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Plaintiff, Eric F. Vestrup, appeals from the order of thecircuit court affirming the decision of the Du Page County OfficersElectoral Board (Board) excluding Vestrup's name from the ballot asthe Libertarian Party (LP) candidate for state representative forRepresentative District 47 in the 2002 general election. Weaffirm.

The following facts are undisputed. The LP candidate forstate representative for Representative District 39 received 26.20%of the vote in the November 2000 general election. The map of therepresentative districts has since been redrawn. Portions of theformer territory of District 39 now fall within the boundaries ofDistricts 41, 42, 47, 48, and 95.

The State Board of Elections' Candidate Guide for 2002 (the2002 Candidate Guide) reads in pertinent part:

"The Libertarian Party received more than 5% of the number ofvotes cast at the November 2000 General Election in the 39thRepresentative District. Accordingly, to the extent theboundaries of the 39th Representative District are changed bylegislative redistricting, the State Board of Elections willconsider the Libertarian Party to be an established party inany representative district which includes any portion of theformer 39th Representative District until directed to thecontrary by a court of competent jurisdiction."

On May 20, 2002, Vestrup filed a petition with the State Boardof Elections to fill the LP's vacancy in nomination for staterepresentative for District 47 in the November 2002 generalelection. The petition was forwarded to the Du Page CountyElection Commission. George Boltz filed an objection to thepetition, arguing that the LP is not an "established politicalparty" (as defined by section 10--2 of the Illinois Election Code(Election Code) (10 ILCS 5/10--2 (West 2000)) in District 47 andtherefore could not fill a vacancy in nomination. In response,Vestrup urged the Board to adopt the State Board of Elections'suggestion in the 2002 Candidate Guide that, for purposes of theNovember 2002 election, the LP is an established political party inall districts that include portions of the former District 39. Vestrup argued that the LP is an established political party inDistrict 47 under section 10--2 because the LP polled more than 5%of the vote in District 39 in the 2000 general election for staterepresentative and District 47 includes part of the geographic areaof the former District 39.

The Board rejected the argument that the LP is an establishedpolitical party in District 47:

"The fact that the 47th Representative District contained aportion of the former 39th Legislative District, in which aLibertarian candidate did poll 5% of the entire vote cast inthe November 2000 General Election, does not elevate theLibertarian Party to 'established political party' status inthe newly created 47th District."

The Board ruled that the LP could not nominate Vestrup in District47 because the LP had failed to establish itself as a new politicalparty in the district by submitting signatures as required bysection 10--2 of the Code: "For the first election following aredistricting of representative districts, a petition to form a newpolitical party in a representative district shall be signed by atleast 1,500 qualified voters of the representative district" (10ILCS 5/10--2 (West 2000)).

The trial court affirmed the Board's decision. We grantedVestrup's motion for an expedited review of his appeal. We affirm.

ANALYSIS

The issue for review is whether the Board properly interpretedsection 10--2 of the Election Code. This is a question of law,which we review de novo. Stephens v. Education Officers ElectoralBoard, Community College District No. 504, Cook County, 236 Ill.App. 3d 159, 161 (1992).

Section 7--61 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7--61 (West2000)) provides that, where an established political party fails tonominate a candidate in the primary election, the party may fillthat vacancy in nomination for the general election. See 10 ILCS5/7--61 (West 2000). Section 10--2 provides two means by which apolitical party may become an "established political party" withinthe meaning of the Election Code. First, "[a] political partywhich, at the last general election for State and county officers,polled for its candidate for Governor more than 5% of the entirevote cast for Governor, is *** an 'established political party' asto the State and as to any district or political subdivisionthereof." 10 ILCS 5/10--2 (West 2000). Second, a party who didnot nominate a candidate for Governor in the last general electionor whose candidate did not earn more than 5% of the vote in thelast general election may still become an established politicalparty within a particular district or political subdivision. Section 10--2 of the Election Code provides:

"A political party which, at the last election in anycongressional district, legislative district, county,township, municipality or other political subdivision ordistrict in the State, polled more than 5% of the entire votecast within such territorial area or political subdivision, asthe case may be, has voted as a unit for the election ofofficers to serve the respective territorial area of suchdistrict or political subdivision, is hereby declared to be an'established political party' within the meaning of thisArticle as to such district or political subdivision." 10ILCS 5/10--2 (West 2000) (hereinafter the establishmentprovision).

As noted by the Board, section 10--2 also describes theconsequences that follow upon the redistricting of a representativedistrict: "For the first election following a redistricting ofrepresentative districts, a petition to form a new political partyin a representative district shall be signed by at least 1,500qualified voters of the representative district." 10 ILCS 5/10--2(West 2000) (hereinafter the signature provision).

