marriage and comparing it to the accrued benefit at the dateof dissolution. Mason testified that 87.6% was a fair value for the marital portion of thepension because, "as earnings go up, the amount of contributions to the fund in a union-negotiated plan normally increase, so that there would have been more benefit accruedafter the date of the marriage than prior." Todd did not have an expert testify as to thevalue of the marital portion of the pension.

The parties stipulated that all payments on the marital home came from maritalincome except Todd's initial down payment of $16,920.

In June 2002, prior to closing arguments, Todd's counsel withdrew. Toddcontinued the case pro se. On September 20, 2002, the trial court issued a letter opinionand the judgment of dissolution was entered November 1, 2002. The trial court made thefollowing pertinent rulings: (1) the marital portion of the Central Laborer's Pension Fundwas 87.5%⁽¹⁾ of the total value of the pension; (2) Susan was awarded one-half of themarital portion of the pension, which at that time was $1,298.06; (3) Susan's portion ofthe disability pension was applied retroactively to July 2002; (4) each party wasresponsible for any tax liability incurred by that party's receipt of any distribution andwould hold the other party free, harmless and indemnified from any tax liability soincurred; (5) the marital residence was to be sold and the proceeds split equally betweenthe parties after Todd received $16,920 for his non-marital contribution; (6) Todd wasordered to pay $354.70 per month child support; (7) child support was retroactive toJune 2002; (8) Todd was ordered to maintain medical insurance for T.C.; and (9) theissue of maintenance was reserved by the court. Todd's motions for reconsideration weredenied.

On appeal, Todd first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awardingSusan 50% of that marital portion of his disability pension. He claims that an equaldistribution of the disability pension is unfair because his disability leaves him unable topursue gainful employment and he is faced with ever increasing costs for medical andliving expenses.

Section 503(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act)provides that in a dissolution proceeding, the court is to divide the parties' maritalproperty in just proportions considering all relevant factors. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West2000). Those relevant factors include the following:

(1) each party's contribution to the marital estate; (2) the dissipation of martial assets byeither party; (3) the value of the property assigned to the spouse; (4) the duration of themarriage; (5) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division ofthe property is to become effective; (6) any obligations and rights arising from a priormarriage of either party; (7) any antenuptial agreement of the parties; (8) the age, health,station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability,estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties; (9) the custodial provisions for anychildren; (10) whether the apportionment is in lieu of maintenance; (11) the reasonableopportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income; and (12)the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economiccircumstances of the parties. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000).

The trial court has broad discretion in the valuation and subsequent distribution ofmarital assets. Kew v. Kew, 198 Ill. App. 3d 61, 555 N.E.2d 731 (1990). An abuse ofdiscretion is said to have occurred only when no reasonable person would take the viewadopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of Courtright, 229 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 595N.E.2d 619 (1992).

We have reviewed the factors under section 503(d) that are relevant to this caseand find that the trial court's decision to award Susan 50% of the portion of Todd'sdisability pension which it deemed to be marital property was not an abuse of discretion. See 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000).

Both Susan and Todd contributed equally to the acquisition of marital property intheir capacities as homemaker and wage earner. See 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(1) (West 2000);In re Marriage of Swigers, 176 Ill. App. 3d 795, 531 N.E.2d 858 (1988) (the parties'contributions to the acquisition of marital property when one spouse is the homemakerand the other spouse is the wage earner can be considered as relatively equal). This isparticularly true since Todd and Susan's marriage lasted for 17 years. See 750 ILCS5/503(d)(4) (West 2000); In re Marriage of Marriott, 264 Ill. App. 3d 23, 636 N.E.2d1141 (1994) (a spouse's greater financial contributions do not necessarily entitle him orher to a greater share of the marital assets, especially in long-term marriages where onespouse is the homemaker).

