Adair Architects, Inc. v. Bruggeman

Case Date: 02/19/2004
Court: 3rd District Appellate
Docket No: 3-03-0229 Rel

No. 3-03-0229


IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2004

ADAIR ARCHITECTS, INC., an
Illinois corporation,

          Plaintiff-Appellee,

                    v.

ALAN R. BRUGGEMAN and LAURA A.
GOLDEN,

          Defendants-Appellants.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court
of the 12th Judicial Circuit
Will County, Illinois



No. 02-SC-5559


Honorable Robert C. Lorz,
Judge, Presiding

JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:


Adair Architects, Inc. (corporation), filed a lawsuit pro sein small claims court for payment due on an architectural contract. The court ruled in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, defendants arguethat the judgment is void because plaintiff's pro se representationby its president, Mark Adair (Adair), violated supreme court rule282(b). We reverse, finding that the proceedings were null andvoid ab initio.

Plaintiff corporation entered into a contract with defendants,Allen Bruggeman and Laura Golden to prepare architectural designand construction documents for an addition to their home. Adaircompleted the initial design development documents in July 2001 andsent them to defendants. In December of 2001, the parties met todiscuss the design drawings. Mr. Bruggeman felt the project wastoo expensive and he and Adair discussed ways to reduce the costs.

In July of 2002, Bruggeman received formal construction bidsindicating that the cost of the project would be around $450,000. Bruggeman called Adair and told him that the project was tooexpensive and that it was being abandoned. Following that phonecall, Adair sought payment for the hours he spent drafting theconstruction drawings. The contract provided that if "the clientwishes to abandon the project, fees will be paid to AdairArchitects, Inc,. for the work completed to date." Defendantsrefused to pay.

Without counsel and on behalf of his corporation, Adair fileda small claims action against defendants for the balance due. Adair is not an attorney. At the trial, the circuit court found infavor of Adair in the amount of $2907.50.

Supreme court rule 282(b) provides that "no corporation mayappear as a claimant, assignee, subrogee, or counterclaimant in asmall claims proceeding, unless represented by counsel." However,the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure permits a corporation toappear pro se: "a corporation may prosecute as plaintiff or defendas defendant any small claims proceeding in any court of this Statethrough any officer *** as though the corporation were appearing inits proper person." 735 ILCS 5/2-416 (2003).

Defendants argue that the corporation violated rule 282(b) byappearing in small claims court without counsel. Adair concedesthat he appeared without counsel, but argues that the Code of CivilProcedure explicitly authorizes such representation.

When a statute directly and irreconcilably conflicts with asupreme court rule on a matter within the court's authority, therule prevails. People v. Williams, 143 Ill. 2d 477, 483 (1991). The supreme court has primary constitutional authority over courtprocedure, and the doctrine of separation of powers is violated"when a legislative enactment unduly encroaches upon the inherentpowers of the judiciary, or directly and irreconcilably conflictswith a rule of this court on a matter within the court'sauthority." Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 528 (1997).

Rule 282 provides the procedure by which a corporation mayappear in small claims court. Matters of court procedure fallsquarely within the judiciary's authority to promulgate rules. Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 528. Since the matter is within the court'sauthority, rule 282(b) must prevail over section 2-416. If thecivil code was allowed to preempt Rule 282(b), the judiciary wouldbe nothing more than an extension of the legislature. "It is thecourt's solemn duty to protect the judicial power from legislativeencroachment and to preserve the integrity and independence of thejudiciary. People v. Felella, 131 Ill. 2d 525, 538-39 (1989).

In support of its argument, the corporation cites Woerner v.Seneca Petroleum, Inc., 175 Ill. App. 3d 329 (1988), decided bythis court in 1988. Woerner held that the statute prevailed overrule 282(b). However, during that same year our supreme courtdecided People v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 465, 473-75 (1988), whichheld that when a statute directly and irreconcilably conflicts witha supreme court rule on a matter within the court's authority, therule will prevail. See also Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 528(1997). The holding in Woerner must bow to the more recentprecedent established by the supreme court. See Walker, 119 Ill. 2dat 473-75.

Proceedings involving a layperson's representation of acorporation are null and void ab initio. Berg v. Mid-AmericaIndustrial, 293 Ill. App. 3d 731, 736 (1997). Since Adair, a non-attorney, appeared on behalf of the corporation pro se, theproceedings were void ab initio. Though we do not necessarilydisagree with the trial court's determination of the case on the merits, we must treat its decision as null and void. We note thatplaintiff is not foreclosed from re-filing a new claim with properrepresentation. See Saxon Mortgage, Inc. v. United FinancialMortgage Corp., 312 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1104 (2000).

The order of the circuit court of Will County is reversed.

Reversed.

MCDADE and SCHMIDT, JJ., concurring.