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JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, the Wauconda Fire Protection District (District), sought an injunction againstdefendants, Stonewall Orchards, LLP (Stonewall), and Lake County (County), to enforce a Districtordinance. The trial court granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The District appeals, arguing thatits ordinance is valid and enforceable in unincorporated Lake County. We affirm in part, reverse inpart, and remand the cause.

BACKGROUND

Stonewall is a privately owned golf course open to the public, located within the commonboundaries of unincorporated Lake County and the District. Stonewall submitted plans to the Countyand to the District for the construction of a clubhouse on its golf course. The District informedStonewall that pursuant to a District ordinance, the clubhouse would need sprinklers.

The County approved building plans that did not include a sprinkler system and issuedStonewall a building permit. After construction of the clubhouse, Stonewall received a temporaryoccupancy permit from the County. The clubhouse opened for business in June 2002.

The District sought an injunction to prevent Stonewall from occupying the clubhouse withouta sprinkler system. The District also sought to enjoin the County from issuing Stonewall a certificateof occupancy. In response, the County and Stonewall filed motions to dismiss. They pointed out thatpursuant to section 11 of the Fire Protection District Act (Act) (70 ILCS 705/11 (West 2002)), theDistrict does not have the authority to adopt and enforce ordinances when a municipality has adoptedfire prevention laws. Defendants argued that the County should be considered a municipality, citingsection 1 of the Municipal Adoption of Codes and Records Act (50 ILCS 220/1 (West 2002)). TheCounty alternatively argued that the complaint should be dismissed because the County could not becompelled to enforce a District ordinance.

The District subsequently filed an amended complaint seeking, in addition to injunctive relief,a declaratory judgment that (1) pursuant to section 11 of the Act, the District has the authority toenact ordinances within unincorporated Lake County, and (2) the District's sprinkler ordinance wasenacted with proper statutory authority and is valid and enforceable within the unincorporated areasof Lake County. The trial court granted defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2--619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 2002)). The Districttimely appealed.

MOTIONS

Ordered taken with this case were the County's motions to (1) strike portions of the statementof facts in the District's brief and (2) strike the District's reply brief. The disputed facts in theDistrict's brief are not supported by the record, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(6) (177Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6)). Accordingly, we grant the County's motion to strike these statements.

The County also points out various statements in the District's reply brief that are notsupported by the record and an attached exhibit that is not included in the record. Attachments tobriefs not included in the record on appeal are not properly before the appellate court, and theycannot be used to supplement the record. In re O.R., 328 Ill. App. 3d 955, 961 (2002). However,since substantial portions of the District's reply brief contain legitimate argument, we deny theCounty's motion to strike the reply brief, but we strike the challenged statements and the exhibitcontained in the reply brief.

ANALYSIS The District argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motions to dismiss. Wereview de novo the grant of a section 2--619(a)(9) motion to dismiss. Byron Dragway, Inc. v.County of Ogle, 326 Ill. App. 3d 70, 73 (2001).

Defendants maintain that the District is prohibited from enforcing ordinances in the Countybecause the County has a fire prevention code. The District concedes that its ordinances are not validin "municipalities" that have their own fire codes, but it argues that the County is not a municipalitywithin the context of the Act. Section 11 of the Act sets forth the power of fire protection districtsto adopt and enforce fire prevention codes, and states in its entirety:

"The board of trustees of any fire protection district incorporated under this Act hasthe power and it is its legal duty and obligation to provide as nearly adequate protection fromfire for all persons and property within the said district as possible and to prescribe necessaryregulations for the prevention and control of fire therein. The board of trustees may provideand maintain life saving and rescue equipment, services and facilities, including an emergencyambulance service. Except in cities having a population of 500,000 or more inhabitants andexcept in municipalities in which fire prevention codes have been adopted, the board oftrustees has the express power to adopt and enforce fire prevention codes and standardsparallel to national standards." (Emphasis added.) 70 ILCS 705/11 (West 2002).

The term "municipalities" is not defined in the Act.

The primary rule of statutory construction requires that the legislature's intention bedetermined and given effect. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 507 (2003). Courts should first look to the statute's language as the best indication of the drafters' intent. Carver,203 Ill. 2d at 507. If the language is unambiguous, courts must follow the plain meaning of thestatute. Carver, 203 Ill. 2d at 507; County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc.,109 Ill. 2d 143, 151-52 (1985). When interpreting a statute, courts must give effect to the entirestatutory scheme rather than look at words and phrases in isolation from other relevant portions ofthe statute. Carroll v. Paddock, 199 Ill. 2d 16, 22-23 (2002).

By citing to extrinsic sources, defendants impliedly argue that, as used in the Act, the meaningof "municipalities" is ambiguous. They point out that the Counties Code gives counties the powerto adopt ordinances governing building construction, including fire prevention codes. See 55 ILCS5/5--1063 (West 2002). Defendants maintain that we should apply the definition of "municipalities"from the Municipal Adoption of Codes and Records Act (50 ILCS 220/1 et seq. (West 2002)). Itpermits municipalities to adopt codes (including fire prevention codes) and public records byreference, and states in relevant part:

" 'Municipality' means any fire protection district or other political subdivision of theState of Illinois having power to legislate on the subject matters mentioned in this Act." 50ILCS 220/1(a) (West 2002).

However, this provision includes fire protection districts in its definition of "municipalities," so itcannot coherently be applied to section 11 of the Act.

The District maintains that this issue has already been settled by Orland Fire ProtectionDistrict v. Intrastate Piping & Controls, Inc., 266 Ill. App. 3d 744 (1994). In that case, the courtupheld the fire protection district's power to adopt a sprinkler ordinance. Orland Fire ProtectionDistrict, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 750-51. However, the issue of whether a district would have suchauthority in a county with its own fire prevention code was not before the court. Orland FireProtection District provides no guidance in the instant case.

We note that in other sections of the Act, the legislature used the word "municipality" to referto cities, villages, and incorporated towns. Section 9, entitled "Acquiring apparatus frommunicipality," requires a fire protection district to reimburse "any city or village or incorporatedtown" from which it acquires a fire protection facility. 70 ILCS 705/9 (West 2002); see also 70 ILCS705/18 (West 2002) ("municipality" referred to as a city, village, or incorporated town in context ofdisconnecting annexed territory). The Act also includes sections using "municipality" and "county"as distinct terms. See 70 ILCS 705/1.02 (West 2002) (distinguishing boundaries for cost-of-electionpurposes); 70 ILCS 705/11(e) (West 2002) (stating that address number system of fire protectiondistrict may not supercede any county or municipal numbering system).

An examination of the statute's legislative history lends further support to the position thatcounties were not meant to be included in the definition of "municipalities." During Senate debate,Senator Bowers questioned, "Now, if I understand this correctly, we have no exception in here as itrelates to a County Building Code [sic], is that correct?" Senator Vadalabene, the bill's sponsor,replied, "Yes, that's correct." 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 17, 1977, at 183(statements of Senators Bowers and Vadalabene).

Moreover, the Statute on Statutes provides a definition of "municipality," which wouldcontrol unless its use would be inconsistent with the intent of the legislature or repugnant to thecontext of the statute. 5 ILCS 70/1, 1.27 (West 2002). The Statute on Statutes defines"municipality" according to the Illinois Constitution, which states in relevant part:

" 'Municipalities' means cities, villages and incorporated towns. 'Units of localgovernment' means counties, municipalities, townships, special districts, and units, designatedas units of local government by law, which exercise limited governmental powers or powersin respect to limited governmental subjects, but does not include school districts." Ill. Const.1970, art. VII,