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JUSTICE THOMAS HOMER delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises out of a declaratory judgment actionbrought by Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. (Aetna) against itsinsured, O'Rourke Bros., Inc. (O'Rourke), seeking to determineinsurance coverage. O'Rourke filed a counter-complaint againstAetna and brought a third-party complaint against AmericanManufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. (American Manufacturers),another insurer of O'Rourke, seeking declaratory judgment. Allof the parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trialcourt granted summary judgment in favor of AmericanManufacturers, finding that it owed O'Rourke no duty to defend orindemnify. The court granted partial summary judgment for Aetnaand partial summary judgment for O'Rourke, finding that Aetna hadno duty to defend or indemnify O'Rourke under its commercialgeneral liability (CGL) policy but had a duty to defend andindemnify O'Rourke under its commercial excess liability (CEL)policy. The court ordered Aetna to reimburse O'Rourke for themoney O'Rourke paid in settlements and further ordered Aetna topay O'Rourke's attorney fees in the declaratory judgment action. O'Rourke appealed, and Aetna cross-appealed. We affirm in part,reverse in part, and remand.

O'Rourke is a consumer electronics distributor headquarteredin Moline, Illinois. In the early 1990s O'Rourke entered into anagreement with American General Finance (AGF) in which AGF agreedto finance satellite systems that O'Rourke sold in Alabama andMississippi. Pursuant to their agreement, O'Rourke established acredit card purchasing program for its prospective customers. In1995, O'Rourke was named as a defendant in numerous consumercases filed in Mississippi and Alabama involving the sale andfinancing of satellite systems. The complaints in those casesalleged that O'Rourke made misrepresentations to its customers,committed fraud, breached contracts and violated truth-in-lendingstatutes. The complainants claimed that they suffered mentalanguish as a result of O'Rourke's scheme to defraud them. Someof the plaintiffs also claimed that they suffered damage tocredit or a fear of damage to credit because of O'Rourke'sactions. When the complaints were filed against O'Rourke,O'Rourke sought coverage from its insurers, Aetna and AmericanManufacturers.

Aetna issued CGL and CEL policies to O'Rourke for thecontract periods from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1994, andJanuary 1, 1994 to January 1, 1995. American Manufacturersissued CGL and CEL policies to O'Rourke for the policy periodfrom December 31, 1994 to December 31, 1995. The CGL policiesprovided coverage of up to $1 million, and the CEL policiesprovided coverage of up to $3 million each.

The CGL policies issued by Aetna and American Manufacturersprovide coverage for "'personal injury' caused by an offensearising out of your business, excluding advertising, publishing,broadcasting or telecasting done by you *** if the offense wascommitted in the 'coverage territory' during the policy period." Under the policies, "'[p]ersonal injury' means injury, other than'bodily injury', arising out of *** oral or written publicationof material that slanders or libels a person or organization ordisparages a person's or organization's goods, products orservices." The CGL policies also provide coverage for "bodilyinjury," which is defined as "injury, sickness or diseasesustained by a person, including death resulting from any ofthese at any time."

The CEL policies issued by Aetna and American Manufacturersprovide coverage for specific and defined occurrences not coveredby the CGL policies and provide excess coverage when theunderlying limits of the CGL policies have been exhausted. TheCEL policies issued by Aetna and American Manufacturers providecoverage for "bodily injury," "personal injury" and "advertisinginjury." "Bodily injury" has the same definition in bothAmerican Manufacturer's CEL and CGL policies. Aetna, however,defines "bodily injury" more expansively in its CEL policy toinclude "shock, fright, mental injury, disability, mentalanguish, humiliation, sickness or disease sustained by a person,including death resulting from any of these at any time."

The Aetna CEL policy provides that Aetna will pay on behalfof the insured the "ultimate net loss" in excess of the"applicable underlying limit" which the insured becomes legallyobligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury", "propertydamage, "personal injury" or advertising injury to which theinsurance applies. Under the policy, the "[a]pplicableunderlying limit" is the amount stated in the Declarations as the"retained limit." The amount of the retained limit identified inthe Declarations page is $10,000 for "any one occurrence oroffense." The CEL policy provides that the insurance appliesonly to bodily injury or property damage that occurs during thepolicy period that is caused by an "occurrence." The CEL policydefines "occurrence" as "an accident including continuous orrepeated exposure to substantially the same general harmfulconditions." Aetna's CEL policy specifically excludes coveragefor "bodily injury" or "property damage" expected or intendedfrom the standpoint of the insured.

