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The State filed a juvenile petition requesting that theminors⁽¹⁾ be adjudged wards of the court due to allegations ofabuse and neglect. The court conducted a shelter care hearingand gave temporary custody of the minors to the IllinoisDepartment of Children and Family Services (DCFS). DCFSformulated a service plan for respondent with tasks includingalcohol treatment. The State later filed a supplemental petitionalleging six counts of abuse and neglect.

At an adjudicatory hearing on June 4, 1996, respondentadmitted the allegations in two counts of the supplementalpetition. According to those counts, respondent and her husband(the parents) endangered the minors by excessively using alcohol and engaging in physical altercations while under the influenceof alcohol. The court accepted respondent's admissions andadjudged that the minors were abused and neglected. Theremaining counts of the supplemental petition were dismissed.

At a dispositional hearing on July 18, 1996, the court notedthat the parents had made significant progress with their housingand in acknowledging their alcohol problems. Nevertheless, thecourt found that the minors' best interests warranted a transferof guardianship to DCFS. After announcing this finding, thecourt admonished the parents of their right "to appeal from theDispositional Order that will be entered."

A permanency review hearing⁽²⁾ was held on October 22, 1996. The court did not file its dispositional order (from the July 18hearing) until October 23, 1996. According to that order: theparents were adjudged unfit to have custody of the minors due toexcessive alcohol use; the minors were made wards of the court;and DCFS was named as their guardian with the right to place themin foster care. The parents were instructed to cooperate withDCFS and Catholic Social Service (CSS).

The next permanency review hearing was held on April 22,1997. In preparation for the hearing, a CSS caseworker submitteda report containing recommendations for further handling of thecase. The following colloquy occurred regarding therecommendations:

"BY MR. NEIGEL [Guardian Ad Litem]: Your Honor, Iwould concur in that recommendation. I think that,based on the report, the recommendations areappropriate.

I am pleased to see that there has been somemeaningful progress in this case. It looks like theparents are doing pretty much everything we're askingthem to, and I'm glad to see we're going in the rightdirection.

BY MR. DAVIS [parents' attorney]: We would agreewith the recommendations, Your Honor, and I just wantto state to the Court that I'm very pleased with myclients. I feel that they have made substantialprogress, and I would ask the Court to take note ofthat.

BY THE COURT: The Court would agree. When Ireceived the report sometime last week, it came as apleasant surprise. It's not always that we see, andparticularly in these cases, that parents are makingsubstantial progress.

And I think you both ought to be commended fortaking the steps that you have to help yourself andalso to help with your children. So you should becommended for that."

The next permanency review hearing was held on September 2,1997. A CSS caseworker submitted another report in preparationfor that hearing. According to the report, the parents hadmaintained an orderly home, cooperated in dealing with theirfinances, and were participating in an aftercare alcoholtreatment program. They reported having abstained from alcoholfor eight months. They were attending parenting classes throughCSS, and their visits with the minors had been graduallyincreased. The caseworker recommended that the minors bereturned home with close monitoring for six months. The courtadopted this recommendation and entered an order giving theparents physical custody of the minors. Guardianship remainedwith DCFS.

The minors were taken from the home again in January of1998, when a police officer reportedly found respondentintoxicated while supervising them. Subsequent permanency reviewhearings were held on March 3 and November 12, 1998. At bothhearings, the parents were ordered to cooperate with DCFS and CSSor risk having their parental rights terminated.

The State filed a petition to terminate the parents'parental rights on March 19, 1999. The grounds asserted forterminating respondent's rights were: (1) failure, within ninemonths of the minors' adjudication of abuse and neglect, to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions that caused them tobe removed from her custody; (2) failure, within nine months ofthe minors' adjudication of abuse and neglect, to make reasonableprogress toward their return to her custody; and (3) habitualdrunkenness for at least one year immediately prior tocommencement of the unfitness proceeding. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m),1(D)(k) (West 1998).

On May 13, 1999, the court held an initial hearing on thetermination petition. The permanency goal for the minors, whichhad previously been "return home," was changed to "substitutecare pending court determination on termination of parentalrights." The parents later denied the allegations in thetermination petition, and the case proceeded to a hearing on theissue of parental fitness.

