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1 September 2000

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JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
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Country Mutual Insurance Company (Country Mutual) filed suitagainst Universal Underwriters Insurance Company (Universal),seeking reimbursement of funds expended defending David Evans, whowas involved in a traffic accident while test driving a vehicleowned by Mike Murphy Ford (Ford) and insured by Universal. CountryMutual, as Evans' personal insurance carrier, alleged thatUniversal had primary liability because Evans was driving a thirdparty vehicle at the time of the accident. Country Mutual filed amotion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Universal appeals, claiming that (1) Country Mutual's coverage ofEvans is "co-primary;" (2) Country Mutual is liable for a pro ratashare of the defense; and (3) its policy limits are $20,000 perperson, $40,000 per occurrence and $15,000 for property damage. Weaffirm.

Evans was involved in an automobile accident while testdriving a vehicle owned by Ford. His liability insurance withCountry Mutual contained an "other insurance" clause, which statedthat "any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do notown will be excess over any other collectible insurance." (Emphasis in original.) The vehicle driven by Evans at the time ofthe accident was insured by Universal through a garage liabilityinsurance policy issued to Ford. Ford's policy provided that themost Universal "will pay" for a claim arising from a customeraccident "is that portion of such limits needed to comply with theminimum limits provision law in the jurisdiction where theOCCURRENCE took place." (Emphasis in original.)

Evans attempted to tender his defense of the underlyingpersonal injury and property damage claims to Universal, butUniversal refused to defend him. Country Mutual subsequentlydefended Evans under a reservation of rights against Universal. Country Mutual settled the claims against Evans for $49,808.13, andthen sued Universal for reimbursement.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The trial court granted Country Mutual's motion and deniedUniversal's motion, holding that (1) Universal's coverage wasprimary; (2) Country Mutual's coverage was excess; and (3)Universal's policy provided Evans with coverage in the amount of$100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. Universalappeals.

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, affidavits andother evidence establish, when viewed in a light most favorable tothe nonmovant, that there is no genuine issue of material fact, andthe movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co. v. Pavlick, 265 Ill. App.3d 526,529, 637 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 (1994). When a trial court grantssummary judgment, we review de novo. Courson v. Danville SchoolDistrict No. 118, 301 Ill. App.3d 752, 755, 704 N.E.2d 447, 449(1998).

Universal admits that it had primary liability for theaccident involved here, but it claims that Country Mutual's policyalso provided primary coverage. Citing Universal UnderwritersInsurance Group v. Griffin, 287 Ill. App.3d 61, 677 N.E.2d 1321(1997), Universal claims that coverage by the two insurancecompanies should be deemed "co-primary," and damages should beprorated between them based on policy limits. Country Mutualresponds that its policy only allowed for excess coverage.

Primary liability is generally placed on the insurer of anautomobile rather than on the insurer of a driver. State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group,182 Ill.2d 240, 246, 695 N.E.2d 848, 851 (1998); Pekin InsuranceCo. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 305 Ill. App.3d417, 421, 711 N.E.2d 1227, 1230 (1999). Thus, a garage liabilityinsurer has responsibility for providing primary coverage tocustomers test driving an automobile dealer's vehicles. State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co., 182 Ill.2d at 245-246, 695 N.E.2dat 851; Pekin Insurance Co., 305 Ill. App.3d at 421, 711 N.E.2d at1230.

Here, Universal must provide primary coverage to Evans as acustomer test driving a vehicle owned by Ford. See State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co., 182 Ill.2d at 245-246, 695 N.E.2dat 851; Pekin Insurance Co., 305 Ill. App.3d at 421, 711 N.E.2d at1230. Nothing alleged to exist in Evans' personal automobileinsurance policy can be construed as allowing co-primary coveragefor an accident occurring under these circumstances. On thecontrary, the policy that Country Mutual issued to Evans statedthat "any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do notown will be excess over any other collectible insurance." (Emphasis in original.) The language contained in Country Mutual'spolicy is consistent with the supreme court's analysis in StateFarm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., where the court noted "thatpursuant to custom in the insurance industry, primary liability isgenerally" not placed on the insurer of the driver of a vehicle;rather, liability is placed upon the insurer of the automobile. 182 Ill.2d at 246, 695 N.E.2d at 851.

Universal's argument for co-primary coverage, premised onGriffin, does not persuade. In Griffin, the court addressed whichinsurance company, that of an automobile dealership or that of atest driver, provided primary coverage for an accident involving atest driver. 287 Ill. App.3d at 74-75, 677 N.E.2d at 1330-1331. Because neither policy in that case could be construed as providingprimary liability, the court reasoned that the insurers shouldshare liability. Griffin, 287 Ill. App.3d at 75, 677 N.E.2d at1331. Griffin, however, was decided before our supreme court'sdecision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., findingthat regardless of the language in a dealership policy, itsinsurer's liability is always primary (182 Ill.2d at 246, 695N.E.2d at 851); thus, the analysis in Griffin is inapplicable here. See also, Browning v. Plumlee, No. 5-99-0379 (Aug 4, 2000). Accordingly, Universal's argument must fail.

Ford's garage liability insurance policy provides that themost Universal "will pay" for a claim arising from a customeraccident "is that portion of such limits needed to comply with theminimum limits provision law in the jurisdiction where theOCCURRENCE took place."

Universal argues that sections 7-317(b)(3) and 7-601(a) of theIllinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(3), 7-601(a)(West 1996)), establish the minimum amount of coverage that it wasrequired to provide Evans, i.e. $20,000 per person, $40,000 peroccurrence and $15,000 for property damage. See Griffin, 287 Ill.App.3d at 76-77, 677 N.E.2d at 1332. According to Universal,Country Mutual must pay any additional liability.