Vestrup argues that, even though Districts 39 and 47 were redistricted since the 2000 election, the LP is not a new politicalparty in District 47 because its performance in District 39 in the2000 election made the LP an established political party inDistrict 47 for the 2002 election.

We can best assess Vestrup's argument by analyzing it step-by-step. Vestrup begins with the uncontroversial premise that when adistrict or political subdivision "has voted as a unit for theelection of officers to serve the respective territorial area of[a] district or political subdivision" and a political party wins5% of the vote in that election, that party becomes an establishedpolitical party within that district or political subdivision forpurposes of the next election. Vestrup then suggests, however,that the party's status as an established political party withinthat district or political subdivision does not endure only as longas that district or political subdivision retains its currentboundaries. Rather, upon a change in the boundaries of thatdistrict or political subdivision, the party retains the status ofan established political party within the geographic area of theformer district or political subdivision. Vestrup's next premiseis that the party gains the status of an established politicalparty in any district or political subdivision that contains anyportion of the geographic area of the former district or politicalsubdivision. Applying this logic, Vestrup argues that the LP is anestablished political party in District 47 because (1) the LP wonmore than 5% of the vote in District 39 in the 2000 election and(2) part of the former District 39 is now in District 47.

The question for our review is whether Vestrup's argument hasany foundation in the establishment provision of section 10--2. Acourt's primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain andgive effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Jurisec,199 Ill. 2d 108, 118 (2002). The most reliable indicator of thelegislature's intent is the language of the statute itself. Peoplev. Lavallier, 187 Ill. 2d 464, 468 (1999).

Before addressing the merits of Vestrup's claim, we mustresolve a difficulty raised by the phrasing of the establishmentprovision of section 10--2. When the restrictive clause following"political party" is partially redacted, the provisions reads, "Apolitical party which *** has voted as a unit for the election ofofficers to serve the respective territorial area of [a] districtor political subdivision[] is hereby declared to be an 'establishedpolitical party' ***." 10 ILCS 5/10--2 (West 2000)). Thus, theestablishment provision apparently attaches legal consequences toa political party having "voted as a unit for the election ofofficers to serve the respective territorial area of [a] districtor political subdivision."

Several canons of statutory construction persuade us that thelegislature did not intend to attach any legal consequences to apolitical party having voted as a unit in an election. First, acourt will presume that the legislature did not intendinconvenience, injustice, or absurdity and will favor aninterpretation that renders the law reasonable and sensible overone that renders the law illogical and absurd. People v. Stanciel,153 Ill. 2d 218, 233-34 (1992). We can fathom neither what thelegislature could have meant by a political party "voting as aunit" in an election nor how a party's "voting as a unit" in anelection could be relevant in determining whether that party is anestablished political party.

Significantly, nowhere else in the Election Code is there anyreference to a political party "voting as a unit" in an election;only districts or political subdivisions are described as "votingas a unit." For instance, "district" is defined as "any area whichvotes as a unit for the election of any officer." 10 ILCS 5/1--3(14) (West 2000). Section 10--2 states that a petition to form anew political party in a district or political subdivision lessthan the State "shall be signed by qualified voters equaling innumber not less than 5% of the number of voters who voted at thenext preceding regular election in such district or politicalsubdivision in which such district or political subdivision votedas a unit for the election of officers." 10 ILCS 5/10--2 (West2000). In describing the nomination requirements for newindependent candidates, section 10--3 of the Election Code twicerefers to a district or political subdivision as "vot[ing] as aunit" in an election. 10 ILCS 5/10--3 (West 2000).

Statutes that relate to the same subject are considered to begoverned by one spirit and a single policy and are construedtogether. Dundee Township v. Department of Revenue, 325 Ill. App.3d 218, 223 (2001). The establishment provision of section 10--2harmonizes with the rest of the Election Code only if interpretedas conditioning the status of "established political party" onwhether a district or political subdivision voted as a unit in thelast election, not on whether a political party had voted as a unitin that election. Our interpretation is guided also by the rulethat, where a word or phrase is used in different sections of thesame legislative act, a court presumes that the word or phrase isused with the same meaning throughout the act, unless a contrarylegislative intent is clearly expressed. Robbins v. Board ofTrustees of the Carbondale Police Pension Fund, 177 Ill. 2d 533,541 (1997). In our aim to harmonize the establishment provisionwith provisions elsewhere in the Election Code illustrating whatentities the legislature presupposed could "vote as a unit," weinterpret the establishment provision as making the status of"established political party" contingent on a political subdivisionor district, not a political party, having voted as a unit in thelast election.

