Find Legal Information

Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, sued defendant, Nicole Grater,to recover payments it made to its policyholders, Gussie and Andrew Lewis. When defendant failedto appear, plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendant moved to vacate the judgment,contending that she was not properly served with summons. The trial court denied the motion anddefendant appeals, contending that plaintiff did not strictly comply with the statute providing forservice of out-of-state motorists on the Secretary of State. We affirm.

In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant negligently caused an accident with plaintiff'sinsureds and sought to recover what it paid them. After at least two summonses were returnedunserved, plaintiff moved for special service through the Secretary of State. On July 23, 2003, analias summons issued, requesting service on defendant "c/o Secretary of State."

On July 24, 2003, plaintiff's counsel had the summons and complaint sent to the Secretary ofState by registered mail. Apparently on the same day, a notice of the service and a copy of thecomplaint were mailed to defendant at her last known address. On July 29, 2003, an employee of theSecretary of State's office called plaintiff's counsel to acknowledge receipt of the service.

Defendant did not appear and plaintiff obtained a default judgment for $3,841.61. OnOctober 9, 2003, defendant moved to quash service and vacate the default judgment. The trial courtdenied the motion, finding that notice to defendant was mailed at the same time the summons wasmailed to the Secretary of State. Defendant timely appeals.

Defendant contends that plaintiff did not strictly comply with the statute governing substitutedservice on the Secretary of State and, therefore, the judgment against her is void. Of course, it isessential to the validity of a judgment that the court have both jurisdiction of the subject matter of thelitigation and jurisdiction over the parties. State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308(1986). Absent a general appearance, personal jurisdiction can be acquired only by service of processin a manner prescribed by statute. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d at 308.

Section 10--301 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/10--301 (West 2002)) provides forsubstituted service on an out-of-state motorist by serving the Secretary of State. This section requiresstrict compliance. Allied American Insurance Co. v. Mickiewicz, 124 Ill. App. 3d 705, 708 (1984). Section 10--301 provides in relevant part as follows:

" (b) Service of such process shall be made by serving a copy upon the Secretary ofState or any employee in his office designated by him to accept such service for him, or byfiling such copy in his office, together with an affidavit of compliance from the plaintiffinstituting the action, suit, or proceeding, which states that this Section is applicable to theproceeding and that the plaintiff has complied with the requirements of this Section, and a feeof $5 and such service shall be sufficient service upon the person, if notice of such service anda copy of the process are, within 10 days thereafter, sent by registered mail by the plaintiff tothe defendant, at the last known address of the defendant, and the plaintiff's affidavit ofcompliance herewith is appended to the summons." 625 ILCS 5/10--301(b) (West 2002).

Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff properly effected service on the Secretary of State,but she argues that plaintiff did not comply with the provision that it send notice and a copy of theprocess to defendant "within 10 days thereafter." Defendant notes that the notice was mailed to heron July 24, 2003, but service on the Secretary of State was not completed until July 29, 2003, whenan employee of his office acknowledged receiving the summons. According to plaintiff, "within 10days thereafter" means that the notice must be sent during a 10-day period after the service iscompleted. Thus, the notice mailed five days before the service was completed did not strictlycomply with the statute.

Plaintiff responds that "within 10 days thereafter" sets a deadline for providing the notice, sothat a notice sent anytime before that date will be timely. Plaintiff asserts that the purpose of thenotice provision is to provide the best notice possible and that it would be absurd to penalize it forproviding "too much" notice. We agree.

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of thelegislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). The best evidence of legislative intent is thestatutory language. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 171 (2003). In giving effect to legislativeintent, the court should consider, in addition to the statutory language, the reason for the law, theproblems to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought. People v. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d 263,271 (1987). A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations. Peoplev. Holloway, 177 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1997). The court can consult interpretive aids when construing anambiguous statute. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 97-98 (1999). Courts presume that theGeneral Assembly, in passing legislation, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Peopleex rel. Madigan v. Dixon-Marquette Cement, Inc., 343 Ill. App. 3d 163, 171 (2003). Theinterpretation of a statute is reviewed de novo. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 172.

We hold that "within 10 days thereafter" is ambiguous. The interpretations the partiesadvance are equally plausible. One dictionary definition of "within" is "before the end of <gone ~ aweek>." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1355 (10th ed. 2001). This indicates a deadlinerather than a specific time period. Conversely, courts have interpreted the requirement of SupremeCourt Rule 604(d) that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed, if at all, "within 30 days ofthe date on which sentence is imposed" (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) to mean that the motion must be filedafter sentencing. See People v. Ramage, 229 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1030 (1992).

Considering the purpose of the statute, the more reasonable construction is that which makes"within 10 days" a deadline rather than a specific time period. The goal of the provision is to providethe best notice possible to the out-of-state defendant. Thus, providing notice at the earliest dateshould be encouraged, not discouraged. In this context, it would be absurd to hold that a noticedropped in the mail one minute before the summons arrives at the Secretary of State's office isineffective, while one mailed 10 days after the service is completed is valid.

We agree with the trial court that "within 10 days thereafter" means any time until 10 daysafter service on the Secretary of State. Accordingly, the notice in this case, sent five days before theservice was completed, was effective. As a result, the service was also valid and the trial courtobtained jurisdiction over defendant.

The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

BOWMAN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.