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Plaintiff, Wausau Insurance Company (Wausau), initiated asubrogation action against All Chicagoland Moving & Storage Company(Chicagoland), alleging that Chicagoland dropped and damaged anelectron microscope owned by the McCrone Group, Inc. (McCrone), andinsured by Wausau. Wausau's amended complaint alleged thatChicagoland acted negligently and breached a bailment agreementwith McCrone. The trial court granted Wausau summary judgment andawarded $90,500 in damages, and Chicagoland appeals. We affirm theportion of the court's order granting Wausau summary judgment, butwe reverse the award of $90,500 and remand the cause for a newdetermination of Wausau's damages.

FACTS

In June 1997, McCrone, a business which provides chemicalanalysis services, decided to replace a JEM200CX electronmicroscope (the microscope) with a more advanced microscope. McCrone had originally purchased the old microscope from JEOL, themicroscope's manufacturer, and intended to place the microscopewith JEOL for resale. JEOL contacted McDonald Moving & Storage(McDonald) to transport the microscope. On June 26, 1997, McDonaldretained Chicagoland to retrieve the microscope from McCrone'sWestmont facility, deliver it to Chicagoland's Elmhurst warehouse,and await further instruction from McDonald.

Larry Illingworth, Jr., a Chicagoland employee, prepared abill of lading and directed Mike Holt, an independent contractor,to retrieve the microscope and transport it to Chicagoland'sElmhurst warehouse. The bill of lading identified Chicagoland'swarehouse as the microscope's final destination. On June 30, 1997,Holt transported the microscope without incident. However, KevinIllingworth, Chicagoland's warehouse manager, dropped and damagedthe microscope while he and an assistant were repackaging it withinChicagoland's warehouse.

On appeal, Chicagoland contends that the damage occurred onthe day Chicagoland accepted the microscope. However Chicagoland'sanswer to the complaint states that the accident occurred two dayslater, "on or about July 2, 1997." Chicagoland concedes that itsagents dropped the microscope but insists that they were notnegligent in doing so.

Before the accident, McCrone had purchased from Wausau aninsurance policy that purportedly covered the microscope. McCronesubmitted a claim for the damaged microscope, and Wausau paidMcCrone $90,250 after accounting for the $250 deductible. Wausau'soriginal and amended complaints each sought $90,500, which allegedly represented the aggregate loss of the insurer and theinsured. After Wausau amended its complaint, the trial courtpermitted additional discovery but barred eight interrogatories anda deposition request submitted by Chicagoland that addressedWausau's damages. The trial court subsequently granted Wausausummary judgment on its subrogation claim against Chicagoland, andChicagoland timely appeals.

ANALYSIS

In all appeals from the entry of summary judgment, we conducta de novo review of the evidence in the record. Espinoza v. Elgin,Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). Summaryjudgment is appropriate where the pleadings, affidavits,depositions, and admissions on file, when viewed in the light mostfavorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuineissue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 1998);Bier v. Leanna Lakeside Property Ass'n, 305 Ill. App. 3d 45, 50(1999). "Summary judgment is a drastic means of resolvinglitigation and should be allowed only when the right of the movingparty is clear and free from doubt." Bier, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 50. "Therefore, where reasonable persons could draw divergentinferences from the undisputed material facts or where there is adispute as to a material fact, summary judgment should be deniedand the issue decided by the trier of fact." Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2dat 114.

If a party moving for summary judgment introduces facts that,if not contradicted, would entitle him to a judgment as a matter oflaw, the opposing party may not rely on his pleadings alone toraise issues of material fact. Hermes v. Fischer, 226 Ill. App. 3d820, 824 (1992).

In this case, Wausau and Chicagoland filed opposing motionsfor summary judgment to dispose of Wausau's subrogation claim, andthe trial court ruled for Wausau. Chicagoland asserts thatquestions of fact exist but nevertheless argues that it is entitledto summary judgment. Chicagoland contends that (1) Wausau did notestablish a prima facie case of bailment; (2) Chicagoland exerciseddue care in handling the microscope; (3) Wausau's subrogation claimis barred because McCrone's insurance policy did not require Wausauto pay for the loss; (4) the damage award of $90,500 is notsupported by competent evidence; (5) the bill of lading limitedChicagoland's liability to "$2 times the weight of the subjectmicroscope in pounds"; and (6) the trial court abused itsdiscretion in barring Chicagoland's discovery requests regardingWausau's damages.