The fitness hearing began on August 24, 1999. The State'sfirst witness was Kelly Rockwell, a CSS caseworker. AlthoughRockwell was new to respondent's case, she had reviewed the filematerials dating back to the minors' adjudication of abuse andneglect in 1996. Eight service plans had been written, the firstof which was dated May 28, 1996. Each plan contained objectivessuch as participation in alcohol counseling, attendance atAlcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings and parenting classes,achievement of financial stability, and maintenance of a cleanand safe home.

On July 30, 1996, one of respondent's visits with the minorswas canceled because she was intoxicated. Rockwell had nodocumentation of any subsequent visits being canceled due torespondent's intoxication. The overall ratings on the second andthird service plans (dated October 2, 1996, and April 2, 1997)were unsatisfactory. However, the overall ratings on the fourthand fifth plans (dated August 13, 1997, and January 5, 1998) weresatisfactory.

According to Rockwell, respondent subsequently quitparticipating in parenting classes. On January 31, 1998, a CSSemployee saw her husband drunk at a gas station. The minors hadreturned home by that time, and the police were called to checkon them. Rockwell testified that respondent was observed to beintoxicated while supervising the minors. They were consequentlytaken from the home again.

Rockwell further testified that respondent was dischargedfrom an alcohol counseling program in February of 1998 for lackof participation. She did not attend her AA meetings because oftransportation problems. CSS knew about the transportationproblems but never assisted respondent in attending her meetings. The overall ratings on the next three service plans wereunsatisfactory.

According to Rockwell, a CSS employee smelled alcohol on theparents' breath after a court hearing on May 13, 1999. Breathalyzer tests were consequently performed. Respondent'shusband failed his test, but respondent passed hers with areading of zero. Nevertheless, Rockwell testified thatrespondent admitted to drinking the night before the hearing. She also testified that respondent's biggest problem was ongoingalcohol consumption. When questioned about this conclusion, shecited the incident on May 13, 1999, and then stated: "we have noproof that she [respondent] has quit drinking. We have no reasonto believe that she has quit."

After a continuance, the fitness hearing resumed onSeptember 23, 1999. The State's second witness was TerryBoughan, an addiction specialist at Community Mental HealthCenter (CMHC). Boughan testified that respondent was evaluatedon August 21, 1996, and found to be alcohol dependent. She wasplaced in a comprehensive outpatient therapy program involvingfour sessions per week. She attended five sessions and thenbegan missing her appointments. The workers at CMHC believed shewas unable to abstain from alcohol in an outpatient setting. Shewas consequently discharged with a referral for residentialtreatment.

According to Boughan, respondent returned to CMHC onFebruary 21, 1997, reporting that she had successfully completedan inpatient program at Riverside Robert Young Center. She wasreassessed and placed in another outpatient program involving onesession per week. Regarding this program, Boughan testified: "itwould have been more in the nature of an after care type of lessintensive treatment as she appeared to have made some goodprogress in the residential treatment." She participated in theoutpatient program at CMHC through November of 1997. She did notreturn thereafter, informing Boughan that she was ill and had notransportation. Boughan believed she was credible and sincerelydesired treatment. Her file was closed on February 18, 1998.

As its final witness, the State called respondent and askeda few questions about the parents' social security income. Respondent then testified on her own behalf. She saidtransportation was always a problem when she tried to keep herappointments. She did not have a car or a driver's license. Thenearest AA meetings were 7 to 10 miles away, and no one in thegroup would give her a ride. She expressed these problems to herCSS caseworkers.

Respondent also testified that she had stopped drinkingalcohol within the last three to four weeks. She said she wasnot drinking when the police came to her house on January 31,1998. She paid all her bills and cleaned her house at least oncea week. From October of 1998 to April of 1999, she knew herservice plans required abstinence from alcohol and compliancewith CMHC's recommendations. Nevertheless, she acknowledgeddrinking alcohol and missing her sessions at CMHC during thatperiod.

The court found respondent unfit on all three groundsalleged in the State's termination petition. The court thenconducted a best interests hearing on October 14, 1999, andconcluded that the minors' best interests warranted terminatingrespondent's parental rights. She appeals from the ensuingtermination order.

