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JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

In July 2000, plaintiff and counterdefendant, Tires 'N Tracks,Inc., filed a verified complaint against defendant andcounterplaintiff, Dominic Fiordirosa Construction Company, Inc.(Fiordirosa or defendant), and defendant, the City of Wheaton (theCity). Count I alleged breach of contract on the part ofFiordirosa and sought a judgment of at least $15,750 plus interestfor its failure to pay for certain work done by plaintiff ininstalling a water main as part of a water system improvementproject. Count II sought an accounting and the foreclosure of alien on funds due to defendant from the City. The City is astakeholder in this suit. Plaintiff was a subcontractor on theproject, and defendant was the general contractor. In defendant'sverified answer to plaintiff's allegation that plaintiff hadperformed all conditions required to be performed under thesubcontract, defendant generally denied the allegation withoutstating any facts showing how plaintiff had failed to perform.

On October 12, 2000, defendant filed its unverifiedcounterclaim, alleging that plaintiff had breached the contractbecause certain joint connections on the water main had leaked. Defendant alleged that it notified plaintiff of its intent torepair the defective joints at plaintiff's cost and requestedplaintiff to sign a copy of the correspondence as an indication ofplaintiff's agreement to the proposed course of action. Attachedto the counterclaim was a copy of a letter presumably signed by arepresentative of plaintiff agreeing to pay for the cost of therepairs on a time and material basis. Defendant alleged that therepairs cost $29,604.60 and sought compensation for them. Thetrial court ultimately entered summary judgment for plaintiff oncount I of its complaint and against defendant on its counterclaim. The court entered a finding that there was no just reason to delayenforcement or appeal (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Defendanttimely appeals following the denial of its postjudgment motions.For reasons that we shall explain, we affirm the judgment.

On September 19, 2000, plaintiff served defendant with a setof 11 requests to admit facts (collectively, the request to admit)pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 216(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 216(c)). Under Rule 216(c), each matter of fact of which admission isrequested is admitted unless, within 28 days after the service ofthe request, the party to whom the request is directed serves uponthe party requesting the admission either (1) a sworn statementdenying specifically the matters of which admission is requested orsetting forth in detail the reasons why the party cannot truthfullyadmit or deny those matters or (2) written objections on the groundthat some or all of the requested admissions are privileged or thatthe request is otherwise improper in whole or in part. 134 Ill. 2dR. 216(c).

On September 29, 2000, defendant served plaintiff objectionsto 3 of the 11 requests (Nos. 3, 4, and 5) and unsworn answers to,or denials of, the remaining 8 requests. If defendant failedproperly to deny the requests to admit, then certain relevant factswould be admitted as true for purposes of entering summary judgmentin favor of plaintiff. Under the rule, defendant is deemed to haveadmitted the facts in the following numbered requests to admit assummarized here: (No. 1) defendant entered into the subcontractwith plaintiff to install the water main; (No. 2) the amount to bepaid for the work was a per-unit price; (No. 6) "As of the presentdate, taking into account all credits, Fiordirosa owes Tires 'NTracks at least $15,750 for its work pursuant to the Subcontract";(No. 7) despite a demand for payment, defendant has failed andrefused to pay for the work performed by plaintiff; (No. 8) theCity is holding funds in excess of $15,750 due but unpaid todefendant under the contract between defendant and the City; (No.9) on or about April 7, 2000, plaintiff served notice of its claimon the City by certified mail; (No. 10) plaintiff also served acopy of the notice of its claim on defendant by certified mail; and(No. 11) this suit was commenced within 90 days after service ofsuch notice.

On January 29, 2001, well after the 28-day period forresponding had elapsed, plaintiff served its motion for summaryjudgment predicated in part on defendant's failure to serve timely sworn denials of 8 of the 11 requests to admit; the motion wasfiled on January 31, 2001. On January 30, 2001, defendant servedan "Emergency Motion for Leave to Amend Answers to Request toAdmit." This motion was filed January 31, 2001. However, no "goodcause" was asserted for the failure of defendant to provide timelysworn denials. Defendant merely asserted that allowing it toattach a verification to its responses would result in nothing morethan a "re-verification or reaffirmation" of its verified answersto plaintiff's complaint; that plaintiff would not be prejudiced; and that defendant's prior verified answer to the complaint shouldnot be deemed a nullity. The trial court denied defendant'semergency motion without prejudice on January 31, apparentlybecause no "good cause" had been shown for the delay.