O'Rourke gave notice of the claims to Aetna and AmericanManufacturers in October 1995, and submitted the complaints tothem. Both companies denied coverage. In September 1996, Aetnafiled a declaratory judgment action to resolve the coverageissues, and O'Rourke filed a counter-complaint for declaratoryjudgment against Aetna and a third-party complaint againstAmerican Manufacturers. O'Rourke filed a motion for partialsummary judgment against Aetna and American Manufacturers. Aetnafiled a counter-motion for summary judgment, and AmericanManufacturers filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

As a result of these motions, the trial court grantedsummary judgment in favor of American Manufacturers, ruling thatAmerican Manufacturers did not have a duty to defend or indemnifyO'Rourke under its CGL or CEL policies. The trial court grantedpartial summary judgment to Aetna, concluding that it had no dutyto defend or indemnify O'Rourke under its CGL policy and grantedpartial summary judgment to O'Rourke, finding that Aetna had aduty to defend and indemnify O'Rourke under its CEL policy. Thecourt also granted partial summary judgment to O'Rourke againstAetna for any further relief to which O'Rourke may be entitled. The trial court's orders expressly reserved for ruling whetherO'Rourke would be entitled to attorney fees and O'Rourke's rightof reimbursement for indemnity paid in settlement of theunderlying suits subject to the retained limit in the CEL policy,if applicable.

Later, O'Rourke filed a second motion for partial summaryjudgment seeking reimbursement for attorney fees for thedeclaratory judgment action and interest on amounts advanced byO'Rourke for defense costs and settlement of certain suits. Thetrial court granted the motion as to attorneys fees but did notaddress the issue of interest. O'Rourke filed a third motion forpartial summary judgment seeking indemnity for all settlementspaid by O'Rourke, and that motion was granted. The court orderedAetna to pay full reimbursement to O'Rourke for the cases thatO'Rourke had settled and precluded Aetna from asserting theretained limit as a coverage defense.

The trial court determined that there was no just reason fordelaying enforcement or appeal of the orders, and O'Rourkeappealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a). 155 Ill. 2d R.304(a). O'Rourke specifically appealed the court's finding thatAetna and American Manufacturers did not owe a duty to defend orindemnify under their CGL policies. In its cross-appeal, Aetnaclaims the court erred by (1) finding that Aetna had a duty todefend and indemnify under the CEL policy issued to O'Rourke, (2)holding that the retained limits set forth in the CEL policy wasinapplicable to O'Rourke's claims, and (3) granting O'Rourkeattorney fees incurred in the declaratory judgment action.

This court conducts a de novo review of the trial court'sgrant of summary judgment. Landeros v. Equity Property &Development, 321 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63, 747 N.E.2d 391, 398 (2001). Although the trial court found that neither Aetna norAmerican Manufacturers had a duty to defend under their CGLpolicies, O'Rourke claims that the allegations of damage tocredit reputation contained in some of the complaints aresufficient to invoke a duty to defend under both Aetna's andAmerican Manufacturers' GCL policies. O'Rourke argues that theclaims of injury to credit reputation establish claims of slanderor libel against O'Rourke and, therefore, fall under the GCLpolicies, which cover personal injury "arising out of *** oral orwritten publication of material that slanders or libels a personor organization or disparages."

To determine an insurer's duty to defend its insured,courts must look to the allegations of the underlying complaints,and if the complaints allege facts within or potentially withinpolicy coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend its insured.United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co. 144 Ill. 2d 64, 73, 578 N.E.2d 926, 930 (1991). However, thefactual allegations must be sufficient to make thisdetermination. Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 161, 384N.E.2d 335, 347 (1978).