Subrogation has been defined as the substitution of anotherperson in the place of a claimant whose rights he succeeds to inrelation to the debt or claim asserted, which he has paidinvoluntarily. North American Insurance Co. v. Kemper NationalInsurance Co., 325 Ill. App. 3d 477, 481 (2001). The right ofsubrogation may be grounded in equity or based on an express orimplied agreement. To establish its status as a subrogor, aninsurer must prove that (1) a third party is primarily liable tothe insured for the loss; (2) the insurer is secondarily liable tothe insured for the loss pursuant to an insurance policy; and (3)the insurer paid the insured under the policy, therebyextinguishing the debt of the third party. North American, 325Ill. App. 3d at 481. Chicagoland disputes whether Wausauestablished the first two elements of subrogation.

1. Chicagoland's Liability to Wausau

We initially consider whether Chicagoland is primarily liableto McCrone for the damage to the microscope. The trial courtdecided that Wausau proved Chicagoland's liability by establishinga prima facie case of bailment. " 'A bailment is the delivery ofproperty for some purpose upon a contract, express or implied, thatafter the purpose has been fulfilled, the property shall beredelivered to the bailor, or otherwise dealt with according to hisdirections, or kept until he reclaims it.' " American AmbassadorCasualty Co. v. Jackson, 295 Ill. App. 3d 485, 490 (1998), quotingAmerican Ambassador Casualty Co. v. City of Chicago, 205 Ill. App.3d 879, 881 (1990). To recover under a bailment theory, aplaintiff must establish (1) an express or implied agreement tocreate a bailment; (2) a delivery of the property in goodcondition; (3) the bailee's acceptance of the property; and (4) thebailee's failure to return the property or the bailee's redeliveryof the property in a damaged condition. Jackson, 295 Ill. App. 3dat 490.

A prima facie case of bailment creates a rebuttablepresumption that the defendant acted negligently. Jackson, 295Ill. App. 3d at 490. A bailee for hire must exercise reasonablecare under the circumstances, but he is not an insurer of thebailed property. Ortiz v. Warren Chevrolet, Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d199, 202 (1974). Whether a bailee has met the burden of showingthat damage to the bailed property occurred without the bailee'sfault is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier of fact. Ortiz, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 202. However, even though the questionis ordinarily a question of fact, a question of law that may bedispensed with by summary judgment is presented if only oneconclusion may be drawn from the undisputed facts. Reynolds v.Decatur Memorial Hospital, 277 Ill. App. 3d 80, 84 (1996).

Chicagoland concedes that it accepted the microscope atMcCrone's Westmont facility pursuant to the bill of lading and thatit returned the microscope in damaged condition. Therefore, theexistence of the first, third, and fourth elements of bailment isundisputed. However, Chicagoland argues that a question of factexists as to whether McCrone tendered the property in goodcondition. We agree with Wausau that the second and fourthelements of bailment can be established by evidence that the baileereturned the property in worse condition than when the bailortendered it.

Wausau's amended complaint alleges that "[a]t the timeCHICAGOLAND picked up McCrone's microscope, the microscope was notdamaged, was operable, and was otherwise in good condition." Inits answer to this particular allegation, Chicagoland stated that"on or about June 30, 1997, the subject microscope was in apparentgood order and condition at the time [Chicagoland] picked it upfrom a location in Westmont." Moreover, Donald Brooks, McCrone'sowner and president, stated in an affidavit that the microscope was"in good operating condition immediately prior to the microscopebeing dropped."

On appeal, Chicagoland ignores its admission and insteadrelies upon its document entitled "Electronic DescriptiveInventory," which Holt prepared when he accepted the disassembledmicroscope from McCrone. In the form, Holt noted that McCrone hadpackaged the microscope and that the "contents and condition [were]unknown." Chicagoland also argues that Brooks was unqualified tocomment on the microscope's condition because he did not operate itand because other McCrone employees were more familiar with it. Chicagoland presumes that the microscope was not in good conditionbecause McCrone believed it was "old technology" and intended tosell it.

A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocalstatement of a party, about a concrete fact, within the party'speculiar knowledge. It is well settled that the party making theadmission is bound by that admission and cannot contradict it. Ajudicial admission will support a grant of summary judgment. Eidson v. Audrey's CTL, Inc., 251 Ill. App. 3d 193, 195-96 (1993).

