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IN THE

PRESIDING JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, the Village of Itasca appeals the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of its complaintagainst defendants, the Village of Lisle (Lisle) and Environetx, LLC (Environetx), under the Codeof Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--615, 2--619 (West 2002)) and its denial of plaintiff'smotion for reconsideration and motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff argues that(1) it has standing to bring its claims; (2) the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over its claims;(3) the trial court's denial of its motion for leave to file an amended complaint was an abuse ofdiscretion; (4) the trial court's denial of its motion for reconsideration was an abuse of discretion; (5)it adequately alleged a claim for imposition of a constructive trust; and (6) the trial court improperlydismissed its claim for tortious interference. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff and Lisle are municipal corporations located in Du Page County; Environetx is anIllinois limited liability company that sells office products within the State of Illinois. While it waslocated in Itasca, Environetx generated substantial tax income for the municipality, which receivedpercentages of the company's state sales tax payments under the Service Occupation Tax Act (35ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2002)) and the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act (35 ILCS 120/1 et seq.(West 2002)). In August and September 2000, Environetx agreed to move its sales operations fromItasca to Lisle so that Lisle could benefit from Environetx's state sales tax revenues. Lisle, in turn,offered Environetx a sales tax rebate projected to be worth approximately $1.7 million of theestimated $3 million Lisle would receive from sales tax revenues generated by Environetx over thenext 10 years. Thereafter, Environetx began listing Lisle as the site of its sales for state sales taxpurposes in its filings with the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR). The parties dispute whetherEnvironetx actually moved the site of its sales operations to Lisle.

On October 8, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants, for a declaratory judgmentinvalidating the agreement between defendants, the imposition of a constructive trust on all sales taxrevenues retained by Lisle and generated by Environetx, and tortious interference with prospectiveeconomic expectation or advantage. In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that the findings of fact Lisleused to support the tax rebate agreement were false (see 65 ILCS 5/8--11--20 (West 2002) (listingstatutorily required findings of fact for such tax rebate programs)) and also that Environetx in factnever moved its offices out of Itasca as it claimed. Defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff'scomplaint under sections 2--615 and 2--619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2--615, 2--619 (West 2002)). The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, holding that (1) plaintiff did not have standing to seeka declaratory judgment nullifying defendants' agreement; (2) the court lacked subject matterjurisdiction to determine whether Environetx was falsely reporting to IDOR the origin municipalityof its sales; and (3) Lisle had no duty toward plaintiff sufficient to support a tortious-interference-with-a-business-relationship claim and, in any event, Lisle was immune from liability for tortiousinterference. The trial court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and motionfor leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff timely appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's first issue on appeal is whether the trial court improperly dismissed its action forlack of standing. Our standard of review is de novo. Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220-21 (1999).

Here, the trial court found that plaintiff lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgmentinvalidating the agreement between defendants. The doctrine of standing is designed to precludepersons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 221. Thedoctrine assures that issues are raised only by those parties with a real interest in the outcome of thecontroversy. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 221. Standing requires some injury in fact to a legally cognizableinterest. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 221. The claimed injury must be actual or threatened, and it must be(1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) substantially likely tobe prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 221. In thecontext of an action for declaratory relief, there must be an actual controversy between adverseparties, and the party requesting the declaration must possess some personal claim, status, or rightthat is capable of being affected by the grant of such relief. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 221.

In this case, plaintiff does not have standing to pursue its claim because the relief it seeks isnot substantially likely to provide redress for any harm caused it. Plaintiff's alleged injury is its lossof tax revenue due to the fact that Environetx is now listing its sales site as Lisle instead of Itasca. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a declaratory judgment nullifying the rebate agreement betweendefendants. Even if the court were to grant such relief, plaintiff's injury would not be cured. Adeclaration that the contract between defendants is null and void would not alter Environetx's taxfilings and thus would not remedy plaintiff's alleged injury. The only direct result of the declaratoryjudgment plaintiff seeks would be a cessation of Environetx's rebate benefits from Lisle.

Plaintiff's assertion that a declaration nullifying defendants' agreement would simultaneouslybe a declaration that Environetx's tax site never moved out of Itasca is simply not true. The issue ofthe validity of the rebate agreement centers on whether the statutory requirements for the tax rebateprogram were actually met; the issue of Environetx's tax site centers on whether Environetx's salesoperation actually relocated. The two issues are entirely separate, and a ruling in favor of plaintiffon one would not necessitate a ruling in favor of plaintiff on the other. Thus, we find that plaintifflacks standing to pursue its declaratory judgment claim.

However, in its proposed amended complaint, plaintiff also sought a declaration thatEnvironetx was falsely reporting the site of its sales. If the court had jurisdiction to find that Itasca,and not Lisle, was the actual site of Environetx's sales, and if the court allowed plaintiff to amend itscomplaint, then the court would address an issue that, if resolved in plaintiff's favor, would affordplaintiff redress for its alleged injury. Accordingly, we must now consider plaintiff's next two issueson appeal: whether the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's false-tax-site claim,and whether the trial court should have allowed plaintiff's amended complaint, which included thefalse-tax-site claim.

Plaintiff's second issue on appeal is whether the trial court improperly dismissed its action forwant of subject matter jurisdiction under section 2--619 of the Code. We will review de novo thetrial court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss. Krilich v. American National Bank & Trust Co.of Chicago, 334 Ill. App. 3d 563, 571 (2002).

The circuit courts of Illinois have original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters. EmployersMutual Cos. v. Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d 284, 287 (1994); Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,