Of the more than one hundred suits filed against O'Rourke,three complaints allege injury to credit reputation. Two of thecomplaints state that the complainant's "credit reputation hasbeen damaged." The other complaint states that the "Plaintiffs'credit records have been jeopardized and in some cases, ruined,by the action of the Defendants" and seeks an injunction"requiring the Defendants to remove any negative reporting bythem to any credit bureau or credit agency with respect to thePlaintiffs."

An insurer may not justifiably refuse to defend an actionagainst its insured unless it is clear from the face of theunderlying complaints that the allegations fail to state factswhich bring the case within, or potentially within, the policy'scoverage. Conway v. Country Casualty Insurance Co., 92 Ill. 2d388, 393, 442 N.E.2d 245, 247 (1982). Here, it is clear that thecomplaints fail to state facts which establish that O'Rourkecommitted defamation. Under the laws of Mississippi and Alabama,where the underlying complaints were filed, the followingelements must be alleged to state a cause of action fordefamation: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning theplaintiff; (2) an unprivileged communication of that statement toa third party; (3) fault amounting to at least negligence; and(4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of specialharm or the existence of special harm caused by the publicationof the statement. McCraig v. Talladega Publishing Co., 544 So.2d 875, 877 (Alab. 1989); Hamilton v. Hammons, 792 So. 2d 956,959 (Miss. 2001).

Of the complaints set out above, none of them allege thatO'Rourke made a false statement regarding the complainants. Although one complaint does imply that O'Rourke communicated someinformation to credit bureaus or credit agencies, that complaintdoes not allege that such information was false. Because thecomplaints do not allege that the damage resulted from any falsestatements made by O'Rourke, the complaints fail to set forthfacts that bring the claim potentially within the coverage of thepolicies. See Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Hartford FireInsurance Co., 424 F.Supp. 830, 833 (N.D.Ill. 1976) (explainingthat a complaint devoid of allegations that insured communicatedsomething about the plaintiffs' good name or reputation to athird person did not invoke insurer's duty to defend for libel orslander).

This court reviews de novo the trial court's partial grantof summary judgment to O'Rourke, in which the court concludedthat Aetna had a duty to defend and indemnify under its CELpolicy. See Landeros, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 63, 747 N.E.2d at 398. Aetna claims the trial court's conclusion was erroneous because(1) the injuries suffered by O'Rourke's customers did not resultfrom an "occurrence;" (2) O'Rourke should have expected itscustomers' injuries; (3) the complaints did not state that theinjuries occurred during policy periods; and (4) Aetna did notnecessarily have a duty to indemnify simply because it had a dutyto defend.

The CEL policy Aetna issued to O'Rourke provides coveragefor bodily injury caused by an "occurrence." The policy definesan occurrence as "an accident including continuous or repeatedexposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." When construing insurance policies, courts define an accident as"an unforeseen occurrence, usually of an untoward or disastrouscharacter or an undesigned sudden or unexpected event of aninflictive or unfortunate character." Monticello Insurance Co.v. Wil-Freds Construction, Inc., 277 Ill. App. 3d 697, 703, 661N.E.2d 451, 455 (1996). Aetna claims that it does not have aduty to defend or indemnify under the CEL policy because themental anguish suffered by O'Rourke's customers was foreseeable.

The issue that must be determined in deciding whether thereis an accident under a liability insurance policy is whether theinjury was expected or intended, not whether the acts wereperformed intentionally. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v.American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315 Ill. App. 3d 552,561, 734 N.E.2d 50, 57 (2000). The determination of whether anoccurrence qualifies as an accident requires a review of thematter from the objective foreseeability of the insured todetermine whether the contingency is known to all sensible peopleas likely to follow naturally from the insured's conduct. StateFarm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Martin, 296 Ill. App. 3d 466, 471,694 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (1998).

Although the economic injuries that O'Rourke's customerssuffered followed naturally from O'Rourke's defrauding scheme,these injuries are not recoverable under the terms of theinsurance policy. The bodily injury covered under the CEL policyis the mental anguish that the customers suffered. Because Aetnafailed to establish that the emotional injuries were the naturaland ordinary consequences of O'Rourke's actions, Aetna had a dutyto defend under the CEL policy. See Bonnie Owen Realty v.Cincinnati Insurance Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 812, 816, 670 N.E.2d1182, 1185 (1996) (explaining that any doubts about coverage areto be resolved in insured's favor in determining whether a dutyto defend exists).

