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JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

The Village of Mundelein appeals from an order of the circuitcourt of Lake County suppressing evidence obtained as a result ofan allegedly illegal investigatory stop of defendant, Robert C.Thompson, and rescinding the statutory summary suspension ofdefendant's driver's license, pursuant to section 11--501.1 of theIllinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 (West 2000)),for driving under the influence of alcohol. We dismiss the appealof the portion of the order suppressing evidence and reverse theportion of the order rescinding the summary suspension.

The parties purportedly stipulated to a statement of facts foruse at the suppression hearing. Both parties filed memoranda oflaw prior to the hearing, each of which contained a sectionentitled "Stipulated Facts" that referred to a transcript of adispatch tape from the Mundelein police department. The twostatements of stipulated facts are not identical, and, in fact,vary significantly in their phrasing at the critical juncture. There is no indication that any other evidence was presented. Wetherefore take the sequence of events from the points at which thestatements agree, except that for the critical events we provideboth the Village's and defendant's statements.

On December 7, 2001, shortly after 2 a.m., a male callercontacted the Mundelein police department to report that he was"following a guy in a van who seems to be drunk" and that the vanwas "all over the road." He described the van and provided itsfull license plate number. The dispatcher radioed a message toOfficer Kaplan of the Mundelein police department with adescription of the van and its license number.

Beyond this, defendant states:

"The dispatcher then continues the conversation withthe person who is still at this time unidentified whoindicates 'they got him right now. They are right behindhim.' At this time Officer Lechner (who has heard thedispatch to Officer Kaplan) *** attempts to stop thevehicle as the caller provides the dispatcher with hisname and address commenting at the same time 'Man, thisguy's refusing to stop.' At the request of thedispatcher, the caller then goes on to provide thedispatcher an address and phone number."

There is no indication of when the van actually pulled to the sideof the road, nor is there discussion of whether defendant everacknowledged the police by means other than pulling over.

The Village states:

"At 2:12:15 the dispatcher continues on with theirconversation with the caller to get an update on theirlocation. When the caller advises that they are justpassing Family Video, the dispatcher confirms thatinformation. The caller then states, 'They got him rightnow. They are right behind him.' *** When thedispatcher advises the caller to confirm that it is aminivan, the caller states, 'Yeah, he's right behind himnow. I'm in a wrecker.' Officer Lechner eventuallystops the defendant's minivan on Route 83 south ofMidlothian Road. (The Village would ask the Court to takejudicial notice that the distance from Hawley Street andGilmer Road to Route 83 and Midlothian Road isapproximately 3.1 miles.)

At this point, the dispatcher asks the caller forhis name and address. While giving his address, thecaller states 'Man, this guy's refusing to stop.' Aftergiving his name and address the caller advises thedispatcher, 'I'm going to standby, behind in case.' "

Defendant, the driver of the van, was eventually arrested andcharged with driving under the influence of alcohol.

Defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress theevidence derived from it and a petition to rescind the statutorysummary suspension of his driver's license. On March 15, 2002, thecircuit court granted both. It recited that the parties hadstipulated to the facts and to the transcript of the dispatch tape,and it ruled that all information available to the Mundeleindispatcher could be imputed to the arresting officer. It furtherruled:

"The dispatcher *** failed to obtain sufficientinformation prior to and up to the initiation of the stop*** including, but not limited to the fact that thedispatcher failed to obtain, at that time, identificationof the anonymous caller or verification of his identityor other information so as to provide sufficient indiciaof reliability as to warrant a Terry stop of thedefendant's vehicle."

The Village filed its notice of appeal from this order onApril 5, 2002. On July 11, 2002, the parties filed an "AgreedStatement of Facts," which differs in critical detail from the twoversions of "stipulated facts" presented to the trial court bydefendant and the Village. The parties' posttrial statementacknowledges the transcript of the dispatch tape, but does notstipulate "to the times or sequence as shown by the transcript."

We first must consider what facts are before us in thismatter. An agreed statement of facts, in lieu of a report ofproceedings, is a proper method of placing facts into the appellaterecord. 166 Ill. 2d R. 323. In general, we are forced to assumethat the adversarial process results in an agreed statement with afair semblance to the reality of what took place below. In thiscase, however, we can be certain that something has gone awry. Thetrial court ruled on the basis of the two statements of "stipulatedfacts" and both of these are available to us. Now the parties haveattempted to present us with a third set of purported facts that isclearly at variance from the first two. We do not believe that theparties consciously attempted to manipulate the facts to reframethe legal issues before us, but that would be the result of ouracceptance of the agreed statement. We will not knowingly allowthe parties to present facts and issues not before the trial court. See Tekansky v. Pearson, 263 Ill. App. 3d 759, 763-64 (1994)(refusing to consider facts not contained in the record on appeal). We therefore strike the agreed statement of facts and proceed onthe basis of the documents that were before the trial court.