Since termination of parental rights is an extraordinarilyserious matter, the State must first prove parental unfitness byclear and convincing evidence. In re M.F., 304 Ill. App. 3d 236,710 N.E.2d 519 (1999). Such a finding will not be reversed onappeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence(i.e., the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent). In re C.M.,R.M., K.M., and C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d 154, 711 N.E.2d 809(1999). A trial court's decision regarding a parent's fitness,and an appellate court's review of that decision, should be basedonly on evidence properly admitted at the fitness hearing. In reJ.G., 298 Ill. App. 3d 617, 699 N.E.2d 167 (1998); In re L.L.S.,218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 577 N.E.2d 1375 (1991).

At respondent's fitness hearing, the State requested thatthe court take judicial notice of the service plans. The judgeadvised that she possessed only one plan, and the State thencalled its first witness without any judicial notice being taken. Additionally, the State did not introduce any documentaryevidence. Our review is consequently limited to the testimonyoffered at the fitness hearing.

Two of the grounds on which the court found respondent unfitare codified in section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)). According to that section, a finding ofunfitness is proper when a parent has failed to make "reasonableefforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for theremoval of the child" or "reasonable progress toward the returnof the child to the parent." On either ground, the court mayonly consider evidence of parental conduct occurring within thestatutory period prescribed in section 1(D)(m). In re D.L., 191Ill. 2d 1, 727 N.E.2d 990 (2000); In re E.B., J.B., and D.B., No.4--99--0805 (June 1, 2000). The statutory period applicable torespondent's case is "within 9 months after [the] adjudication ofneglected or abused minor." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998); seeE.B., J.B., and D.B., No. 4--99--0805. The period began when thecourt filed its dispositional order. In re D.S., No. 4--99--0683(June 1, 2000) (noting that an adjudication of abuse or neglectis not complete until the dispositional order is filed).

Under these guidelines, the State bore the burden of provingby clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to makethe requisite reasonable efforts and progress between October 23,1996, and July 23, 1997. We hold that the court contravened themanifest weight of the evidence in finding that the State carriedits burden. Rockwell's testimony covering the relevant periodaddressed the service plan ratings with very little focus onrespondent's specific acts. However, the testimony did indicatethat respondent had regained custody of the minors by January of1998. The order returning custody to the parents was actuallyentered on September 2, 1997. Certainly the minors would nothave been returned home without respondent previously makingreasonable progress toward that goal and reasonable efforts toovercome her alcoholism.

Boughan's testimony confirmed that respondent madereasonable efforts during the relevant period. Respondent cameto CMHC in February of 1997 having successfully completed aninpatient alcohol treatment program. Boughan testified that she"appeared to have made some good progress in the residentialtreatment." She was reevaluated and found to need only oneoutpatient session per week. She subsequently participated in anaftercare program at CMHC through November of 1997.

Thus, the testimony from the fitness hearing showed thatrespondent made the requisite reasonable efforts and progress. The judge's comments at the end of the fitness hearing supportthis conclusion. She stated:

"[I]t took some period of time, but the parents did, totheir credit, involve themselves in the treatmentprogram, and because of their efforts and because ofthe progress made *** [the minors] were returnedsometime in August of 97.

[A]s I indicated, I think the parents expendedconsiderable efforts and especially the mother byinpatient treatment, but I am looking at the timeperiod after the removal in January of 98."

The judge then found respondent unfit, but she based the findingonly on conduct occurring after the relevant period.

Based on these facts, we see no way in which the State couldhave established by clear and convincing evidence that respondentfailed to make reasonable efforts and progress under section1(D)(m). The court's contrary findings are thus against themanifest weight of the evidence.

The other ground on which the court found respondent unfitis codified in section 1(D)(k) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS50/1(D)(k) (West 1998)). According to that section, parentalunfitness encompasses "[h]abitual drunkenness *** for at leastone year immediately prior to the commencement of the unfitnessproceeding." An unfitness proceeding commences when the Statefiles its petition for termination of parental rights. In reLatifah P., 307 Ill. App. 3d 558, 718 N.E.2d 1043 (1999); In reGrant M., 307 Ill. App. 3d 865, 719 N.E.2d 195 (1999). A findingof habitual drunkenness depends on a determination of whether theindividual (1) had a fixed habit of drinking to excess, and (2)used alcohol so frequently as to show an inability to control theneed or craving for it. In re D.M., W.M., and L.L., 298 Ill.App. 3d 574, 699 N.E.2d 212 (1998).