In a variation on the preceding argument, Aetna claims itdid not owe a duty to defend because the injuries that O'Rourke'scustomers sustained should have been expected by O'Rourke. TheCEL policy provides an exclusion from coverage for "'[b]odilyinjury' or 'property damage' expected or intended from thestandpoint of the insured."

If the insured relies on an exclusionary provision indenying duty to defend, it must be clear and free from doubt thatthe policy's exclusion prevents coverage. Atlantic Mutual, 315Ill. App. 3d at 560, 734 N.E.2d at 56 (2000). Here, it is notclear from the complaint that O'Rourke expected or intended anybodily injuries to result from its satellite-selling scheme. Even if O'Rourke should have expected the injury of itscustomers, that is not enough to prove that the exclusion appliesbecause the exclusion employs a subjective standard that requiresO'Rourke to actually expect or intend the mental anguish sufferedby its customers. Since it is not clear that O'Rourke intendedor expected to cause the injuries to the customers, the policyexclusion will not prevent coverage.

Aetna also claims that it should not be required to defendor indemnify O'Rourke because the complaints do not allege thatthe complainants' injuries occurred during the policy periods. O'Rourke concedes that Aetna does not have a duty to defend twoof the lawsuits because those involved the sale of satellitesafter the policy expired on January 1, 1995. Although theremaining complaints identify dates of sales transactions duringthe Aetna policy periods, they do not identify when the customersexperienced their mental anguish.

An insurer owes a duty to defend whenever a complaintalleges facts that are potentially within policy coverage. WilkinInsulation Co. 144 Ill. 2d at 73, 578 N.E.2d at 930. Becausethe satellites were sold within the policy periods, the injuriescould have potentially occurred within that period since theinjuries arose from the sale of the satellites. That possibilityis enough to trigger Aetna's duty to defend. See FremontCompensation Insurance Co. v. Ace-Chicago Great Dane Corp., 304Ill. App. 3d 734, 710 N.E.2d 132 (1999); Petersen Sand andGravel, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 881 F.Supp. 309 (N.D. Ill.1995) (explaining that insurer was obligated to defend where itappeared that injury at least potentially occurred within thepolicy period).

Finally, Aetna claims that even if it owed O'Rourke a dutyto defend, that does not necessarily trigger a duty to indemnify. It is true that an insurer's duty to defend is broader than itsduty to indemnify. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. ResolutionTrust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 393-94, 620 N.E.2d 1073, 1081(1993). Although an insurer can normally dispute coverage evenafter a court determines there is a duty to defend, when aninsurer breaches its duty to defend, the estoppel doctrine hasbroad application and operates to bar the insurer from raisingpolicy defenses to coverage, even defenses that may have beensuccessful had the insurer not breached its duty to defend. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186Ill. 2d 127, 151-152, 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1135 (1999).

When an insurer fails to seek a declaratory judgment as toits obligations and rights in a timely manner or defend under areservation of rights, it has breached its duty to defend. Ehlco, 186 Ill. 2d at 150-151, 708 N.E.2d at 1135. The mostimportant factor in determining whether an insurer has breachedits duty to defend is not the raw chronological delay in aninsurer's filing a declaratory judgment action, but whether theinsurer waited until trial or settlement was imminent. Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Heileman Brewing Co., 321 Ill.App. 3d 622, 634, 747 N.E.2d 955, 965 (2001).

In the instant case, Aetna breached its duty to defend atleast some of the underlying suits because Aetna did not bringthe declaratory judgment action until 11 months after it wasnotified of the first claims by O'Rourke. By that time, four ofthe underlying suits had been settled and many other suits werefiled with the understanding that they would be settled in thenear future. However, many of the suits against O'Rourke werenot filed until after or shortly before Aetna filed itsdeclaratory judgment action. Aetna cannot be found to havebreached its duty to defend those cases in which Aetna soughtdeclaratory judgment in a timely manner. Consequently, we findit necessary to remand to the trial court to determine in whichcases Aetna breached its duty to defend.