In its answer, Chicagoland stated that the microscope was in"apparent good *** condition" when it was accepted. Brooks statedthat, although he was not an expert in electron microscopy, he knewthat the microscope operated before Chicagoland dropped it. Holt's"Electronic Descriptive Inventory" merely asserts that themicroscope's external casing was scratched and that the conditionof the microscope was otherwise "unknown." The inventory form doesnot refute Brooks's affidavit, and no one disputes that McCroneintended to sell the microscope because it was obsolete, notbecause it was broken. Most importantly, Chicagoland concedes onappeal that the microscope was in worse condition after it "came incontact with the floor" of Chicagoland's warehouse. Chicagolandmay not rely upon a novel appellate argument to contradict itsprior admission, Wausau's pleadings, and Brooks's affidavit. Therefore, we conclude that Wausau established a prima facie caseof bailment and created a rebuttable presumption that Chicagolandacted negligently when it dropped the microscope.

We next address Chicagoland's contention that it exercised duecare in handling the microscope. Chicagoland relies exclusivelyupon a supplemental affidavit in which Kevin Illingworth describedin detail the equipment and procedures he used when moving themicroscope. Illingworth opined that he and his assistant were "incompliance with the custom and practice in the shipping industry"when they dropped the main column of the microscope. We need notconsider the conclusory portion of Illingworth's affidavit becauseSupreme Court Rule 191(a) states that an affidavit supporting asummary judgment motion "shall not consist of conclusions but offacts admissible in evidence." See Official Reports Advance SheetNo. 8 (April 17, 2002), R. 191(a), eff. July 1, 2002.

Furthermore, Illingworth admitted that he read JEOL's movinginstructions before he dropped the microscope. The instructionsdirected Illingworth to contact JEOL if he had any questions aboutmoving the microscope and cautioned that the microscope's maincolumn is "extremely heavy and can tip very easily." Chicagoland contends that the instructions were inadequate but concedes thatIllingworth did not contact JEOL or McCrone before moving themicroscope. Chicagoland does not allege that McCrone negligentlypackaged the microscope or that any intervening force contributedto the accident. Under these undisputed facts, we conclude thatthe trial court correctly decided that Chicagoland did not presentevidence to rebut the presumption that it acted negligently indropping the microscope.

2. Wausau's Liability to McCrone

We next address whether the insurance policy rendered Wausausecondarily liable to McCrone. Chicagoland argues that it isentitled to summary judgment because McCrone's insurance policy didnot require Wausau to pay for the loss. The construction of aninsurance policy is a matter of law subject to de novo review. Toascertain the meaning of the policy and the intent of the parties,a court must construe the policy as a whole considering the riskundertaken, the subject matter that is insured, and the purposes ofthe entire policy. The terms of the policy must be read accordingto their plain and ordinary meaning, and the court should notsearch for an ambiguity where there is none. Commonwealth EdisonCo. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 323 Ill. App. 3d 970, 986(2001).

McCrone's "Building and Personal Property" insurance policyprovides in relevant part:

"A. Coverage.

We will pay for direct physical loss or damage to CoveredProperty at [McCrone's Westmont facility] caused by orresulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.

1. Covered Property

Covered Property, as used in this Coverage Part, meansthe type of property described in this section A.1, andlimited in A.2, Property Not Covered, if a Limit of Insuranceis shown in the Declarations for that type of property.

* * *

b. Your Business Personal Property located in or on the[Westmont facility] or in the open (or in a vehicle) within100 feet of the described premises, consisting of thefollowing unless otherwise specified in the Declarations or onthe Your Business Personal Property Separation of Coverageform:

(2) Machinery and equipment;

(3) 'Stock';

* * *

5. Coverage Extensions

Except as otherwise provided, the following Extensionsapply to property located in or on the [Westmont facility] orin the open (or in a vehicle) within 100 feet of the describedpremises.

* * *

d. Property Off-Premises

You may extend the insurance provided by this CoverageForm to apply to your Covered Property, other than 'stock,'that is temporarily at a location you do not own, lease oroperate. *** The most we will pay for loss or damage underthis Extension is $10,000."

The building and personal property policy defines "stock" as"merchandise held in storage or for sale, raw materials and in-process or finished goods, including supplies used in their packingor shipping." A related policy section labeled "Business IncomeCoverage Form" further defines "finished stock" as "stock [McCrone]has manufactured."