On February 9, 2001, defendant also filed a motion for leaveto file its response to the request to admit nunc pro tunc September 19, 2000. Again, defendant failed to assert "good cause"for extending the time to respond. Instead, defendant merely arguedthat since its attorney signed the original response, thissatisfied the requirement of providing a sworn statement under Rule216(c). The court allowed defendant to file the response (but notnunc pro tunc) on February 15, 2001, without ruling on itsefficacy.

On April 5, 2001, after a hearing, the trial court enteredjudgment in favor of plaintiff on count I for breach of contractand also entered judgment against defendant on its counterclaimseeking payment of its claim based on the same subcontract.

On April 11, 2001, defendant filed a motion to reconsider andvacate the judgment. Defendant also sought leave to file anamended, verified counterclaim. In its motion to reconsider,defendant argued inter alia that the court erred in requiring "goodcause" to be shown in order for defendant to "amend" its responseto the request to admit. Defendant characterized its response asa "pleading" subject to amendment under section 2--616(a) of theCode of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--616(a) (West 2000)).

In defendant's motion to file an amended counterclaim,defendant claimed that it erred in alleging previously that it hadbeen damaged as a result of plaintiff's breach of the"subcontract." Defendant was now asserting that it was damaged asa result of plaintiff's breach of an agreement represented by theletter previously attached to the counterclaim. This argument hadbeen rejected by the court in ruling on the motion for summaryjudgment. In granting summary judgment, the court determined thatthe letter merely represented a claim arising out of the samecontract--the subcontract.

On appeal, defendant argues that (1) plaintiff's failurepromptly to seek a hearing on defendant's objections or deficientresponses to the request to admit has resulted in the waiver ofplaintiff's right to have the facts deemed admitted; (2) a genuineissue of material fact exists regarding whether plaintiff performedall of the conditions of its contract, which precludes the entry of

summary judgment; (3) a showing of good cause is not required forthe trial court to allow amendment of the denials to the request toadmit; and (4) the court abused its discretion in denying defendantleave to file an amended, verified counterclaim.

We consider together whether plaintiff was required to seekpromptly a hearing on defendant's objections or deficient denialsto the request to admit and whether defendant was required to showgood cause to "amend" its answers after the 28-day period forresponses had elapsed.

The failure to file a timely response to a request to admitfacts--including the "ultimate" facts of a case--in accordance withthe requirements of Rule 216(c) results in the admission of those facts. 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(c); People v. Mindham, 253 Ill. App. 3d792, 797 (1993) (effect of ignoring request to admit is thatmatters contained in request automatically stand admitted); seegenerally Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204 (1995). A responsedenying the facts that is neither timely nor sworn fails to complywith the rule. Johannsen v. General Foods Corp., 146 Ill. App. 3d296, 300 (1986). An admission pursuant to a request to admitoperates as a judicial admission that is consideredincontrovertible and has the effect of withdrawing a fact fromcontention. Mindham, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 797.

In Bright, our supreme court appears to have required strictcompliance with the rule absent a showing of good cause for thedelay in complying. There, the defendant's response to theplaintiff's request to admit was untimely and unsworn. Thedefendant moved for leave to file a properly sworn response out oftime, but she offered no explanation why the deadline was not metor why the document was not signed under oath. The trial courtdenied her motion. On appeal, the supreme court held that,although a court has the discretion to allow responses to be servedbeyond the 28-day limit, that discretion does not come into playunless the responding party can first show good cause for theextension of time. Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 209. The courtexplained that it is the responding party who has the burden ofshowing good cause, and the requesting party has no obligation toshow that an untimely response would be prejudicial. Indeed, thecourt stated that the opposing party "should be under no obligationto show anything." Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 210. The court furtherstated that the nonmoving party "should not be required to justify application of a rule before it will be given effect" and thepresumption must be that supreme court rules "will be obeyed andenforced as written." Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 210.