Turning now to the merits of Vestrup's argument, we hold thathis construction of the establishment provision of section 10--2 ismisconceived. The establishment provision states that, where thevoters in a "congressional district, legislative district, county,township, municipality or other political subdivision or districtin the State" have "voted as a unit for the election of officers toserve the respective territorial area of such district or politicalsubdivision," then a party that garnered more than 5% of that voteis considered an established political party "as to such districtor political subdivision" for purposes of the next election. 10ILCS 5/10--2 (West 2000). The text is inescapable: if Vestrupwould have us declare that the LP is an established political partyin the current District 47 for purposes of the 2002 election, hemust demonstrate that the LP garnered more than 5% of the votes inthe last election when the current District 47 voted as a unit forthe election of officers. The insurmountable difficulty forVestrup is obvious: the current District 47 could not have voted asa unit in the last election because the current District 47 did notexist in the last election, or, to be more precise, District 47'sboundaries were different in the last election.

Vestrup's claim that the LP's status as an establishedpolitical party in District 39 survived redistricting and, Midas-like, conferred established party status on the LP in District 47for purposes of the 2002 election rests on a fundamentalmisunderstanding of "territorial area" as used in the establishmentprovision. Vestrup suggests that "territorial area" meanssomething over and above "district" or "political subdivision" suchthat the LP could continue to be an established political partywithin the geographic outline of the former District 39 once itceased to be a "district" or "territorial area." We disagree. Toemphasize our point we again set forth the language of theestablishment provision:

"A political party which, at the last election in anycongressional district, legislative district, county,township, municipality or other political subdivision ordistrict in the State, polled more than 5% of the entire votecast within such territorial area or political subdivision, asthe case may be, has voted as a unit for the election ofofficers to serve the respective territorial area of suchdistrict or political subdivision, is hereby declared to be an'established political party' within the meaning of thisArticle as to such district or political subdivision." (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/10--2 (West 2000).

"Territorial area" is used twice in this provision. Its firstappearance is merely as a surrogate term for the long list ofvarious political subdivisions listed previously in the restrictiveclause. Tellingly, it is linked with "political subdivision,"suggesting synonymity for purposes of the provision. Where"territorial area" next appears, it is, as Vestrup claims, employedto describe the geographic scope of a district or politicalsubdivision. However, in our view this use of "territorial area"merely was to underscore the necessity that the entire district orpolitical subdivision voted as a unit in the last election for aparty to qualify for the status of established political party inthat district or political subdivision. This use of "territorialarea" does not, contrary to Vestrup's contention, confer anytalismanic effect on the geographic area of a district or politicalsubdivision. Such is evident from the predicate of the provision,which confers established party status with respect to districts orpolitical subdivisions but does not mention territorial areas. Theabsence of "territorial area" in this part of the establishmentprovision despite its presence elsewhere leads us to conclude,under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that thelegislature intended to confer established party status withrespect to districts and political subdivisions, not geographicareas defined independently of political boundaries. See Peoplev. Ward, 326 Ill. App. 3d 897, 902 (2002) ("A cardinal rule ofstatutory interpretation is expressio unius est exclusio alterius,which means that the enumeration of certain matters in a statuteimplies the exclusion of all others").

In our view, the establishment provision of section 10--2provides that a political party has the status of an establishedpolitical party in any of several enumerated districts or politicalsubdivisions if, when that district or political subdivision votedas a unit for the election of officers in the last election, thatparty polled more than 5% of the vote. That status, we emphasize,is conferred with respect to districts and political subdivisions,not geographic areas that exist independently of districts andpolitical subdivisions. Necessarily, then, a party's status as anestablished political party in a particular representative districtdoes not outlast in any fashion the existence of that district onceit has been altered by redistricting. As for what a politicalparty must do to obtain a place on the ballot after redistricting,there are specific provisions in the Election Code addressing theconsequences of redistricting.

Applying these principles to the facts at hand yields thefollowing analysis. There is no dispute that District 39 voted asa unit in the 2000 general election and that the LP candidate forstate representative earned more than 5% of the vote in thedistrict. Hence, the LP would have been an established politicalparty in District 39 for the 2002 general election. The LP neverreaped the fruit of that status, however, because District 39 wasredistricted before the 2002 election. District 47 also wasredistricted since the last election. Since, due to redistricting,District 47 has not yet voted as a unit for the election ofofficers, the establishment provision has not conferred the statusof established political party on the LP with respect to the 2002general election in District 47.

