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JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

The Village of Algonquin (the Village) appeals from the trialcourt's order rescinding the statutory summary suspension of thedriving privileges of defendant, Joan Tilden. On appeal, theVillage contends that the trial court committed reversible errorwhen it excluded defendant's incriminating statements made beforethe arrest and barred the Village from calling defendant as anadverse witness at the hearing. We reverse.

FACTS

At 2:49 p.m. on November 5, 2001, Algonquin police officerTimothy Wilkin arrested defendant for driving under the influenceof alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(1) (West 2000)) after shefailed several roadside sobriety tests and chemical testingrevealed that her blood-alcohol concentration was 0.223. TheSecretary of State summarily suspended defendant's drivingprivileges pursuant to section 11--501.1(e) of the Illinois VehicleCode (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(e) (West 2000)). Thethree-month statutory summary suspension was to begin on December21, 2001. See 625 ILCS 5/6--208.1(a)(2) (West 2000).

On November 21, 2001, defendant petitioned to rescind thesuspension under section 2--118.1 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS5/2--118.1 (West 2000)). The petition alleged several statutorygrounds for a rescission, but at the hearing, defendant argued onlythat Wilkin lacked reasonable grounds to believe that defendant wasdriving or in actual physical control of her vehicle upon a highwaywhile under the influence of alcohol or another drug. See 625 ILCS5/2--118.1(b)(2) (West 2000).

Wilkin testified that he was at the Shell gas station inAlgonquin when an unidentified person approached Wilkin, pointed todefendant, and stated that she was "bombed." Defendant was sittingin the driver's seat of her car and the engine was running. Defendant was parked at the gas station, and Wilkin never observeddefendant driving on a public highway or violating any traffic law. Wilkin testified that he approached defendant and asked her how shearrived at the gas station. However, because Wilkin had failed toadvise defendant of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), before questioningher, the court did not allow him to testify to what she said. Thecourt permitted Wilkin to describe his other observations.

When he spoke with defendant, Wilkin detected a strong odor ofperfume but he did not smell alcohol. Defendant's eyes were"glassy, glazed-over, and bloodshot." Defendant stuttered andslurred her speech, and she could not answer simple questionsquickly. Wilkin saw that defendant's front passenger-side tire wasflat and had a two-inch tear. Wilkin's sworn report noted thatdefendant admitted consuming four vodka drinks before leaving homeon the date of the arrest, but this information was suppressed atthe hearing.

Defendant exited the vehicle and submitted to several fieldsobriety tests. Defendant was directed to complete the one-leggedstand test, but she could not even lift her foot off the ground. Defendant also failed the "finger-to-nose" and horizontal gazenystagmus tests. After a portable breath test revealed thatdefendant's blood-alcohol concentration was 0.223, Wilkin arrestedher.

The Village called defendant to testify as an adverse witness,and she objected, citing the right against self-incriminationprescribed by the fifth amendment to the federal constitution. Thecourt sustained the objection, only briefly commenting thatdefendant did not waive her rights by filing the petition torescind the suspension. The court rescinded the statutory summarysuspension after concluding that Wilkin lacked probable cause toarrest defendant for DUI. This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Officer Wilkin formally arrested petitioner after she told himthat she had consumed four vodka drinks before driving to the gasstation, and the trial court suppressed these statements. Onappeal, the Village contends that (1) Wilkin did not violatedefendant's Miranda rights and, therefore, the trial courterroneously suppressed the incriminating statements; (2) even ifWilkin did not comply with Miranda before questioning defendant,the statements were admissible at the statutory summary suspensionhearing because the proceeding was civil rather than criminal; and(3) defendant waived her right to decline to testify when she filedher petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of herdriving privileges.

Generally, a reviewing court will reverse a trial court'sdecision on a motion to suppress statements only if that ruling ismanifestly erroneous. However, de novo review is appropriate ifneither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is at issue. People v. Patel, 313 Ill. App. 3d 601, 603 (2000). We apply a denovo standard of review in this case because the trial courtaccepted the testimony of Officer Wilkin, who was the only personto testify at the hearing. See Patel, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 603-04.

In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the State may not usestatements made during a suspect's custodial interrogation unlessprocedural safeguards were used to preserve the privilege againstself-incrimination. The Court held that suspects interrogatedwhile in police custody must be told that they have a right toremain silent, that anything they say may be used against them incourt, that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney at thetime of the interrogation, and that if they cannot afford anattorney, one will be appointed for them. Patel, 313 Ill. App. 3dat 604, citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706-07, 86S. Ct. at 1612.

The Village concedes that defendant did not receive anyMiranda warnings before she made the incriminating statements. However, the Village asserts that the arresting officernevertheless complied with Miranda because defendant was not "incustody" when she was questioned. We need not decide the issuebecause we conclude that any noncompliance with Miranda would notrequire excluding defendant's statements in this case. We followthe Fourth and Fifth Districts of the Illinois Appellate Court,which have held that statements made in violation of Miranda, whichwould be otherwise inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, may beconsidered in a proceeding to rescind a statutory summarysuspension of driving privileges. People v. Pelc, 177 Ill. App. 3d737, 741 (1988); People v. Furness, 172 Ill. App. 3d 845, 849-50(1988).

It is well established that statutory summary suspensionproceedings are civil rather than criminal, and the disposition ofa petition to rescind the suspension is completely independent ofthe disposition of the underlying criminal charge. People v. Orth,124 Ill. 2d 326, 337 (1988); People v. Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d 85, 93(1988). A license suspension under section 11--501.1 of theVehicle Code arises in the context of a criminal DUI action inwhich the prosecution must prove guilt, but the burden of provinga prima facie case for rescinding the civil suspension rests on themotorist. People v. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 289, 295 (1996). Furthermore, section 2--118.1 provides that a suspension rescissionhearing must proceed in the circuit court " 'in the same manner asin other civil proceedings.' " (Emphasis in original.) Orth, 124Ill. 2d at 337, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95