For those cases in which Aetna breached its duty to defend,Aetna cannot raise defenses to coverage. See Central MutualInsurance Co. v. Kammerling, 212 Ill. App. 3d 744, 571 N.E.2d 806(1991) (holding that the insurer was estopped from assertingcoverage defenses when it waited to file a declaratory actionuntil 10 months after it had notice of the claim and severalmonths after it had notice of a potential settlement of theunderlying litigation). Consequently, Aetna is required toindemnify O'Rourke for the full amount of the settlements inthose cases.

For those cases in which the trial court determines thatAetna did not breach its duty to defend, Aetna should be allowedto raise coverage defenses. See Employers Insurance, 186 Ill. 2dat 151-52, 708 N.E.2d at 1135 (holding that an insurer cannormally dispute coverage even after a court determines there isa duty to defend). The court should then determine whether anydefenses to coverage apply which would absolve Aetna of itsresponsibility to indemnify O'Rourke. Additionally, we remand tothe trial court to determine what defense costs need to be paidby Aetna based on Aetna's failure to defend the suits againstO'Rourke.

The trial court determined that Aetna could not apply the$10,000 retained limits from its CEL policy to O'Rourke's claims. Aetna argues that the retained limit is an express term of thepolicy and should be treated like a deductible applying to everyclaim against O'Rourke so that Aetna is only required to pay forsettlements that exceed $10,000. O'Rourke agreed in oralarguments that the retained limit should be applied once toreduce the total amount that Aetna owes O'Rourke by $10,000, butargued that the retained limit should not apply to each and everyclaim against O'Rourke.

Because O'Rourke concedes that the retained limit should beapplied once to reduce the total amount Aetna owes O'Rourke, weconclude that the trial court erred by refusing to apply theretained limit at all. However, we further find that Aetnashould not be allowed to use the retained limit more than once. The insurance policy provides that the retained limit should beapplied to "any one occurrence or offense." The policy defines"occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeatedexposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."

We conclude that O'Rourke's solicitation campaign to sellthe satellite systems was one "occurrence." Illinois hasfollowed the majority of jurisdictions which conclude that thenumber of occurrences is determined by referring to the cause orthe causes of the damage rather than to the number of individualclaims or injuries. Illinois National Insurance Co. v.Szczepkowicz, 185 Ill. App. 3d 1091 1094-95, 542 N.E.2d 90(1989). In this case, the cause of the customers' injuries wasthe same -- O'Rourke's fraudulent sales campaign.

In United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 268Ill. App. 3d 598, 651 643 N.E.2d 1226, 1258 (1994), the insurancepolicy at issue defined "occurrence" the same as it was definedin Aetna's policy to include "continuous or repeated exposure tosubstantially the same condition***." In that case, the courtheld that Gypsum's continuing process of manufacturing andselling asbestos-containing products constituted one occurrence even though there were approximately 250 claims filed againstGypsum. Gypsum, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 652, 643 N.E.2d at 1259. Likewise, in this case, it was O'Rourke's continuing process ofsoliciting the satellite systems that gave rise to theplaintiffs' claims. Merely because there are many claims againstO'Rouke involving different plaintiffs, as in Gypsum, that doesnot mean that there were many occurrences. Consequently, weconclude that O'Rourke's acts constituted only one "occurrence,"and therefore the retained limit should apply only once.

Additionally, allowing Aetna to apply the retained limit toeach and every settlement by every plaintiff would, in effect,deny O'Rourke all coverage and make Aetna's CEL policy coverageillusory. See W.E. Erickson Construction, Inc. v. Chicago TitleInsurance Co., 266 Ill. App. 3d 905, 909, 641 N.E.2d 861, 864(1994) (explaining that an illusory promise is one that appearsto be a promise, but closer examination reveals that the promisorhas not promised to do anything.) All of the plaintiffs to datehave settled their cases against O'Rourke for amounts rangingfrom $0 to $6,000, so applying the $10,000 limit to each of thosesettlements would make O'Rourke liable for all of the damageawards and Aetna liable for none of them. Consequently, we holdthat Aetna should not be able to apply the retained limit to eachand every claim against O'Rourke.

