Vowell v. Pedersen

Case Date: 07/31/2000
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-99-0805 Rel

1 August 2000

No. 2--99--0805

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

MAXINE VOWELL and TONY VOWELL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MARSHALL E. PEDERSEN;
FOX VALLEY NEUROSURGERY, LTD.;
OLSTEN KIMBERLY QUALITY CARE;
ADVOCATE HEALTH CARE AND
HOSPITAL CORPORATION, d/b/a
Good Shepherd Hospital;
THERAPY NETWORK RESOURCES,
P.C.; and TAMARA WORKMAN,

Defendants-Appellees

(Barth H. Goldberg, Contemnor-
Appellant).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Lake County.


No. 98--L--281











Honorable
Charles F. Scott,
Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE GALASSO delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs, Maxine and Tony Vowell, and their attorney,the contemnor, Barth H. Goldberg, appeal from an order of thecircuit court of Lake County holding Mr. Goldberg in contempt forrefusing to comply with the circuit court's order to turn over to defendants Dr. Marshall Pedersen (also appearing in the record as Pederson) and Fox Valley Neurosurgery, Ltd., the records of Dr.Steven Lammers, a psychologist who treated Maxine.

Even where no party raises the question, a reviewing court hasa duty to consider sua sponte its jurisdiction. Cashmore v.Builders Square, Inc., 207 Ill. App. 3d 267, 269 (1990). For thereasons hereinafter set forth, we dismiss the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction.

In their jurisdictional statement, the plaintiffs state thatthis court has jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 301through 304. 134 Ill. 2d R. 301; 155 Ill. 2d Rs. 302, 303, 304. They further cite Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's MedicalCenter, 162 Ill. 2d 205 (1994), as additional authority in supportof this court's jurisdiction. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs inthis case, neither the case nor the rules cited provide this courtwith jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

In this case, Mr. Goldberg requested that the trial court holdhim in contempt in order to have this court review the orderrequiring the turnover of Maxine's psychological records to thedefendants. The following colloquy ensued:

"THE COURT: Okay. Well, then, I will find you intechnical contempt. Give me an order of contempt so that thiscase can wind its way immediately to the 2nd District, and, ofcourse, that will delay this case for about a year. So be it.

***

MR. GOLDBERG: Any specific language you want in theorder?

***

THE COURT: Rather than have the records produced, it ishereby ordered that--whatever counsel's name is--hereby be andhereby is held to be in contempt, and that gets you to theappellate court."

Contrary to the trial court's belief, an order merely holdingan individual in contempt is insufficient to give this courtjurisdiction over an appeal from such an order. In order for thiscourt to assume jurisdiction, the contempt order must imposesanctions of some kind upon the contemnor. See 155 Ill. 2d R.304(b)(5). It is the imposition of the sanction that is final andappealable. People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d 167,172 (1981). The order in this case merely provided that theattorney was held in contempt. No sanction was imposed. Therefore, the contempt order in this case is not final andappealable.

The purpose of the jurisdictional statement required bySupreme Court Rule 341(e)(4)(ii) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(4)(ii)) isnot merely to tell the court that it has jurisdiction. In reMarriage of Ruchala, 208 Ill. App. 3d 971, 976 (1991). Instead,the jurisdictional statement requirement was intended to provokecounsel to make an independent determination of the right to appealbefore writing the brief. Ruchala, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 976.

This case illustrates the necessity of giving more than lipservice to the requirement of providing the reviewing court with ajurisdictional statement; had counsel in this case focused on thespecific supreme court rule supporting jurisdiction in appeals fromcontempt orders, namely, Rule 304(b)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(5)),the necessity that the order appealed from contain a sanction inaddition to the finding of contempt would have been patentlyobvious. Moreover, a careful reading of Almgren would have alsoalerted counsel to the omission. See Almgren, 162 Ill. 2d at 204-05. Finally, we must comment that a contributing factor to thisscenario is the somewhat casual approach to the drafting of thecontempt order by both the trial court and counsel.

It is most unfortunate when a court finds itself forced todismiss appeals without reaching the merits because ofjurisdictional defects. However, we have a duty as an appellatecourt to dismiss an appeal if jurisdiction is wanting. Cashmore,207 Ill. App. 3d at 269.

Appeal dismissed.

BOWMAN, P.J., and RAPP, J., concur.