We next consider the scope of our jurisdiction. A reviewingcourt has an independent duty to insure that jurisdiction is properin both civil and criminal cases (People v. O'Connor, 313 Ill. App.3d 134, 135 (2000)), and thus we treat issues of jurisdictionregardless of whether either party has raised them. The Villagestates that this court has jurisdiction over the appeal of thesuppression order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (188 Ill.2d R. 604(a)) and over the rescission of the summary suspensionpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303).

Supreme Court Rule 604(a) allows the State to pursueinterlocutory appeals of certain orders in criminal cases,including those for suppression of evidence, when the substantiveeffect of the order is a dismissal of the charge. This court hasconstrued Rule 604(a) to apply only to appeals brought by the Stateproper in criminal proceedings, and not to appeals brought bymunicipalities. Village of Cary v. Pavis, 171 Ill. App. 3d 1072(1988).

However, this court has held that when, pursuant to section16--102 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/16--102 (West 2000)), a municipalattorney prosecutes a violation of the Code with written permissionof the State's Attorney, the municipal attorney is acting as theState, and an appeal under Rule 604(a) will lie. City of HighlandPark v. Lee, 291 Ill. App. 3d 48, 49-50 (1997).

Thus, when a municipality brings an appeal pursuant to Rule604(a), the jurisdictional statement should include the fact thatthe prosecution was brought pursuant to some section of the Codeand that the municipal attorney has the written authority of theState's Attorney to bring such prosecutions. There is no suchstatement in the Village's brief.

In this case, the only indication of whether the prosecutionwas pursuant to the Code or some equivalent ordinance is thecitation issued to defendant. The uniform citation form has checkboxes indicating various sections of the Code. Under this are twomore check boxes, "ILCS" and "local ordinance." Next to the "localordinance" box is a space for the local ordinance citation. The"local ordinance" box is checked, but there is no citation to anyordinance. Lacking a clearer indication, we take this to indicatean intent to prosecute under a local ordinance. Village of Carycontrols as to the appeal of the suppression order, and thus thiscourt lacks jurisdiction over the appeal of that portion of theorder.

The Village has also appealed the rescission of defendant'ssummary suspension. A trial court's decision to grant or deny apetition to rescind a summary suspension is treated as a finalorder in a civil matter which is appealable under Rule 303. O'Connor, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 136. We thus have jurisdiction toreview the rescission. We note that our dismissal of the Village'sappeal from the suppression order is not a decision on the meritsof whether the traffic stop was proper. Therefore, our dismissalof the appeal from the suppression order does not preclude reviewof the rescission of the summary suspension because of resjudicata.

In a petition to revoke the summary suspension of a driver'slicense, the petitioner has the burden of providing a prima faciecase for the rescission. People v. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 289, 295(1996). The burden then shifts to the prosecution to come forwardwith evidence justifying the suspension. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at295. In the fourth amendment context, a defendant may shift theburden to the prosecution by showing that "he was doing nothingunusual to justify the intrusion by the police at the time of thestop." People v. Drewes, 278 Ill. App. 3d 786, 788 (1996).

Because the trial court's determination was based on thereview of written documents, and did not involve a determination ofthe credibility of witnesses, we consider de novo all the issuesthat determine whether defendant has met his burden of proof. SeePeople v. Hockenberry, 316 Ill. App. 3d 752, 755-56 (2000). Inother words, the question of whether a certain set of facts wouldprovide a basis for a seizure and the question of whether defendanthas made a prima facie case that no such facts exist are bothquestions of law, to be reviewed de novo.

Defendant argues that the summary suspension of his driver'slicense flowed from an improper seizure; defendant thus has theburden of making a preliminary showing that the Mundelein policehad no basis for the seizure. An investigatory seizure is properunder Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868(1968), when the police officer can point to specific andarticulable facts which, taken together with rational inferencesderived from those facts, indicate that the person seized iscommitting, has committed, or is about to commit an offense. People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d 863, 868 (1997). Probable causeis not required. People v. Mills, 115 Ill. App. 3d 809, 814(1983). An objective standard is applied to determine whether theseizure is reasonable, and a mere suspicion or hunch isinsufficient. People v. Vena, 122 Ill. App. 3d 154, 160 (1984); People v. Brodack, 296 Ill. App. 3d 71, 74 (1998).

