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JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

The Board of Trustees of the City of Aurora, Illinois, thepolice pension fund, Kevin Baxter, Daniel Hoffman, Edward Beale,John P. Duggan, and William J. Weigel (collectively, the Board),appeal the trial court's decision reversing the Board's denial of "line of duty" benefits to Robert W. White, after White was injuredwhile stepping out of his squad car to place a traffic citation onthe windshield of a car. We reverse.

The following facts are uncontroverted. On November 13, 1997,White, a 56-year-old, 23-year veteran of the Aurora policedepartment, was assigned to patrol the area of the Hollywood Casinoin Aurora. All officers were instructed to write more parkingcitations. As White exited his squad car to place a citation onthe windshield of a car illegally parked on a bridge near thecasino, he slipped. The accident caused an injury to his back thatresulted in a permanent disability.

On January 7, 1999, White applied for a "line of duty"disability pension under section 3--114.1 of the Illinois PensionCode (Pension Code or Code), which provided 65% of an officer'ssalary. 40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1996). On August 17, 1999, aftera hearing, the Board denied White's application for a "line ofduty" pension, leaving him eligible for a "not on duty" pension,which would provide 50% of his salary (40 ILCS 5/3--114.2 (West1996)).

On September 21, 1999, White filed a complaint foradministrative review, adding the City of Aurora as a party-defendant. On November 3, 1999, the trial court dismissed the Cityof Aurora. After hearing arguments and reviewing the parties'briefs, the trial court reversed the decision of the Board, findingthat White was entitled to a "line of duty" pension. The Boardfiled this timely appeal.

Section 3--114.1 of the Pension Code provides:

"Disability Pension--Line of duty. If a police officeras the result of sickness, accident or injury incurred in orresulting from the performance of an act of duty, is found tobe physically or mentally disabled for service in the policedepartment, so as to render necessary his or her suspension orretirement from the police service, the police officer shallbe entitled to a disability retirement pension of 65% of thesalary attached to the rank on the police force held by theofficer at the date of suspension or retirement. A policeofficer shall be considered 'on duty', while on any assignmentapproved by the chief of the police department of themunicipality he or she serves, whether the assignment iswithin or outside the municipality." (Emphasis added.) 40ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1996).

Initially we must address which standard of review to apply. White asserts that the issue presented is one of law and that theBoard's decision must be reviewed de novo. Conversely, the Boardcontends that the issue presented is a mixed question of fact andlaw and that its decision must be upheld unless it is clearlyerroneous. We agree with White.

On administrative review, determinations regarding questionsof fact are given deference and will not be disturbed unless theyare against the manifest weight of the evidence. City of Belviderev. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205(1998). Determinations regarding mixed questions of fact and laware not disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Belvidere,181 Ill. 2d at 205. Determinations regarding questions of law arereviewed de novo. Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. Interpretationof a statute is a question of law. Albazzaz v. Department ofProfessional Regulation, 314 Ill. App. 3d 97, 105 (2000).

Here, the facts were uncontroverted and the Board was chargedonly with interpreting the meaning of the term "act of duty" ascontained in section 3--114.1 (40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1996)) anddefined in section 5--113 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/5--113(West 1996)). Because these are purely issues of statutoryinterpretation, we will apply a de novo standard of review.

Section 3--114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code establishes,inter alia, the right of a police officer to receive a "line ofduty" disability retirement benefit equal to 65% of his salary atthe time the disability is allowed where the disability resultsfrom injury incurred in "the performance of an act of duty." 40ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1996). In contrast, section 3--114.2 of theCode provides that an officer disabled as the result "of any causeother than the performance of an act of duty" is to receive adisability benefit of 50% of his salary at the time the disabilityoccurs. 40 ILCS 5/3--114.2 (West 1996). Section 5--113 of theCode defines an "[a]ct of duty," in pertinent part, as follows:

"Any act of police duty inherently involving specialrisk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinarywalks of life, imposed on a policeman by the statutes of thisState or by the ordinances or police regulations of the cityin which this Article is in effect or by a special assignment***." (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West 1996).

