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A hit-and-run motor vehicle, if the driver or owner cannot be identified and which strikes, or causes another vehicle tostrike, you or a motor vehicle you are occupying, is an uninsured motor vehicle. If there is no physical contact withthe hit-and-run vehicle, the facts of the accident must be proved.

The Groshanses argued that they were entitled to coverage under that paragraph of their policy which deals with hit-and-runvehicles. Dairyland argued that the plaintiffs could not recover under the policy because no contact was made with the hit-and-run vehicle. The circuit court granted Dairyland's motion for summary judgment. The Groshanses appeal.

A motion for summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on fileshow that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Machinery Transports of Illinois v. Morton Community Bank, 293 Ill. App. 3d 207, 687 N.E.2d 533 (1997). An appellatecourt performs its review de novo. Container Corp. v. Wagner, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 689 N.E.2d 259 (1997).

In this case, we are called upon to determine whether the trial court erred in granting Dairyland's motion for summaryjudgment, thereby ruling as a matter of law that the Groshanses were not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage underDairyland's insurance policy.

The parties initially disagree about whether Illinois law requires physical contact between the insured's vehicle and a hit-and-run vehicle for an insured to recover under an uninsured motorist policy. Dairyland contends that case law in Illinoisprovides that physical contact is required. The Groshanses argue that Illinois law merely permits an insurance contract torequire actual contact between the vehicles, but that actual contact is not required by law.

Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 58 Ill.2d 109, 317 N.E.2d 550 (1974), speaks directly to this issue.In Ferega, the plaintiff ran off the road to avoid an oncoming car, much as Karl did in the case before us. Unlike this case,however, the policy held by the plaintiff in Ferega included a clause requiring physical contact between the hit-and-runvehicle and a vehicle occupied by the insured at the time of the accident. The supreme court found this provision of thepolicy to be consistent with section 143a of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a (West 1998)) which requires thatall automobile liability insurance policies include coverage for persons entitled to recover damages from a hit-and-runaccident. Ferega, 58 Ill. 2d at 111, 317 N.E.2d at 552. Thus, the court denied plaintiff coverage.

Dairyland contends that Ferega stands for the proposition that actual physical contact with a hit-and-run vehicle is requiredunder Illinois law before an insured may recover. We disagree. A careful reading of Ferega reveals that the court, whiledetermining that a provision in an insurance policy requiring physical contact is permissible under Illinois law, did not saythat physical contact is always required in order to recover under an uninsured motorist provision.

Illinois appellate courts clearly differ on this issue. While some have found, as we do, that Ferega merely stands for theproposition that a requirement of physical contact in an insurance policy is "valid under the Illinois insurance statute" (Colev. Pekin Insurance Co., 117 Ill. App. 3d 391, 453 N.E.2d 876 (1983)), others seem to suggest that Ferega requires physicalcontact regardless of the policy language. See Illinois National Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 116 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 452 N.E.2d707 (1983). We note that the vast majority of cases which indicate that Ferega requires physical contact involve policieswhich unequivocally state that physical contact is required, as did the policy in Ferega. See, e.g., Yutkin v. United StatesFidelity & Guaranty Co., 146 Ill. App. 3d 953, 497 N.E.2d 471 (1986); Swan v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 306 Ill.App. 3d 958, 715 N.E.2d 688 (1999).

Shortly after Ferega was decided, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the Ferega holding in Finch v. Central NationalInsurance Group of Omaha, 59 Ill. 2d 123, 319 N.E.2d 468 (1974). The insurance policy issued to the plaintiff in Finchlimited hit-and-run coverage to accidents in which some physical contact occurred. The supreme court reaffirmed its Feregadecision, stating that Ferega "held that physical contact between the vehicle of the insured and that of the hit-and-run driverwas required under the insurance policy and that the inclusion of a provision to that effect was valid under section 143a ofthe Illinois Insurance Code." Finch, 59 Ill. 2d at 124, 319 N.E.2d at 469. This language indicates to us that the supremecourt never intended to insert within all insurance policies a physical contact requirement where none exists.

Having found that Illinois law does not require actual physical contact but merely permits an insurance policy to requiresuch contact, we now turn to the question of whether the Dairyland policy required there to be actual physical contact inorder for the policyholders to recover.

The Groshanses argue that the plain language of the policy allows for coverage even when the hit-and-run vehicle does notactually strike the insured's vehicle. Specifically, the Groshanses cite to the following provision: "If there is no physicalcontact with the hit-and-run vehicle the facts of the accident must be proved." Alternatively, the Groshanses contend thatthe contract language is ambiguous when construed in conjunction with the other provisions in the same paragraph and,thus, according to Illinois law, the policy must be interpreted in their favor.

Dairyland contends that in taking the contract as a whole, as we must, it is evident that the policy language specificallyprohibits recovery absent physical contact between the insured's vehicle and some other vehicle. Dairyland argues thatimmediately preceding the sentence relied upon by the Groshanses, and within the same paragraph, is a sentence defining a"hit-and-run motor vehicle" for the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage. That preceding sentence states: "A hit-and-runmotor vehicle, if the driver or owner cannot be identified and which strikes, or causes another vehicle to strike you or amotor vehicle you are occupying is an uninsured motor vehicle." (Emphasis in original.) Dairyland contends that a closereview of the entire hit-and-run section indicates that the provision which requires the facts of an accident to be provedapplies to those situations where the hit-and-run vehicle causes another vehicle to strike the insured. Thus, while the policydoes not specifically state that "physical contact" is required as in Ferega, it does require that some vehicle strike theinsured's vehicle.

We find that the contract provision, requiring the facts of an accident to be proved when the hit-and-run vehicle does notstrike the insured, is ambiguous. The hit-and-run provision can be logically read as both parties have interpreted it. When acontract contains language that is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the contract is said to beambiguous. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Illinois v. Allsteel, 304 Ill. App. 3d 34, 709 N.E.2d 680 (1999). It is wellestablished in Illinois that all doubts and ambiguities in an insurance contract must be resolved in favor of the insured.Smagala v. Owen, 307 Ill. App. 3d 213, 717 N.E.2d 491 (1999).

Because we must construe the contract against the insurer, we find that the provision at issue in the Dairyland insurancepolicy does not require actual physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured's vehicle. The Groshansesmust now prove the facts of the accident in order to recover under the policy as there was no such contact between anothervehicle and the Groshanses' vehicle.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County is reversed and this cause is remanded forfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

LYTTON and KOEHLER, JJ., concur.