In Hubeny v. Chairse, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1038 (1999), a personalinjury case, the defendants timely responded to a request to admitcertain facts regarding negligent conduct on the part of defendant Chairse. However, the defendants failed to submit sworn statementsspecifically denying these matters as required by Rule 216(c). Inresponse to the plaintiffs' motion, the trial court ruled that theallegations of fact were deemed admitted. The trial court thenfound that Chairse was negligent based on the facts deemedadmitted. On appeal, this court concluded that the defendant wasbound by her failure to respond properly to a request for admissioneven though the admission contained "ultimate" facts showing shewas negligent. We believe that the above-cited cases stand for theproposition that the rule will be strictly enforced and a partythat fails to respond in compliance with the rule's requirementsdoes so at its own peril.

Defendant attempts to avoid the requirements of the rule byarguing that the trial court erred in not requiring plaintiff toobject promptly by motion to defendant's failure to respondproperly. In support of its argument, defendant cites the lastsentence of Rule 216(c): "Any objection to a request or to ananswer shall be heard by the court upon prompt notice and motion ofthe party making the request." 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(c). Defendantrelies, for example, on La Salle National Bank of Chicago v.Akande, 235 Ill. App. 3d 53, 67 (1992). In Akande, in response toa request to admit, the defense attorney wrote a letter suggestingthat the use of Rule 216(c) under the particular circumstance wasan abuse of the discovery process. The trial court found that thedefendant failed to object properly to the request to admit anddeemed the factual matters admitted. The issue before thereviewing court was whether, in responding to the plaintiffs'request to admit, defense counsel's letter was an improperobjection and thus determinative of whether the facts set forth inthe request were properly deemed admitted. Based on the lastsentence in Rule 216(c), this court determined that the use of theletter was not procedurally fatal to the defendant because, underthe circumstances, the plaintiffs had a concomitant duty to raisethe issue of the objection in a motion before the trial courtpursuant to the last sentence found in Rule 216(c).

The Akande court found that the letter evinced a willingnessof the defendant to respond once the objection was addressed andresolved. The court believed that the trial court had broaddiscretion to allow late filings where it could prevent injusticeor where the requesting party could not show prejudice. Thecourt's concern was that the defendant did not have a sufficientopportunity to correct the error.

Akande is distinguishable in that an objection was at issue,and the timeliness of the response was specifically not at issue.

Furthermore, the principle that the requesting party must showprejudice is no longer valid under the stricter application of therule as explained in Bright. Under Bright, it is the respondingparty that must show good cause for the delay.

Defendant also cites another older case, Redmond v. CentralCommunity Hospital, 65 Ill. App. 3d 669 (1978). Redmond is alsodistinguishable. There, the trial court granted the plaintiffleave to submit a late response to the defendant's request to admitand the defendant failed to object. On appeal, the defendant wasfound to have waived the issue of the untimely response. A similarresult was reached in Vulcan Metals Products, Inc. v. Schultz, 180Ill. App. 3d 67 (1989) (having failed to object to untimelyresponse to request, plaintiff waived issue on appeal).

