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The respondent, Lawrence Eugene Jackson, appeals from thejudgment of the trial court awarding custody of his son, Lateef,to his former spouse, the petitioner, Kathy Kay Jackson. We findthat the trial court improperly gave res judicata effect to thecustody provisions of a plenary order of protection enteredbefore the commencement of the dissolution of marriageproceedings. This error deprived Lawrence of a fair custodyhearing. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court andremand the matter for further proceedings.

Lawrence and Kathy were married in July 1976. Theirdaughter was born in January 1980, their son in April 1983. InDecember 1998, Kathy filed a verified petition for order ofprotection. In her petition, she alleged that the preceding dayLawrence had choked their daughter. Kathy stated that sheattempted to intervene and all three ended up on the floor. Kathy further alleged that Lawrence had threatened to kill her inSeptember 1998, and, six weeks earlier, had choked Lateef andthrown him out of the house. An emergency order of protectionwas entered that day, with visitation between Lawrence and Lateefto be according to Lateef's wishes.

On April 27, 1999, the trial court issued a plenary order ofprotection requiring Lawrence to stay away from Kathy andgranting him visitation with Lateef only at Lateef's request.

In June 1999, Kathy filed a petition for dissolution ofmarriage. She filed an amended petition in August 1999. In herpetition, she asked the court to give res judicata effect to thecustody, visitation and child support provisions of the plenaryorder of protection.

Kathy asked the trial court to consolidate the order ofprotection proceedings with the dissolution of marriageproceedings. Over Lawrence's objection, the trial court grantedthe consolidation. The court also determined that the custody,visitation and child support provisions of the plenary order ofprotection would be incorporated into the judgment ofdissolution. The final judgment of dissolution was entered inOctober 1999.

Lawrence raises several arguments on appeal. All of thesearguments are centered around the fairness of the way the trialcourt handled the issue of custody of Lateef. Lawrenceessentially argues that the custody determination was unfairlymade and cites three factors he believes contributed to theunfairness. We agree with Lawrence that the hearing was unfairlyconducted, for the reasons we will set forth below. Given thisconclusion, we need not respond individually to each ofLawrence's arguments.

In her pleadings, Kathy asked the trial court to considerthe plenary order of protection res judicata as to the issues ofcustody, visitation and child support. However, at the time ofthe hearing, Kathy's attorney couched that request in terms of"consolidating" the order of protection proceeding with thedissolution of marriage proceeding. The trial court agreed to"consolidate" the cases and then accepted the custodydetermination of the order of protection as its custody orderwithout further hearings on the matter. Clearly, the effect ofthe "consolidation" was to give res judicata effect to theplenary order of protection's custody provisions.

The doctrine of res judicata reflects a public policyfavoring finality in litigation and judicial economy. Pfeifferv. William Wrigley Jr. Co., 139 Ill. App. 3d 320, 484 N.E.2d 1187(1985). It provides that a final judgment on the merits renderedby a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to therights of the parties. People ex. rel. Burris v. ProgressiveLand Developers, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 285, 602 N.E.2d 820 (1992). Res judicata applies when there is: (1) a final judgment on themerits; (2) identity of causes of action; and (3) identity ofparties. Horton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 260 Ill. App. 3d 150, 632N.E.2d 1061 (1994). An identity of causes of actions is provenwhen the two claims arise out of a single group of operativefacts, even if different theories of relief are pursued. RiverPark, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 703 N.E.2d883 (1998). A court will review the application of res judicatade novo. American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Village ofLibertyville, 269 Ill. App. 3d 400, 645 N.E.2d 1013 (1995).

In the instant case, the order of protection and dissolutionof marriage proceedings did not arise from a single group ofoperative facts. The order of protection case was concerned withonly the issue of whether Lawrence had abused Kathy and theirchildren and what actions should be taken to end the abuse. Theevidence would have necessarily been limited to instances ofalleged abuse. The dissolution of marriage proceeding,particularly that portion involving the custody and visitation ofthe children, would have involved a much larger inquiry intoLawrence's parenting abilities. To be sure, his alleged abusewould have been a major factor to consider. However, it wouldnot have been the only factor, as in the order of protectioncase. Thus, no identity of causes of action existed between theorder of protection proceeding and the dissolution of marriageproceeding. As a result, the plenary order of protection couldnot be considered res judicata on the issue of custody. We holdthat the trial court erred in giving the order of protection suchan effect by "consolidating" the order of protection proceedingsand the dissolution of marriage proceedings.

By giving the order of protection proceedings res judicataeffect, the trial court effectively denied Lawrence a fairhearing on his request for custody of Lateef. Consequently, wemust vacate the judgment awarding custody to Kathy and remand thematter for a new hearing on that issue.

The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County isvacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Vacated and remanded.

BRESLIN and KOEHLER, J.J., concur.