Also to be considered are the relevant economic circumstances of each spousewhen the division of the property is to become effective (750 ILCS 5/503(d)(5) (West2000)) and the age, health, station, occupation, sources of income, vocational skills andemployability of the parties (750 ILCS 5/503(d)(8) (West 2000)). Both parties'circumstances, although different, are relatively equal. Susan is a single mother with aninth grade education raising a teenaged child. She has little significant work history as aresult of being a homemaker for almost her entire 17 year marriage. Todd, on the otherhand, has significant work history as a construction laborer. However, he can no longerwork in that field due to his rheumatoid arthritis.

Next, we reviewed the custodial provision for the parties' son, T.C. See 750 ILCS5/503(d)(9) (West 2000). Susan is the residential custodian of T.C. and therefore needsto provide a home for him. An equal distribution of Todd's pension will allow her toprovide housing for T.C. The sale of the marital home also allows Todd to receive hisnon-marital contribution reimbursement.

Another relevant factor is whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition tomaintenance. See 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(10) (West 2000). The trial court did not awardSusan maintenance and chose to reserve that issue instead. Without the income from thepension Susan would be left without income and Todd might be required to pay Susanmaintenance.

Finally, we look to the reasonable opportunity of each spouse to acquire futurecapital assets and income. 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(11) (West 2000). Again, although Toddand Susan's circumstances are different, their abilities to acquire future capital arerelatively the same based on Susan's lack of education and work experience and Todd'sdisability.

Todd argues that the cases of In re Marriage of Davis, 286 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 678N.E.2d 68 (1997) and In re Marriage of Belk, 239 Ill. App. 3d 806, 605 N.E.2d 86 (1992)are highly instructive on the issue of equitable division of a disability pension. In bothcases, the issue was whether the wife was entitled to an interest in the husband'sdisability pension where the judgment specifically gave her an interest in her spouse'spension. In both cases, the appellate court held that the parties could not have intended toaward the ex-spouse an interest in the disability pension because such an interpretationwould be unjust to the disabled spouse. See In re Marriage of Davis, 286 Ill. App. 3d,1065, 1068, 678 N.E.2d 68, 70 (1997); In re Marriage of Belk, 239 Ill. App. 3d 806, 812,605 N.E.2d 86, 90 (1992).

Both Davis and Belk are distinguishable from the instant case. In those cases, theappellate court was interpreting the terms of a settlement agreement where the parties hadagreed that the wife had an interest in the husband's pension. However, both settlementagreements were silent on the issue of the wife's interest in any disability pension. Thecourts in both Davis and Belk held that where the settlement agreement did not refer to adisability pension the parties did not contemplate the division of a disability benefit. Therefore, the courts held that the wife was not entitled to a portion of the husband'sdisability pension. Davis, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1068, 678 N.E.2d at 70, Belk, 239 Ill. App.3d at 812, 605 N.E.2d at 90.

Here, we are not reviewing the terms of a settlement agreement. Todd's disabilitycommenced prior to the dissolution of his marriage, and he was drawing proceeds fromthe disability pension throughout these proceedings. It is well-settled that disabilitypensions are considered marital property. In re Marriage of Smith, 84 Ill. App. 3d 446,405 N.E.2d 884 (1980). Therefore, Davis and Belk are not highly instructive in this case. In re Marriage of Davis, 286 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 678 N.E.2d 68 (1997); In re Marriage ofBelk, 239 Ill. App. 3d 806, 605 N.E.2d 86 (1992).

For these reasons, we find that the trial court properly divided the marital portionof the disability pension equally between Susan and Todd.

Todd next argues that the trial court erred in the method it chose to determine themarital share of his disability pension. He claims that the trial court erred in finding thatthe marital portion of his disability pension was 87.5%, leaving only 12.5% as non-marital property. He contends that the trial court should have used the widely-acceptedformula enunciated in In re Marriage of Hunt to find that the non-marital portion of hispension was actually 38.4%. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d511 (1979).

A formula widely accepted by Illinois courts in allocating the division of maritaland non-marital pension interests was set out in In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1979). With that method, the marital share is determined by thepresent value of the interest multiplied by a fraction whose numerator is the number oryears (or months) of marriage during which benefits were being accumulated, and whosedenominator is the total number of years (or months) during which benefits wereaccumulated prior to the divorce. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 663,397 N.E.2d 511, 519 (1979).