Under these guidelines, the State bore the burden of provingby clear and convincing evidence that respondent was a habitualdrunkard at least between March 19, 1998, and March 19, 1999. Weagain hold that the court contravened the manifest weight of theevidence in finding that the State carried its burden. At most,the evidence from the fitness hearing showed that respondentdrank alcohol and failed to attend her treatment sessions duringthe relevant period. The State did not establish the requiredfrequency and extent elements of a habitual drunkenness finding.

The evidence of respondent's drinking during the relevantperiod may raise a suspicion that she was a habitual drunkard atthat time. Rockwell seems to have based part of her testimony onsuch a suspicion, stating: "we have no proof that she[respondent] has quit drinking. We have no reason to believethat she has quit." Nevertheless, the State was required toprove its case by clear and convincing evidence, not meresuspicion. Such proof is especially important in light ofrespondent's successful treatment between the relevant period andher prior diagnosis of alcohol dependency. The State simply didnot present evidence establishing that respondent's alcoholconsumption during the relevant period rose to the level ofhabitual drunkenness. The court's contrary conclusion is thusagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.

Since the court's findings of unfitness were improper, wereverse the order terminating respondent's parental rights. Shehas raised additional claims of alleged errors committed duringthe termination proceedings. However, our reversal obviates theneed to address those claims.

Respondent also claims that the court erred in failing to(1) enter a written order at the adjudicatory hearing, and (2)make the required statutory findings at the permanency reviewhearings. She further claims that her counsel was ineffectivefor not insisting that the court follow these procedures. Wehave no jurisdiction to review these claims.

In a juvenile case, the adjudicatory order is generally notappealable because it is not a final order. In re J.M., 151 Ill.App. 3d 1037, 503 N.E.2d 1167 (1987). Rather, claims pertainingto the adjudicatory hearing are appealable upon entry of thecourt's dispositional order, which is final. J.M., 151 Ill. App.3d 1037, 503 N.E.2d 1167; In re Smith, 80 Ill. App. 3d 380, 399N.E.2d 701 (1980). Claims pertaining to the permanency reviewhearings are immediately appealable from the permanency revieworders. 705 ILCS 405/2--28(3) (West 1998); 155 Ill. 2d R.304(b)(1). To vest an appellate court with jurisdiction, a partymust file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment fromwhich appeal is sought. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1); In re C.S.,294 Ill. App. 3d 780, 691 N.E.2d 161 (1998) (in appeal from orderterminating parental rights, court had no jurisdiction to addressclaims pertaining to adjudicatory and dispositional hearings). This standard encompasses ineffective assistance of counselclaims. See In re S.D., 213 Ill. App. 3d 284, 571 N.E.2d 1162(1991) (in appeal from order terminating parental rights, courtwould not address father's claim that his counsel was ineffectiveat adjudicatory hearing).

The dispositional order was filed on October 23, 1996, andthe most recent permanency review order was filed on May 14,1999. Nevertheless, respondent did not file her notice of appealuntil November 12, 1999. Since the notice was untimely for herclaims pertaining to the adjudicatory and permanency reviewhearings, we lack jurisdiction to address those claims. We alsolack jurisdiction because, in the notice, she did not specifythat she was appealing from the adjudicatory and permanencyreview orders. See Citizens Against Regional Landfill v.Pollution Control Board, 255 Ill. App. 3d 903, 627 N.E.2d 682(1994).

The judgment of the Fulton County circuit court terminatingrespondent's parental rights is reversed. That portion of theappeal pertaining to the adjudicatory and permanency reviewhearings is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The cause isremanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded.

KOEHLER, J. concurring and HOMER, J. dissenting.

1. ¹The petition included a third minor, S.F., who is notinvolved in this appeal because she has reached majority.

2. ²This hearing, and subsequent hearings, are referred to inthe transcripts as status hearings, although they were clearlypermanency review hearings.