McCrone purchased an additional "Match Guard EnhancementCover," which provides in relevant part:

"1. The BUILDING AND PERSONAL PROPERTY COVERAGE FORM *** ismodified as follows:

* * *

F. Property Off-Premises.

1. Provisions 5.d. Property Off-Premises is amendedto read:

You may extend the insurance provided by thiscoverage form to apply to Your Covered Propertyother than "stock," or contractor or mobileequipment that is temporarily at a location thatyou do not own, lease or operate.

* * *

The most We will pay for loss or damage under thisExtension is: *** $100,000 for all other CoveredProperty; and $100,000 in any one occurrence."

The commercial property conditions section of the insurancepolicy provides that "[i]f any person or organization to or forwhom we make payment under this Coverage Part has rights to recoverdamages from another, those rights are transferred to us to theextent of our payment."

We conclude that the plain language of the building andpersonal property policy provided coverage for "machinery andequipment" at McCrone's Westmont facility but limited coverage to$10,000 for property damaged at a location that McCrone did notown, lease, or operate. McCrone purchased the match guardenhancement, which increased the coverage to $100,000 for coveredproperty, other than "stock," that was damaged at a location otherthan McCrone's Westmont facility.

Chicagoland argues that the microscope is excluded fromcoverage as "stock" under the policy because McCrone intended tosell it. We disagree. The building and personal property policydefines stock in part as "merchandise held in storage or for sale." The policy does not define "merchandise," but the term commonlymeans "the commodities or goods that are bought and sold inbusiness." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1413(1993).

There is no dispute that McCrone is a business that ordinarilyrenders chemical analysis services. McCrone is not in the businessof manufacturing or selling microscopes or any other technicalequipment, and the planned microscope sale was designed to disposeof obsolete technology. Moreover, the policy defines "stock" toinclude raw materials and distinguishes "finished stock" as stockthat has completed a manufacturing process. We agree with Wausauthat the microscope is not a fungible commodity under the facts ofthis case. Therefore, we conclude that the microscope is not"stock," which is excluded under the policy. It is bettercharacterized as "equipment or machinery," which is covered underthe match guard enhancement.

In the trial court, Wausau argued that only the transportationcoverage provisions, which extend coverage to certain property thatis "in transit," covered the damaged microscope; the trial courtagreed. On appeal, however, the parties apparently agree that thetransportation coverage provisions do not confer coverage becausethe microscope was "in storage" at Chicagland's warehouse at thetime of the accident.

Chicagoland argues that Wausau may not now rely upon the matchguard enhancement in arguing that the microscope is covered. However, Wausau's prior interpretation of the provisions is not afactual admission that would preclude it from now arguing thatother sections of the policy confer coverage. Moreover, any waiverof the issue is a limitation on Wausau and not this court (Geise v.Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1994)); we mustpursue a just result and the maintenance of a sound and uniformbody of precedent that may sometimes override the considerations ofwaiver that stem from the adversary character of our system(Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer, 158 Ill. 2d 240, 251(1994)). The transportation coverage provisions merely extendcoverage to items while they are in transit; they do not excludethe microscope from coverage under other sections of the policy. Accordingly, we reject Chicagoland's assertion that, because thetransportation coverage provisions do not apply, the underlyingbuilding and personal property and match guard enhancementprovisions do not cover the microscope.

Chicagoland cites American National Bank & Trust Co. ofChicago v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 692 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 1982), forthe proposition that the subrogation claim is barred because Wausau paid McCrone's claim voluntarily. "Subrogation which is groundedin equity and applied as a matter of law is typically denominated'legal' subrogation. On the other hand, subrogation that isfounded upon an express or implied agreement (e.g., on an insurancecontract where the insurer is subrogated to any recovery forinjuries received directly from a tortfeasor) is termed'conventional' subrogation." Weyerhaeuser, 692 F.2d at 460 n.12. "Various equitable principles, such as the denial of subrogation toa volunteer or to a subrogee who has not paid the claim in full,are not applicable to conventional subrogation." Weyerhaeuser, 692F.2d at 460 n.12.

The equitable rule barring subrogation to a volunteer does notapply here because the insurance policy expressly transferredMcCrone's right of recovery to Wausau. Brooks, McCrone'spresident, acknowledged this transfer by executing a release andsubrogation receipt for Wausau when he received payment. Therefore, we agree with Wausau that it is irrelevant whether theinsurer paid the claim voluntarily. We further note that Wausauadvanced the policy favoring the prompt payment of insurance claimswhen it paid McCrone's claim without first litigating the parties'rights under the policy.