In this case, the Village relies on the information receivedfrom the caller as sufficient grounds for the seizure. Only thefacts known to the officer at the time of the seizure can beconsidered in determining whether the seizure was proper--information gained after the seizure is made must be disregarded. People v. Yarber, 279 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524 (1996). We can inferfrom the structure of the stipulated facts and the circuit court'sorder that both the parties and the court assumed that a seizure iseffected when the police attempt to halt the target vehicle,presumably by activating the police car's emergency lights and/orits siren. This is not the case. In California v. Hodari D., 499U.S. 621, 626, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 697, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551(1991), the Supreme Court explained that for a seizure of a personto occur, there must be "either physical force *** or, where thatis absent, submission to the assertion of authority." (Emphasis inoriginal.) It is merely necessary but not sufficient that, takingall circumstances into consideration, a reasonable person in theposition at issue would have believed that he was not free toleave. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627-28, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 111 S.Ct. at 1551.

This court has applied Hodari D. to seizures involving movingvehicles in Brodack, 296 Ill App. 3d at 75, and People v. Perez,249 Ill. App. 3d 912, 916-17 (1993). In Brodack, an unidentifiedcaller from a cell phone gave a location, description, and partiallicense number of a car that was " 'all over the road.' " Brodack,296 Ill. App. 3d at 73. A police officer located the vehicle andactivated his car's mars lights, but the vehicle continued on forabout 600 feet, entered a left turn lane, made a turn into oncomingtraffic, and proceeded 100 feet into a parking lot before finallycoming to a stop. Brodack, 296 Ill App. 3d at 73. We held thatthe seizure occurred when the vehicle actually halted, andtherefore it was proper to consider all events prior to that pointin determining whether the officer had cause for the seizure. Brodack, 296 Ill App. 3d at 75.

In Perez, a sheriff's deputy had a general description anddirection of travel of a vehicle believed to have been used by theperpetrators of an armed robbery. She located a vehicle matchingthe description at a time and place consistent with the availableinformation. She activated her mars lights and floodlight, atwhich time she observed that a passenger appeared to be trying toconceal something. Perez, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 914. We held thatthe seizure was not effected until the point at which the vehiclebegan to yield and that, therefore, actions observed between theactivation of the lights and that point could be considered indetermining whether the deputy had grounds for the seizure. Perez,249 Ill. App. 3d at 917.

We acknowledge that, under the specific facts of the case,Brodack is consistent with Hodari D. in stating that the vehiclewas seized when it came to a halt. However, the formulation inPerez, that a seizure is effected only when the vehicle begins toyield, is more generally applicable. Hodari D. specifies that,when force is not used, it is the target's submission that marksthe point of seizure. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 113 L. Ed. 2d at697, 111 S. Ct. at 1550-51. For vehicles moving in traffic, anindication of submission may come well before the vehicle comes toa full halt.

According to the facts recited by defendant, "Officer Lechner*** attempt[ed] to stop the vehicle as the caller provide[d] thedispatcher with his name and address commenting at the same time'Man, this guy's refusing to stop.' " This phrasing stronglysuggests that the caller identified himself after the activation ofthe emergency lights and before any indication of submission by thevan.

The facts as recited by the Village confuse the issue. According to the Village:

"When the dispatcher advises the caller to confirm that it isa minivan, the caller states, 'Yeah, he's right behind himnow. I'm in a wrecker.' Officer Lechner eventually stops thedefendant's minivan on Route 83 south of Midlothian Road. (TheVillage would ask the Court to take judicial notice that thedistance from Hawley Street and Gilmer Road to Route 83 andMidlothian Road is approximately 3.1 miles.)

At this point, the dispatcher asks the caller for hisname and address. While giving his address, the caller states'Man, this guy's refusing to stop.' "

This could be read to state that the dispatcher asks thecaller for his name at the point that the van actually halts, andthat it is after the van halts that the caller exclaims " 'Man,this guy's refusing to stop.' " We do not need to presuppose thetruth of the caller's exclamation to conclude that this sequence ofevents is utterly implausible. This cannot have been what theVillage intended its statement to say. After reviewing theparties' factual assertions, we consider it established that theMundelein police knew the name and address of the caller beforethey seized defendant.

In this case, defendant argues that the seizure was improperbecause the caller was unreliable, and we now turn to the questionof whether the police had established the reasonable suspicionnecessary to seize defendant. An informant's tip to police mustbear some indicia of reliability to provide a sufficient basis fora Terry-type seizure. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110L. Ed. 2d 301, 308, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415-16 (1990). In oldercases, if police received information from the victim of, or awitness to, a crime, the information was viewed as presumptivelyreliable. People v. Townsend, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1095 (1980); 2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure