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November 29, 2001

We reverse and remand. We hold that Shawn lacked therequisite standing to raise the issue of whether the doctors'failure to obtain a certificate of registration, as required by the Medical Corporation Act, rendered their bills void. We also holdthat a material issue of fact remains as to whether nonlicensedindividuals provided medical treatment to Neil and Brandi inviolation of the Medical Practice Act.

FACTS

On January 24, 1997, Neil and Brandi were injured in anautomobile accident with Shawn. As a result of the accident,Neil and Brandi received chiropractic care for theirinjuries from Drs. Gary and Callen Childs (doctors), East PeoriaChiropractic Clinic (EPCC), and Orthopedic Diagnostic &Rehabilitation (ODR). Thereafter, plaintiffs Ronald Brockett,individually and on behalf of his son Neil, and Brandi Osborn filedtwo separate personal injury actions against Shawn. The actionswere eventually consolidated.

One year later, Shawn filed a motion for partial summaryjudgment, seeking a determination by the trial court that the billsfor chiropractic services provided by EPCC and ODR were void as amatter of law. In his motion, Shawn claimed, inter alia, thatEPCC's parent company, Gary Childs, D.C., S.C. (parent company),failed to obtain a certificate of registration as required by theMedical Corporation Act (805 ILCS 15/1 et seq. (West 1998)), and that the doctors, through the parent company, allowed nonlicensedindividuals to provide chiropractic treatment to EPCC's and ODR'spatients in violation of the Medical Practice Act. Shawn alsoclaimed that ODR was an illegally created partnership betweenlicensed chiropractors and laypersons and that ODR illegallyengaged in fee-splitting and self-referral. Subsequent to thefiling of Shawn's motion, the doctors, EPCC, and ODR intervened.

At a deposition, Dr. Gary Childs testified that he is achiropractic physician licensed in the State of Illinois. Dr. GaryChilds and his son, Dr. Callen Childs, were the sole shareholdersof the parent company. Although "S.C." indicates that Gary Childs,D.C., S.C., is a medical corporation, the parent company did nothold a certificate of registration issued by the IllinoisDepartment of Professional Regulation (Department). The parentcompany was the owner of EPCC, a nonregistered company operated asa subchapter S corporation, which provided chiropractic adjustmentsand therapies. All chiropractic adjustments provided at EPCC wereperformed by the doctors, and all chiropractic therapies, such asintersegmental traction and interferential current therapies, wereperformed by the doctors or Dr. Childs' son Derek and otherunlicensed employees under the doctors' direct supervision.

Dr. Childs testified that ODR was created by the doctors andDerek as a general partnership between them to provide hands-onrehabilitation and testing services for EPCC's patients. Themajority of services at ODR were provided by Derek under thedoctors' direction. Derek owned 20% of ODR, received bonuses frompatient revenues when ODR made a profit, and had a vote in alldecisions regarding the operation of ODR.

Dr. Callen Childs testified that he is a licensed chiropracticphysician in the State of Illinois. Callen stated that allservices and corresponding charges for care rendered by thedoctors, EPCC, and ORD to Neil and Brandi were reasonable,customary, and necessary. Callen also stated that all chiropracticexaminations and manipulations provided to Neil and Brandi wererendered by the doctors, and all physical therapy was performedunder the doctors' direct supervision.

Thereafter, the trial court granted Shawn's motion for partialsummary judgment on the basis that the bills for chiropracticservices were void as a matter of law. In so doing, the courtdetermined that EPCC was not registered, that EPCC was the 100%referrer to ODR, and that there were no factual issues regardingthe ownership of ODR and the participation of its unlicensedemployees. The doctors appealed.

ANALYSIS

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred whenit granted Shawn's motion for partial summary judgment. This courtreviews a lower court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Grot v.First Bank of Schaumburg, 292 Ill. App. 3d 88, 684 N.E.2d 1016(1997).

The doctors first contend that the trial court erred when itdetermined that the medical bills were void because of the parentcompany's failure to obtain a certificate of registration asrequired by the Medical Corporation Act (805 ILCS 15/1 et seq.(West 1998)). Although the doctors ultimately address the meritsof the trial court's conclusion in detail, they argue initiallythat Shawn lacks standing to petition the court for relief. Weagree with the doctors that Shawn lacks the requisite standing.

The purpose of the standing requirement is to preclude aperson having no interest in a controversy from bringing suit. Townof Northville v. Village of Sheridan, 274 Ill. App. 3d 784, 655N.E.2d 22 (1995). In order for a party to have standing, the partymust suffer some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interestand must have sustained, or be in immediate danger of sustaining,a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct. Nolan v.Hillard, 309 Ill. App. 3d 129, 722 N.E.2d 736 (1999). That a partymay suffer in some abstract way will not suffice; there must be adirect injury to his property or rights. Jenner v. Wissore 164 Ill.App. 3d 259, 517 N.E.2d 1220 (1988).