3. Wausau's Damages

Chicagoland alternatively argues that, if Chicagoland isliable, Wausau failed to prove its damages. We agree. In itsmotion for summary judgment, Wausau relied upon (1) the affidavitof Kathy Greenlee, a Wausau claims adjuster, and (2) Brooks'sanswer to an interrogatory. In opposition to the summary judgmentmotion, Chicagoland offered an October 14, 1997, letter from one ofWausau's consultants to a potential microscope buyer. The letterstated that a JEOL JEM200CX microscope, which is the same model atissue in this case, was available for $65,000. Although themicroscope was offered for sale "as is," the purchase priceincluded any repairs necessary to "make the system operational."

Greenlee stated in her affidavit that "the total amount paidas a result of the claim is $90,500." However, Wausau concedes onappeal that "Greenlee has no personal knowledge of how her companydetermined the value of the microscope" because she was assigned tothe case after McCrone's claim was processed. Rule 191(a) providesthat "[a]ffidavits in support of and in opposition to a motion forsummary judgment *** shall be made on the personal knowledge of theaffiants." See Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 17,2002), R. 191(a), eff. July 1, 2002. Therefore, Wausau may notrely upon Greenlee's affidavit to prove its damages.

In Wausau's answer to one of Chicagoland's interrogatories,Brooks stated as follows:

"[Wausau] states that its damages were calculated as follows:the microscope in question was purchased from JEOL in 1983 forthe price of $230,992.00 (after applying discounts and trade-in allowances). The microscope was in good operatingcondition immediately prior to the event described in [thecomplaint]. The microscope was damaged beyond repair as aresult of its being dropped by [Chicagoland]. The fair marketvalue of the microscope immediately prior to its being droppedwas $90,500.00. This figure was arrived at by conferring withJEOL, the manufacturer of the microscope, who opined that thefair market value of the microscope was $95,200.00. *** Thisinformation is consistent with what Mr. Brooks believed themicroscope to be worth as McCrone was going to place themicroscope for sale at a price of $120,000.00. [Wausau] isunaware of any salvage value to [sic] this microscope after itwas broken." (Emphasis added.)

In arguing that Brooks, as the owner of the microscope, couldtestify to its value, Wausau relies exclusively upon AmericanNational Bank & Trust Co. v. City of North Chicago, 155 Ill. App.3d 970 (1987). In American, the plaintiff alleged that thedefendants negligently demolished a building, and the trial courtbarred the valuation testimony of the general contractor who ownedthe building. This court reversed, holding that a person's statusas an owner of real property qualifies him to opine on the value ofthe property unless the party opposing the testimony shows that theowner does not know basic information about the property such asthe price paid for it, the income received from it, and itspotential uses. American, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 973. Although thecase apparently supports Wausau's contention that Brooks'svaluation of the property is adequate, American involved realproperty rather than personal property, such as the microscope inthis case. Several other cases discuss the evidentiary valuationrules that apply to personal property (see, e.g., State Farm v.Best in the West Foods, Inc., 282 Ill. App. 3d 470 (1996)), and weadmonish the parties for their failure to cite this relevantauthority.

It is well settled that a lay witness may give an opinion asto the value of personal property only if he has sufficientpersonal knowledge of the property and its value. Before a courtwill admit the valuation opinion of a lay witness, there must be anadequate showing of the factors on which he bases his testimony. Best in the West, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 483. In Best in the West, anatural gas explosion destroyed the defendant's grocery store, andthe plaintiff denied coverage under the defendant's insurancepolicy. At the jury trial, the court barred the store manager fromtestifying to the value of the inventory that his store could hold. Acknowledging that the competency question was close, this courtaffirmed the exclusion, noting that the manager had neverparticipated in the inventory process at the store and had notplaced orders for all the types of goods that the store carried. Best in the West, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 483.

Like the store manager in Best in the West, Brooks based hisvaluation on information outside his personal knowledge. Brooksstated that the damages estimation was based on the opinion ofunidentified JEOL employees, and Wausau did not provide depositiontestimony or an affidavit from any JEOL employee who had personalknowledge of the value of the microscope before and after theaccident. Like Greenlee's affidavit, Brooks's interrogatory answerviolates Rule 191(a) because it relies upon the opinions of others. We conclude that the trial court committed reversible error when itbased the $90,500 award on these documents.