We recognize that "ballot access is a substantial right andnot lightly to be denied" (Reyes v. Bloomingdale Township ElectoralBoard, 265 Ill. App. 3d 69, 71 (1994)). We are mindful, too, of"the need to tread cautiously when construing statutory languagewhich restricts the people's right to endorse and nominate thecandidate of their choice." Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 176(1997). Yet, while restrictions on the access of political partiesto the ballot implicate rights under the United StatesConstitution, even that document has been interpreted by the UnitedStates Supreme Court as permitting a State to "condition access tothe general election ballot by a minor-party or independentcandidate upon a showing of a modicum of support among thepotential voters for the office." Munro v. Socialist WorkersParty, 479 U.S. 189, 193, 93 L. Ed. 2d 499, 504-05, 107 S. Ct. 533,536 (1986); cf. Huskey v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 156Ill. App. 3d 201, 206 (1987) (the purpose of conditioning ballotaccess on a candidate's obtaining voter signatures is "to reducethe electoral process to manageable proportions by confining ballotpositions to a relatively small number of candidates who havedemonstrated initiative and at least a minimal appeal to eligiblevoters"). Our view is that to reject Vestrup's construction of theestablishment provision is to uphold all of the cherished valuesemphasized above. Vestrup would have us read the establishmentprovision as granting a political party the status of anestablished political party in any district that includes any pieceof a former district in which that party earned over 5% of the votein the last election, regardless of what level of voter support theparty garnered in the last election in the overlapping portion orin the remaining geographic area comprising the new district. Butthis would permit a political party to spread from ballot to ballotnot through a proportionate showing of public support but throughthe unpredictable processes of redistricting. This wouldundermine, not vindicate, "the people's right to endorse andnominate the candidate of their choice." Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d at176.

We recognize that the effect of our decision is thatestablished political parties that are less than statewideestablished political parties lose their status as establishedpolitical parties when the district or political subdivision inwhich they were established ceases to exist. A party that losesits established party status must proceed under the provisions insection 10--2 that deal specifically with establishing a newpolitical party following redistricting. See 10 ILCS 5/10--2 (West2000).

Vestrup next argues that, whatever our reading of theestablishment provision, defendants are estopped from challenginghis nomination. Vestrup reasons that because he forwent thegathering of signatures in reliance on the State Board ofElections' remark that the LP is an established political party inany representative district that contains some of the old District39, defendants cannot argue that he should have obtained thesignatures. Vestrup relies on Merz v. Volberding, 94 Ill. App. 3d1111 (1981), decided by the First District Appellate Court. InMerz, the appellants appealed the dismissal of their objections tothe appellees' nominations for city offices. The appellants arguedthat the appellees failed to gather the requisite signatures undersection 10--3 of the Election Code. The appellees claimed theyrelied on an information sheet issued by the city clerk ingathering their signatures. After a long analysis of section 10--3, the appellate court concluded that the information sheetconflicted with section 10--3 and that the appellees failed tocomply with the statute. However, because the relevant statutoryprovision was not "unambiguous and clear on its face" but in fact"almost incomprehensible," the court held that the appellees hadjustifiably relied on the information sheet. Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3dat 1115, 1118.

We decline to follow Merz. In holding that the State wasestopped from enforcing its nomination requirements against theappellees, the Merz court failed altogether to acknowledge thespecific rules regarding estoppel against the State. Courts arereluctant to find the State estopped from enforcing its laws. Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410, 431 (1996). This reluctance is "motivated by the concern that doing so 'mayimpair the functioning of the State in the discharge of itsgovernment functions, and that valuable public interests may bejeopardized or lost by the negligence, mistakes or inattention ofpublic officials.' " Brown's Furniture, 171 Ill. 2d at 431-32,quoting Hickey v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 35 Ill. 2d 427, 447-48(1966). Estoppel is applied against the State only to preventfraud and injustice. Brown's Furniture, 171 Ill. 2d at 431.

Far from preventing fraud or injustice, our applying estoppelagainst the State in this case would abrogate the people's right tonominate the candidates of their choice in Illinois representativedistricts. Vestrup claims he relied to his detriment on the StateBoard of Elections' interpretation of section 10--2, but thatconstruction was expressly qualified with the caveat that it wassubject to review by a court of competent jurisdiction. We aresuch a court. Vestrup chose to rely on the State Board ofElections' interpretation of section 10--2 despite having beenadvised that a court might reject that interpretation, and,therefore, we cannot say his reliance gave rise to an injustice inthis case.

An equally decisive ground for rejecting Vestrup's argument isthat our following Merz would be a concession that anadministrative agency's mistaken interpretation of a state statutecan preclude a court from enforcing that statute. Essentially,Vestrup would have us give an interpretative error the force of lawand precedence over the law as enacted by the elected lawmakers ofthe State of Illinois. This is entirely unacceptable, especiallybecause that interpretative error would cost the voters ofrepresentative districts in Illinois their opportunity to nominatethe candidates of their choice.

We recognize that "deference is generally accorded theconstruction placed on a statute by an agency given the authorityto administer that statute." Schober v. Young, 322 Ill. App. 3d996, 999 (2001). Still, courts are not bound by an agency'serroneous construction of a statute. Schober, 322 Ill. App. 3d at999. The State Board of Elections' construction of section 10--2was erroneous, warranting our departure from it.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Du Page County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and KAPALA, J., concur.