We do not find any published decisions in Illinois involvingthe exact scenario presented in this case. It is clear, however,that Neil and Brandi received medical services from Drs. Child and their clinic. A contractual relationship existedbetween Neil and Brandi and their medical providers for which theynow seek reimbursement. See Ferguson v. New England Mutual LifeInsurance Co., 196 Ill. App. 3d 766, 554 N.E.2d 1013 (1990)(determining that a contract is found by the implied obligation ofa physician to his patient). Shawn is not a party to thiscontract. We believe that any alleged illegalities may not beaddressed by third parties such as Shawn. See Town of Northville,274 Ill. App. 3d at 786, 655 N.E.2d at 24 (determining that a partymust assert his own legal rights and interests, rather than basinghis claim for relief upon the rights of third parties). AlthoughShawn would ultimately benefit from a finding that the bills arevoid, there is no evidence that he has suffered a direct injuryfrom the doctors' failure to obtain a certificate of registration. Accordingly, we hold that Shawn does not have the appropriatestanding to raise the issue of whether the bills for chiropracticservices are void for lack of the certificate of registration required by the Medical Corporation Act, and we reverse.

In reaching our decision, we note that Shawn cites Tovar v.Paxton Community Memorial Hospital, 29 Ill. App. 3d 218, 330 N.E.2d247 (1975), in support of his contention that he has standing toraise this issue because EPCC and ODR were operated illegally andtheir bills were "uncollectible and unreasonable as a matter oflaw." In Tovar, the court determined that the purpose of alicensing requirement is to protect the public by assuring it ofadequately trained practitioners and that a person who practicesmedicine without obtaining a license as required by the MedicalPractice Act could not maintain an action for fees. Tovar, 29 Ill.App. 3d at 220, 330 N.E.2d at 249. Notwithstanding Shawn'scontention, we determine that Tovar is inapplicable to this casebecause, unlike the licensing requirement for a doctor under theMedical Practice Act, the certificate of registration required bythe Medical Corporation Act does not appear to be designed toprotect the public by assuring it of adequately trained physicians. See Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center v. HellenicRepublic, 980 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1992) (determining that a hospitalwhich failed to obtain a "certificate of need" from a state boardin order to perform kidney transplants was not barred fromcollecting its bills for services because the statutory violationwas not a serious affront to public policy or a serious injury tothe public welfare that would justify a refusal to enforce thecontract).

Despite our determination that Shawnlacks the requisite standing to raise the issue of whether thebills for services were void because of the medical company'sfailure to obtain the certificate of registration required by theMedical Corporation Act, Shawn is entitled to present evidence ofwhether the bills for chiropractic services were reasonable andnecessary. See Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 76 Ill. 2d353, 392 N.E.2d 1 (1979) (determining that a personal injuryplaintiff is not entitled to recover for the value of services thathe has obtained without expense, obligation, or liability). Assuch, this court must consider the doctors' second contention thatthe trial court erred when it determined that EPCC's and ODR's bills were void because nonlicensed individuals were providing medical treatmentto Neil and Brandi in violation of the Medical Practice Act.

Section 3 of the Medical Practice Act (225 ILCS 60/3 (West1998)) provides that "[n]o person shall practice medicine, or anyof its branches, or treat human ailments without the use of drugsand without operative surgery, without a valid, existing license todo so."

Based on our review of the record, we believe there is agenuine issue of material fact as to whether the services providedby Derek and other unlicensed employees violated theMedical Practice Act. The doctors claim that all of thechiropractic examinations and manipulations given to Neil andBrandi were rendered by them and that the physical therapyperformed by Derek and the others was under thedoctors' direct and constant supervision. The doctors also claim that no investigation was ever conducted by theDepartment into whether employees of EPCC or ODR were conductinginappropriate activities. Shawn claims the chiropractic therapiesand testing performed by Derek and the others should have beenperformed by licensed and trained individuals. Because a factualissue exists regarding whether laypersons were unlawfullypracticing medicine in violation of the Medical Practice Act, wehold that the trial court erred when it granted Shawn's motionfor partial summary judgment. See American National Bank v. Powell,293 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 691 N.E.2d 1162 (1997) (determining thatsummary judgment should be denied if a disputed material factexists).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Tazewell County is reversed, and this cause is remanded to thetrial court for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Reversed and remanded.

HOMER, P.J., concurring.

HOLDRIDGE, J., dissenting.

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court. The majority'sfinding that Davis lacked standing to challenge the validity of the bills issuedby Dr. Childs and ODR ignores the fact that in the underlying lawsuit, theplaintiffs sought to hold Davis liable for those bills. Clearly, Davis was inimmediate danger of sustaining a direct injury (i.e., liabilityfor payment of certain bills), and potential injury to his property rights wasfar more than abstract. I would find that Davis had standing to challenge thevalidity of the bills that plaintiffs sought to require him to pay.

Likewise, on the merits, I would affirm the trial court. An unlicensed entitycannot collect for services it rendered that would require a license. Tovarv. Paxton Community Hospital, 29 Ill. App. 3d 218, 220 (1975). Likewise,where the licensing requirements are promulgated for the protection of thepublic, our courts have held that contracts violating statutes governing thelicensing of professionals injure the public welfare and therefore cannot beenforced under any theory, including quantum meruit. See Ransburgv Haase, 224 Ill. App. 3d 681, 684-85 (1992). As there was no factualdispute over the appellants' failure to comply with the licensing provisions ofthe Medical Corporation Act (805 ILCS 15/5 et seq. (West 1998)), Iwould find that the trial court was correct in granting defendant's motion forsummary judgment.