See Robbins v. Board of Trustees of the Carbondale Police PensionFund, 177 Ill. 2d 533, 540 (1997) (court used the definition of"act of duty" contained in section 5--113 to interpret section 3--114.1).

On appeal, White contends that he is entitled to a line ofduty disability benefit because he sustained his injuries in theperformance of an act of duty as that term is defined in section5--113. We disagree.

It is well settled that to qualify for line of duty disabilitybenefits it is not enough that a police officer was injured whileon duty. Morgan v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity &Benefit Fund, 172 Ill. App. 3d 273, 276 (1988). Rather, a policeofficer is entitled to line of duty benefits only if he becomesinjured while on duty performing an act involving a special risknot shared by ordinary citizens. 40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West 1996);Johnson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & BenefitFund, 114 Ill. 2d 518, 522 (1986). For example, in Morgan, theAppellate Court, First District, determined that a police officerwas not entitled to line of duty benefits after he became disabledwhile attempting to sit down at a desk to fill out a police report. Morgan, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 274. In that case, the chair rolledout from under the police officer and he was injured. Morgan, 172Ill. App. 3d at 274. The court reasoned that filling out policereports did not involve any special risk not ordinarily assumed byordinary citizens. Morgan, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 276-77.

Morgan is instructive here. Just as filling out policereports does not involve a special risk, neither does exiting a carto place a traffic ticket on a windshield. Both filling out areport and exiting a car to place a notice or flyer are acts thatordinary citizens assume. Numerous civilian occupations involvefilling out citations and placing them where the violator will seethem. In fact, White acknowledged that parking regulations areenforced by Aurora employees who are not police officers. Moreover, like the Morgan court, we take judicial notice of thefact that, while completing such citations, many civilians exitautomobiles. As such, we cannot say that placing a citation on avehicle inherently involves a special risk not ordinarily assumedby citizens in the ordinary walks of life. Morgan, 172 Ill. App.3d at 276-77.

To support his argument, White cites Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 518;Barber v. Board of Trustees of the Village of South BarringtonPolice Pension Fund, 256 Ill. App. 3d 814 (1993); and Wagner v.Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 208 Ill. App. 3d 25(1991). These cases are distinguishable from the case at bar. Unlike the case at bar, the police officer in Johnson wasperforming an act that ordinary citizens are not obligated toperform; he was responding to a citizen in need of assistance. This is an "act of police duty inherently involving special risk"because, "unlike an ordinary citizen, the policeman has no optionas to whether to respond" (emphasis omitted) (Johnson, 114 Ill. 2dat 522). Unlike the officer in Johnson, in this case White exitedhis car at his own discretion. White chose, at his own discretion,where and when to stop his vehicle and how and when to exit it. Itis not the mundane nature of White's act that renders it ineligiblefor line of duty benefits but the fact that it did not involve anyspecial risk not ordinarily assumed by ordinary citizens. Thus,White's actions were more like those of an ordinary citizen andless like those of the officer in Johnson who had to respond to acitizen's need for assistance whenever and wherever he was called. The dissent minimizes these distinctions, but we find themparamount in synthesizing the cases addressing this issue,including Morgan, which the dissent seems to invalidate. Thedissent focuses on the fact that White was following orders bywriting tickets, rather than focusing on the nature of the act. Anofficer is entitled to line of duty benefits only if he was injuredwhile engaged in an act "inherently involving special risk, notordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life." (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West 1996). The dissent nevertells the reader how exiting a car to place a citation on awindshield involves a "special risk." We believe that writing aparking ticket and placing it on a windshield without the driverbeing present is more like the clerical act at issue in Morgan thanthe responsive police action at issue in Johnson. Further, unlikethe officer in Johnson, White in this case was performing an actperformed by nonpolice officers, namely, placing a traffic citationon the windshield of a vehicle. Thus, Johnson is not dispositivehere.