Country Mutual responds that the minimum amount of insurancecoverage required for a test driver at a car dealership is $100,000per person, $300,000 per occurrence and $50,000 for propertydamage, mandated by section 5-101(b)(6) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/5-101(b)(6) (West 1996)). See John Deere Insurance Co. v. AllstateInsurance Co., 298 Ill. App.3d 371, 377-379, 698 N.E.2d 635, 639-640 (1998).

Statutory language should be given its plain and ordinarymeaning. Cremer v. City of Macomb Board of Fire and PoliceCommissioners, 281 Ill. App.3d 497, 499, 666 N.E.2d 1209, 1210(1996). The goal of statutory construction is to effectuate thelanguage and intent of the legislature. People v. Frieberg, 147Ill.2d 326, 345, 589 N.E.2d 508, 517 (1992). Where there exists ageneral and a specific statutory provision relating to the samesubject, the specific provision should be applied. People v.Villarreal, 152 Ill.2d 368, 379, 604 N.E.2d 923, 928 (1992). Statutory construction is a question of law. Branson v. Departmentof Revenue, 168 Ill.2d 247, 254, 659 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1995).

In Griffin, the First District Appellate Court held thatsection 7-601(a) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West 1996)),establishes the minimum amount of insurance that a car dealershipmust provide its test drivers. 287 Ill. App.3d at 76, 677 N.E.2dat 1332. Section 7-601(a) states: "no [automobile] owner shallpermit another person to operate *** a motor vehicle *** unless themotor vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy." Theminimum amount of liability insurance required by section 7-601(a)is $20,000 per person, $40,000 per occurrence and $15,000 forproperty damage. See 625 ILCS 5/7-203 (West 1996).

A different panel of the First District Appellate Courtsubsequently rejected the application of section 7-601(a) to cardealerships. See John Deere Insurance Co., 298 Ill. App.3d at 378-379, 698 N.E.2d at 639-640. There, the court held that section 5-101(b)(6) of the Code, not section 7-601(a), governs minimumliability coverage that a garage liability insurance policy mustprovide to a customer test driving a vehicle. John Deere InsuranceCo., 298 Ill. App.3d at 377-379, 698 N.E.2d at 639-640. We agree.

Section 5-101, specifically applicable to new car dealers,provides:

(a) No person shall engage in this State in the business ofselling or dealing in, on consignment or otherwise, newvehicles *** unless licensed to do so in writing by theSecretary of State under the provisions of this section.

(b) An application for a new vehicle dealer's license shall be filed with the Secretary of State *** and shall contain:

6. A statement that the applicant has complied with theappropriate liability insurance requirement. *** Thepolicy must provide liability coverage in the minimumamounts of $100,000 for bodily injury to, or death of,any person, $300,000 for bodily injury to, or death of,two or more persons in any one accident, and $50,000 fordamage to property." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/5-101(a), (b)(6) (West 1996).

Section 5-102(b)(4) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/5-102(b)(4) (West1996), applicable to dealers of used vehicles, contains anidentical provision to section 5-101(b)(6).

Although section 7-601(a) also sets minimum requirements forautomobile insurance, that section is general in nature. On theother hand, sections 5-101(b)(6) and 5-102(b)(4) specificallyaddress insurance requirements of car dealerships. The plainlanguage of sections 5-101(b)(6) and 5-102(b)(4) establishesminimum liability requirements for car dealerships; theseprovisions apply whether the driver of a dealership vehicle is anemployee or a customer/permissive user. John Deere Insurance Co.,298 Ill. App.3d at 377-378, 698 N.E.2d at 639-640. Thus, asspecific statutory provisions, sections 5-101(b)(6) and 5-102(b)(4)must be given effect over the more general obligations undersection 7-601(a). See Villarreal, 152 Ill.2d at 379, 604 N.E.2d at928; John Deere Insurance Co., 298 Ill. App.3d at 377-379, 698N.E.2d at 639-640.

Furthermore, section 7-601(b) limits the applicability ofsection 7-601(a); it provides that certain "vehicles are exemptfrom the requirements of this section." See 625 ILCS 5/7-601(b)(West 1996). Exempted are vehicles "complying with laws whichrequire them to be insured in amounts meeting or exceeding theminimum amounts required by this Section." See 625 ILCS 5/7-601(b)(6) (West 1996). Here, Ford's vehicle is exempt undersection 7-601(b)(6) because it is insured in an amount exceedingthe minimum amounts required by section 7-601(a). See 625 ILCS5/5-101(b)(6), 5-102(b)(4) (West 1996). Accordingly, section 7-601(a) does not apply to this case.

We also reject Universal's contention that section 7-317,contained within article III of the Code, establishes the minimumliability limits for car dealerships.

Article III requires "proof of financial responsibility ***with respect to persons whose driver's licenses or drivingprivileges have been revoked *** or who have failed to payjudgments amounting to $500 or more as defined by Section 7-303." 625 ILCS 5/7-301 (West 1996); see also State Farm Mutual AutomobileInsurance Co., 182 Ill.2d at 244-245, 695 N.E.2d at 850 (theprovisions of article III require that certain motorists submitproof of financial responsibility for the future as a condition ofenjoying driving privileges.) Section 7-317 merely defines theminimum limits of a "motor vehicle liability policy" required underarticle III to avoid the loss of driving privileges. See 625 ILCS5/7-314 through 7-317 (West 1996). Thus, proof of minimumliability requirements, as stated in section 7-317, areinapplicable here.

The judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

SLATER, P.J., and HOLDRIDGE, J., concur.