The trial court has broad discretion in the valuation and distribution of maritalassets. In re Marriage of Alshouse, 255 Ill. App. 3d 960, 627 N.E.2d 731 (1994). However, a reviewing court will reverse a trial court's judgment of the valuation ofmarital assets when no reasonable person could adopt the trial court's position. See In reMarriage of Benz, 165 Ill. App. 3d 273, 518 N.E.2d 1316 (1988).

The trial court abused its discretion in valuing the marital portion of Todd'sdisability pension at 87.5%. Todd began covered employment under his pension plan in1972, a full 13 years before he married Susan. He was a participant in the plan for morethan 27 years before he began receiving disability benefits. At the time he becamedisabled, Todd had 39.65 pension credits. Almost forty percent, or 15.25 of those credits,were earned prior to his marriage to Susan. Nevertheless, the trial court found that 87.5%of Todd's disability pension was marital property.

The court arrived at this figure by fixing Todd's accrued benefit at the time of themarriage and comparing it to the accrued benefit at the date of dissolution. In makingthat determination, the court adopted the method employed by Susan's expert, KevinMason. Mason's rationale for this lowered amount was that in the later years, "asearnings go up, the amount of contributions to the fund in a union-negotiated plannormally increase, so that there would have been more benefit accrued after the date ofmarriage than prior."

In finding that the marital portion of Todd's disability pension was 87.5% the trialcourt implicitly adopted a freezing approach to the determination of the marital share, asopposed to the "proportionality rule" which is more widely accepted in Illinois. See In reMarriage of Wisniewski, 286 Ill. App. 3d 236, 244, 675 N.E.2d 1362, 1369 (1997).

Moreover, the argument for utilizing a fixed, accrued benefit at a set date for adetermination of the marital share has been rejected by at least one appellate court. SeeIn re Marriage of Wisniewski, 286 Ill. App. 3d 236, 675 N.E.2d 1362 (1997). The courtin Wisniewski also held that regardless of how pension benefits are calculated under thelanguage of a particular plan, contributions in the early years are more valuable to thepayor of the plan than are payments in later years because the value of the money in theearly years are worth more than in the later years. In re Marriage of Wisniewski, 286 Ill.App. 3d 236, 244, 675 N.E.2d 1362, 1369 (1997). We are persuaded by the reasoning inWisniewski. In re Marriage of Wisniewski, 286 Ill. App. 3d 236, 675 N.E.2d 1362(1997).

We reject the trial court's finding that the marital portion of Todd's disabilitypension was valued at 87.5%. We reverse the trial court's valuation of the marital portionof the disability pension and remand this issue for the trial court to recalculate the maritalportion the pension in accordance with the Hunt formula (In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill.App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1979)).

Todd also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allocatethe cost of the joint and survivor annuity to Susan or, alternatively, in failing to awardhim compensating assets. In response, Susan argues that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion when it did not allocate the cost of the joint and survivor annuity to herbecause Todd chose to elect the survivor annuity of his own free will in February 2000.

A survivor's benefit is a distinct property interest. Smithberg v. Illinios MunicipalRetirement Fund, 192 Ill. 2d 291, 735 N.E.2d 560 (2000). Even though it is of acontingent nature, a survivor's benefit has a determinable value and it is properlyconsidered a marital asset. In re Marriage of Moore, 251 Ill. App. 3d 41, 621 N.E.2d 239(1993). Section 503 of the Act requires the division of marital property in "justproportions." 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). A trial court's decision on thedistribution of property will not be reversed unless the court clearly abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Perino, 224 Ill. App. 3d 605, 587 N.E.2d 54 (1992).