Furthermore, Chicagoland created a question of material facton the damages issue when it introduced evidence that a potentiallycomparable microscope was on sale for only $65,000. We also notethat Brooks stated he was "unaware" of whether the microscope hadany salvage value, but it is undisputed that only the separatelypackaged main column of the microscope was dropped. The remainingparts of the microscope were not damaged, and they presumably havesome value, which should be ascertained on remand. We nextconsider whether the bill of lading limits Wausau's potentialdamages from Chicagoland. McDonald agreed to pay Chicagoland topick up the microscope at McCrone's Westmont facility and deliverit to Chicagoland's Elmhurst warehouse on June 30, 1997. Chicagoland prepared a bill of lading that incorporated byreference the loading instructions and a transportation orderprepared by JEOL. In the transportation order, JEOL directedChicagoland to "crate and hold [the microscope at the warehouse]until further notice." The bill of lading purportedly limitedChicagoland's liability to "A MAXIMUM VALUE EQUAL TO $2.00 TIMESTHE WEIGHT OF THE SHIPMENT IN POUNDS."

Chicagoland apparently concedes that McCrone is a third-partybeneficiary under McDonald's shipping agreement. Chicagoland thenargues that, if we decide Wausau is McCrone's subrogee, Wausau isbound by McDonald's agreement with Chicagoland. C.f., Draper v.Frontier Insurance Co., 265 Ill. App. 3d 739, 743 (1994) (a third-party beneficiary to a contract has no greater rights than theparty under which the third-party claims). Chicagoland contendsthat, because the bill of lading incorporated the JEOL movinginstructions and directed Chicagoland to hold the microscopeindefinitely, the bill of lading limited Chicagoland's liability atthe time Chicagoland dropped the microscope. We disagree.

Larry Illingworth, Sr., of Chicagoland admitted in adeposition that Chicagoland billed McDonald an additional $198 tostore the microscope for one month starting on June 30, 1997, theday it arrived at Chicagoland's warehouse. Chicagoland furtheradmits that it billed separately for the transportation and storageservices and that it was not hired to transport the microscopeanywhere after it reached the warehouse. Although the bill oflading directed Chicagoland to hold the microscope "until furthernotice," the undisputed facts reveal that Chicagoland dropped themicroscope two days after the one-month storage period began. Therefore, we conclude that the bill of lading, including thedamages limitation, ceased to operate as a contract after Holttendered the microscope to Chicagoland at its warehouse. Thestorage agreement, rather than the bill of lading, governed theparties' relationship, and Chicagoland does not contend that thestorage agreement limited its liability.

4. Discovery Matters

Because the issues will likely arise on remand, we nextaddress whether the trial court erred in (1) striking Chicagoland'sinterrogatories regarding damages and (2) denying Chicagoland leaveto depose Lori Wegner, Wausau's former claims adjuster whoprocessed McCrone's claim. Chicagoland argues that the proposeddiscovery was necessary after Wausau amended its complaint becausethe original complaint alleged a conventional breach of contractand the amended complaint presented new theories of bailment andthird-party breach of contract. Wausau responds that the court didnot abuse its discretion because Wausau alleged the same damages inboth the original and amended complaints.

A trial court has broad discretion in deciding discoverymatters, but orders restricting discovery will be reversed as anabuse of that discretion if they prevent the ascertainment of truthor substantially affect an issue in the case. Fidelity & CasualtyCo. v. Mobay Chemical Corp., 252 Ill. App. 3d 992, 1001 (1992). Inthis case, the trial court decided the damages issue aftererroneously considering Greenlee's affidavit and Brooks'sinterrogatory answer. The court adopted their valuations of themicroscope even though each relied on information outside her orhis personal knowledge. We acknowledge that Chicagoland could havesubmitted the discovery requests sooner, but the record revealsthat the damages issue is a fact question that should not have beendecided based on one party's unsupported hearsay evidence. Itappears that, even though she no longer works for Wausau, Wegner ismost familiar with McCrone's claim, and we conclude that the courtabused its discretion when it declined Chicagoland's request todepose her. On remand, both Chicagoland and Wausau are entitled toreasonable discovery, including depositions and interrogatories, onthe damages issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the portion of the trial court's ordergranting Wausau summary judgment is affirmed, the portion of theorder awarding Wausau $90,500 in damages is reversed, and the causeis remanded with directions.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded withdirections.

McLAREN and KAPALA, JJ., concur.