A trial court's award of attorney fees will not beoverturned absent an abuse of discretion. Westchester FireInsurance Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d at 636, 747 N.E. 2d at 967. Acourt abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, fails toemploy conscientious judgment or ignores recognized principles oflaw. Roberts v. Illinois Power, 311 Ill. App. 3d 458, 461, 723N.E.2d 1180, 1183 (2000).

Illinois adheres to the general American rule that theprevailing party in a lawsuit must bear the costs of litigation,unless a statutory provision, an agreement between the parties,or an equitable exception provides otherwise. Brundidge v.Glendale Federal Bank, 168 Ill. 2d 235, 238, 659 N.E.2d 909, 911(1995). O'Rourke claims that the trial court's award of attorneyfees was appropriate based on (1) the Illinois declaratoryjudgment statute, (2) breach of the insurance contract, (3) a newequitable exception that should be created, and (4) the languageof the Aetna insurance policy, which provides that Aetna will payall "reasonable expenses incurred by the insured at our requestto assist us in the investigation or defense of the claim or'suit.'"

Illinois courts have uniformly held that absent vexatiousbehavior by the insurer, the insured cannot recover its attorneyfees incurred in a declaratory judgment action to establishcoverage. See Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 321 Ill. App. 3dat 638, 747 N.E.2d at 968-69; see also Bonnie Owen Realty, 283Ill. App. 3d 812, 670 N.E.2d 1182 (expressly rejecting that aninsurer should be required to pay insured's attorney fees basedon a breach of contract); International Insurance Co., v.Rollprint Packaging Products, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1015,728 N.E.2d 680, 694 (2000), (holding that an insurance policyproviding that the insurance company would pay "[a]ll reasonableexpenses incurred by the insured at our request" did notestablish an agreement that the insurer would cover attorneysfees and costs to the insured in a declaratory action). In thiscase, there was no finding that Aetna acted vexatiously in notdefending the claims brought against O'Rourke, and no suchfinding was appropriate because there were genuine coverageissues. Therefore, the trial court's award of attorney fees inthe declaratory judgment action was inappropriate and isreversed.

In its second motion for partial summary judgment, O'Rourkerequested attorneys fees and costs incurred in the declaratoryjudgment action as well as interest on the amounts advanced byO'Rourke for defense costs and settlements of certain suits. Thetrial court's order stated that "O'Rourke's Motion for PartialSummary Judgment as to attorneys' fees is granted ***." However,the order did not make any mention of the interest that O'Rourkerequested in its motion. Because we find this order is ambiguousas to whether prejudgment interest was granted by the trialcourt, we remand to the trial court for a determination ofwhether prejudgment interest should be awarded to O'Rourke. Wefind that remand is appropriate because an award of prejudgmentinterest is within the trial court's discretion. Liberty MutualInsurance Co. v. Westfield Insurance Co., 301 Ill. App. 3d 49,55, 703 N.E.2d 439, 443 (1998).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's grantof summary judgment to American Manufacturers and partial summaryjudgment to Aetna, holding they had no duty to defend under theirCGL policies. We also affirm in part the trial court's grant ofpartial summary judgment to O'Rourke, finding that Aetna owed aduty to defend under its CEL policy and must indemnify O'Rourkefor the settlements it made in the cases in which Aetna breachedits duty to defend. We remand for the court to determine whetherAetna has valid coverage defenses in cases in which Aetna timelyfiled its declaratory judgment action. We also remand for thetrial court to determine the amount of attorney fees Aetna owesO'Rourke for defending the suits that Aetna had a duty to defend. We reverse the trial court's finding that the "retained limits"cannot be raised at all and hold that the $10,000 retained limitcan be applied once to the entire amount that Aetna owesO'Rourke. Further, we reverse the trial court's award ofattorney fees and costs to O'Rourke in the declaratory judgmentaction. Finally, we remand on the issue of O'Rourke's requestfor prejudgment interest.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

BRESLIN, J, and LYTTON, PJ, concurring.