Barber and Wagner are not dispositive here for the same reasonas Johnson. Unlike the case at bar, the police officers in Barberand Wagner were performing police acts involving special risks. Barber, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 815 (officer was struck while effectinga traffic stop); Wagner, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 26 (officer injuredhis knee in part while escorting a resisting prisoner up a flightof steps and again while responding to a disturbance). Thus, thesecases are not controlling here.

Ignoring the definition of "act of duty" provided in section5--113 of the Code and Morgan (172 Ill. App. 3d at 276), thedissent eliminates the distinction between "act of duty" and "onduty." The dissent's assertion that we draw too fine a distinctionis belied by the dissent's failure to draw any distinction between"act of duty" and "on duty." We acknowledge that the Code is to beliberally construed in an officer's favor; however, the dissent'sview renders the Code's definition of "act of duty" meaningless andsuperfluous. "Act of duty" is not synonymous with "on duty." Something more is required. Under the dissent's interpretation ofthe Code, all officers injured while on duty would qualify for theline of duty benefit. This view is not supported by the Code orcase law.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuitcourt of Kane County reversing the denial of line of dutydisability benefits to White is reversed.

Reversed.

BOWMAN, J., concurs.

JUSTICE O'MALLEY, dissenting:

Given that pension statutes must be liberally construed infavor of the rights of the pensioner (Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 521),I am unable to distinguish Johnson and I would uphold the circuitcourt's decision reversing the Board's denial of line of dutybenefits to plaintiff.

There are two factual differences between this case andJohnson. First, as the majority's recitation of facts makes clear,White was acting in response to orders from superiors and inJohnson the officer was acting in response to a request from acitizen. Second, the officer in Johnson was crossing the street todeal with a traffic accident as opposed to a parking violation. Ifind these distinctions inadequate to distinguish the rationale ofJohnson. Johnson noted that, while performing their duties, policeofficers perform many acts that are similar to those involved incivilian occupations. Thus, under Johnson, the majority's pointthat "many civilians exit automobiles" to issue parking citationsis not dispositive. Slip op. at 5. In fact, as to exitingautomobiles, Johnson said:

"Police officers assigned to duties that involveprotection of the public discharge those duties by performingacts which are similar to those involved in many civilianoccupations. Driving an automobile, entering a building,walking up stairs, and even crossing the street are activitiescommon to many occupations, be it policeman or plumber.

There can be little question, police officers assigned toduties that involve protection of the public discharge theirresponsibilities by performing acts which are similar to thoseinvolved in many civilian occupations. The crux is thecapacity in which the police officer is acting." Johnson, 114Ill. 2d at 521-22.

The fact that civilians sometimes issue parking citations alsois not dispositive. Civilians routinely are employed by policedepartments to direct traffic (as was the officer in Johnson),issue parking and other citations, fill out accident reports, andguard prisoners, to name just a few of the functions performed byboth police officers and civilians.

The officer in Johnson was assigned to traffic-control duty ata street corner. My conclusion is that if the officer in Johnsonhad slipped while directing traffic, rather than walking across thestreet to assist a citizen regarding a traffic accident, thesupreme court still would have held that the officer was entitledto a line of duty pension. Under the majority's reasoning here,the officer would not be entitled to a line of duty pension if hehad been assigned by his employer to direct traffic, because policedepartments sometimes employ civilians to direct traffic. But hewould be entitled to a line of duty pension if he was directingtraffic after being alerted to a traffic jam by a citizen.

My reading of Johnson is that it held that, even though theofficer was only walking across the street in response to acitizen's request regarding a traffic accident, the officernevertheless "must have his attention and energies directed towardsbeing prepared to deal with any eventuality." Johnson, 114 Ill. 2dat 522. I see that observation by Johnson regarding the nature ofpolice duties to hold true regardless of whether the officer isengaged in the seemingly mundane task of walking across the streetto investigate a traffic accident or getting out of his squad carto enforce the parking laws. Nor should it matter whether theofficer is acting pursuant to direction from his supervisor, at therequest of a citizen, or on his own initiative. As Johnson quotedwith approval:

" 'A policeman is actually engaged in the performance ofhis duty for the protection of life and property whenever heis carrying out the official orders or requirements of hisoffice. Whether he be patrolling, investigating, or directingtraffic, the policeman is the very essence of and should standas a symbol of the protector of life and property.' (Blanchardv. New Orleans Police Department (La. App. 1968), 210 So. 2d585, 588.)" Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 523.