Whether or not Todd chose to elect the survivor annuity during the marriage isirrelevant to the allocation of the cost of the annuity in the judgment of dissolution. Toddchose the survivor annuity during the course of the marriage and therefore it is a maritalasset. It is undisputed that this annuity reduces the amount of the pension. A division ofthe marital property without reference to Susan's interest in the survivor annuity is not adivision "in just proportions." See 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Therefore, the trialcourt abused its discretion when it failed to reduce the portion of Todd's disabilitypension awarded to Susan by the cost of that annuity. Accordingly, we remand this issueto the trial court to calculate such a reduction.

Todd next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to reduce anyportion of his disability pension to Susan when his supplementary pension terminates. He is referring to his $300 per month additional pension which supplements his healthinsurance payments.

Section 503(d) of the Act mandates that marital property be divided in justproportions. 750 ILCS /503(d) (West 2000).

We find no error. The judgment provides that, "Petitioner is hereby awarded one-half of the marital portion of the pension, which at this time is the sum of $1,298.06 permonth." The trial court's reference to "at this time" indicates that it would consider areduction in the payment amount if the marital portion of the pension were reduced atsome time in the future. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing tomake a prospective reduction of the amount awarded to Susan when Todd'ssupplementary pension terminates.

Todd next claims that the trial court abused its discretion in its final order datedNovember 1, 2002 when it retroactively ordered Susan's pension award to be effective toJuly 2002. Todd contends that this retroactive award is unfair because the award covers aperiod when the parties were residing in the same household and Todd was giving Susan$500 per month for spending money.

Todd also argues that this retroactive award was an abuse of the trial court'sdiscretion because: (1) only he has incurred any tax liability by the receipt of pensionpayments after July 2002 since no QDRO had been entered; and (2) the November 1, 2002 order does not state that a party will be responsible for the otherparty's taxes incurred on the receipt of the first party's share.

We find no abuse of discretion. Here, the court used its discretion to create acompromise to cover the nine-month period between the last day of trial on January 29,2002, and the day the judgment of dissolution was entered on November 1, 2002. Whenthis matter began in July 2000 the trial court awarded Susan temporary maintenance andsupport of $500 per month. She has lived off this small amount for two years before theentry of the judgment of dissolution. At the same time, Todd has had control of thepayments from his disability pension and other benefits totaling over $3,000 per month. In awarding Susan her share of the pension retroactively to July 2002 we find that thecourt was merely adjusting the equities between the parties. See In re Marriage ofBenkendorf, 252 Ill. App. 3d 429, 624 N.E.2d 1241 (1993) (trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in using a valuation date of the last date of trial where that date was not soremote from the judgment in time or significant events).

We are likewise not concerned with the tax ramifications of the retroactive award. The trial court specifically noted in its order that each party was responsible for their owntax liability and each party would indemnify the other for any tax liability so incurred. IfTodd believes that Susan has not paid her share of the taxes he may return to the trialcourt to resolve this issue.

Todd raises four distinct issues with regard to the trial court's award of childsupport. We will address each issue separately.

First, Todd argues that the trial court abused its discretion in setting child supportat an amount that exceeded the statutory guidelines. Specifically, he claims that the trialcourt ordered him to pay more than 20% of his income when it required him to continueto provide health insurance for T.C. without deducting the insurance premiums from hisnet income.

Generally, the minimum amount of child support that can be awarded for one childis 20% of the supporting parent's net income. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1) (West 2000). Indetermining net income for the purposes of setting child support, Illinois law providesthat dependant heath insurance premiums will be deducted. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(f)(West 2000). The trial court's findings as to net income will not be reversed absent anabuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Nelson, 297 Ill. App. 3d 651, 698 N.E.2d 1084(1998).

The trial court erred in failing to deduct T.C.'s health insurance premiums beforedetermining his net income. Therefore, we remand this issue for the trial court torecalculate Todd's net income and his child support obligation accordingly.

Next, Todd argues that the trial court erred in granting Susan retroactive childsupport to June 2002. He claims that she is not entitled to retroactive support since heand Susan continued to reside together through the entry of judgment in November 2002.