We adhere to the strict application of the rule under Bright. It was defendant's duty to provide timely, sworn denials inresponse to plaintiff's request to admit. Plaintiff apparentlydid not have reason to object to the deficiencies in defendant'sresponse but did place the response in issue by filing its motionfor summary judgment. In P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred PaxCorp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 239 (1998), the plaintiff offered no reasonfor its failure to respond to a request to admit though itattempted to tender responses at the hearing on the defendant'smotion to deem the facts admitted. The trial court found no goodcause for the plaintiff's untimely response and subsequentlygranted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal,the supreme court held that, while requests to admit may notinclude legal conclusions, they may include questions of ultimatefact that may give rise to a grant of summary judgment, and thecourt affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Here, when plaintiff moved for summary judgment, defendantmoved to "amend" its answers to the request to admit but neveroffered good cause why it should be allowed to do so. The trialcourt initially denied defendant's motion without prejudice. Defendant, through its counsel, has steadfastly refused to showgood cause for its failure to provide sworn responses even whengiven the opportunity to do so. Defendant still maintains onappeal that good cause need not be shown despite a clear rulingfrom our supreme court in Bright. Under the circumstances, we seeno reason why plaintiff should have made a motion specifically topoint out the deficiencies in defendant's responses. Defendant'sunsworn denials are ineffective. Furthermore, we do not believedefendant can circumvent Rule 216(c)--as strictly construed by oursupreme court in Bright--under the guise of "amending" itsresponses. We conclude that plaintiff did not waive its right tohave the facts in its request deemed admitted and that defendant,through its own fault, has failed to show good cause why it shouldhave been allowed additional time to submit properly sworn denials.

Defendant next argues that its objection to request No. 5("Tires 'N Tracks performed all conditions on its part required tobe performed under the Subcontract"), on the basis that it is aconclusion of law, precludes summary judgment. Plaintiff does not dispute that an objection need not be sworn and that it need onlybe in writing. In paragraph No. 11 of its verified complaint,plaintiff stated that it performed all conditions required to beperformed under the subcontract. In its verified answer, defendantdenied the matter without stating any facts showing wherein therewas a failure to perform. Furthermore, defendant's counterclaimalleging that plaintiff breached the subcontract is unverified. Toeffectively raise an issue concerning a condition precedent to acontract, specific facts should be alleged in the answer to aplaintiff's complaint for breach of contract. A general denial ofthe performance of the conditions of a contract without allegationsof such specific facts results in a waiver of the issue. Cushman& Wakefield of Illinois, Inc. v. Northbrook 500 Ltd. Partnership,112 Ill. App. 3d 951, 960 (1983). Otherwise stated, a generaldenial to an allegation of the performance of a condition precedentin a contract is treated as an admission of performance. Wilbur v.Potpora, 123 Ill. App. 3d 166, 171 (1984); see also 134 Ill. 2d R.133(c).

The ultimate fact in this case that was deemed admitted isthat, taking all credits into account, defendant owes plaintiff atleast $15,750. This admission subsumes any general denial ofplaintiff's performance of the conditions as well as the relatedallegations of deficient performance in the unverified counterclaimbased on the same facts. Absent extraordinary circumstances nothere present, admissions pursuant to requests to admit are bindingjudicial admissions that may not be controverted at trial or in amotion for summary judgment. Ellis v. American Family MutualInsurance Co., 322 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1010 (2001). Defendantcannot avoid the effects of its admissions of fact.

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in denying its motion for leave to file an amended,verified counterclaim. The decision to permit or deny an amendmentrests within the sound discretion of the circuit court and will notbe disturbed on review absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263,273-74 (1992). Among the factors to be considered in deciding thatdiscretion was properly exercised are whether (1) the proposedamendment would cure the defective pleading; (2) it would causeprejudice or surprise to the other party; (3) it was timely sought;and (4) previous opportunities to amend the pleadings could beidentified. M. Ecker & Co. v. La Salle National Bank, 268 Ill.App. 3d 874, 881 (1994).

In bringing this belated motion, defendant merely sought torecast its counterclaim with facts previously known in atransparent attempt to avoid the unfavorable judgment that wasentered based on its admissions. The proposed amendment should notbe allowed to cure the effect of defendant's inattention topleading requirements and its failure to avoid its admissions,which had already taken the ultimate facts of the case out ofcontention. Our impression is that defendant or its counsel hasengaged in inattentive and improper piecemeal litigation. It isimproper practice to engage in piecemeal litigation, seeing onetheory of the case to conclusion before proposing another. SeePeople v. Miraglia, 323 Ill. App. 3d 199, 205 (2001). Moreover,the supreme court's rules are not mere technicalities orsuggestions. They must be enforced as written. See Bright, 166Ill. 2d at 210. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in denying this motion.

The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

GEIGER and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.