The majority asserts that I am focusing "on the fact thatWhite was following orders by writing tickets, rather than focusingon the nature of the act." Slip op. at 5. That is the samecriticism lodged by Justice Ryan in his dissent in Johnson. "Themajority seems to tie the 'act of duty' standard to the nature ofthe work to which the policeman is assigned, and not to the natureof the work in which he was engaged when injured." Johnson, 114Ill. 2d at 524 (Ryan, J., dissenting, joined by Miller, J.). AsJohnson said, the crux is the capacity in which the officer isacting, and Johnson makes clear that we are not to determine thatcapacity by assessing the dangerousness of the task nor the routinenature of the particular physical acts undertaken to perform thetask. "We do not find anything in the statute or in itslegislative history to support the [pension board's] strainedconstruction that the term 'special risk' only encompasses'inherently dangerous' activities." Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 521. As indicated in the quote above, Johnson finds that an officer onpatrol is acting in his capacity as "protector of life andproperty." The point I take from Johnson is that an officer doesnot stop patrolling and being on the alert "to deal with anyeventuality" when he is enforcing the traffic laws.

Instead of following Johnson, the majority follows Morgan, 172Ill. App. 3d 273, and relies on Morgan when it contends that I failto distinguish between "on duty" and "act of duty." Morgan basedits holding on the fact it was dealing with an officer who slippedout of a chair while inside a police station filling out a report,as distinguished from Johnson, which, Morgan observed, dealt withthe duties of a "traffic patrolman." Morgan, 172 Ill. App. 3d at276. Because Johnson failed to mention any "on duty--act of duty"distinction, Morgan cited Justice Ryan's dissenting opinion inJohnson to explain the distinction. Morgan, 172 Ill. App. 3d at277, citing Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 525 (Ryan, J., dissenting, joined by Miller, J.). Significantly, despite citing Morgan, themajority here ignores the Ryan dissent that Morgan relied on withemphasis: "Justice Ryan noted that under the majority opinion'almost all policemen, excepting those engaged in clerical duties,who are injured at work will be entitled to the enhancedpension.' " (Emphasis added by Morgan.) Morgan, 172 Ill. App. 3dat 277, quoting Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 525 (Ryan, J., dissenting,joined by Miller, J.). Morgan was then confronted with exactly thecase--one involving clerical duties--that Ryan said the Johnsonmajority would exclude from receiving an enhanced pension.

Indeed, under the rationale of Morgan, the plaintiff here ismuch more similarly situated to the officer in Johnson. They wereboth out on the street acting as "traffic patrolmen" rather than ina station "performing clerical duties." Thus, contrary to themajority's statement that my views would invalidate Morgan andresult in enhanced pensions for all officers injured while on duty, I agree with Morgan that the Justice Ryan's dissent is instructiveon the question of the distinction between "act of duty" and "onduty."

My basic problem with the majority is that, in light of thevery broad language in Johnson, the majority opinion here draws toofine a distinction. It will require pension boards to attempt todetermine whether civilians ever, sometimes, or frequently issueparking citations, direct traffic, or fill out traffic accidentreports and whether an officer was acting in response to an orderfrom a supervisor, at the request of a citizen, or on his owninitiative. In light of the very broad language of Johnson, suchfine, and, in my view, arbitrary, distinctions are inappropriate. In accordance with the rationale of Johnson and the principle thatpension statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of thepensioner, pension boards should resolve such fine distinctions infavor of the pensioner.

As Johnson said, the crux is the capacity in which the officeris acting. The officer in this case was enforcing the law. Granted, it was a mundane task, but, given what the officer inJohnson was doing and the strong language of Johnson, I amcompelled to dissent.