The decision to award retroactive child support rests within the sound discretion ofthe trial court. See generally In re Marriage of Boland, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 721 N.E.2d815 (1999). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Susan retroactivechild support to June 2002. Susan had requested custody of T.C. and payment of childsupport in her petition for dissolution which she filed in June 2000. In June 2000, thecourt entered an order in which Susan was awarded custody of T.C. and child supportwas reserved pending the resolution of the remaining issues in this case. After thoseissues were resolved, it was within the trial court's discretion to award Susan childsupport retroactively to the time of its order granting her custody of T.C.

Todd contends that the trial court erred in failing to abate his child supportresponsibility during the summer months since T.C. lives with him during those months.

There should not be an automatic deduction in child support because a non-custodial parent has the opportunity to spend substantial time with the child and fulfill aparental responsibility. In re Marriage of DeMattia, 302 Ill. App. 3d 390, 706 N.E.2d 67(1999).

Todd is not entitled to an abatement of his child support payments when his sonvisits him during the summer. In addition to the fact that Todd is fulfilling a parentalresponsibility during that time, Susan still must finance T.C.'s expenses includinghousing, clothing and upcoming school expenses during that time. Therefore, the trialcourt did not abuse its discretion in failing to abate Todd's payments during the summermonths.

Todd also argues that the trial court erred in failing to address the income taxdependency exemption. He claims that he is entitled to the dependency exemption inalternate years commencing in 2002 since he provides for T.C.'s health insurance costsand receives no assistance from Susan when T.C. resides with him during the summer.

The allocation of the income tax dependency exemption is an element of supportover which the trial court has discretion. See In re Marriage of Fowler, 197 Ill. App. 3d95, 554 N.E.2d 240 (1990).

Todd was entitled to the dependency exemption in alternate years. His visitationwith T.C. is substantial, consisting of almost the entire summer, three weekends permonth, and one evening per week. That amount of time, coupled with his child supportand health insurance contributions, entitle him to such an exemption. Therefore, onremand, we direct the trial court to award Todd the income tax dependency exemption inalternate years.

Finally, Todd argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motionto reopen the evidence to introduce evidence concerning the details of the disability planthat had not been addressed.

The denial of a motion to reopen proofs is within the sound discretion of the trialcourt and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. In re Marriage ofDavis, 215 Ill. App. 3d 763, 576 N.E.2d 44 (1991). If evidence offered for the first timein a post-trial motion could have been produced at an earlier time, it is not an abuse ofdiscretion for the court to deny its introduction into evidence. Davis, 215 Ill. App. 3d at776, 576 N.E.2d at 53.

The trial court properly denied Todd's motion to reopen the evidence. Toddcomplains that his counsel withdrew from this case in June 2002 and that he had toproceed pro se until judgment was rendered in November 2002. However, Todd failed toallege that the evidence he wanted to introduce could not have been produced at an earliertime. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Todd's motion toreopen the evidence.

We affirm that portion of the trial court's order which equally distributed themarital portion of Todd's disability pension between the parties. We reverse the portionof the trial court's order finding that the marital portion of Todd's disability pension was87.5%. We remand this issue to the trial court to recalculate the marital portion of thedisability pension using the formula set out in In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653,397 N.E.2d 511 (1979). We also remand for the trial court to allocate the cost of the jointand survivor annuity to Susan.

The trial court did not err in failing to reduce any portion of the disability pensionto Susan when Todd's supplementary pension terminates. We affirm the retroactiveaward of Susan's portion of the disability pension to July 2002.

We reverse the trial court's order for child support and remand this cause for thetrial court to consider Todd's contribution of health insurance costs in determining his netincome. We affirm the retroactive award of child support commencing in June 2002. The trial court did not err in failing to abate Todd's child support payments during thesummer months. However, on remand, we order the trial court to award Todd the incometax dependency exemption for T.C. in alternate years. Finally, we affirm the trial court'sorder denying Todd's motion to reopen the evidence. We also direct the trial court tomodify the QDRO to comply with these orders.

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the circuit court of Bureau County isaffirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.

LYTTON and McDADE, JJ., concur.

1. Susan's expert testified that the value of the marital portion of the disability pension was87.6%.