Salte v. YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago Foundation

Case Date: 08/02/2004
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-03-0701 Rel

No. 2--03--0701


IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT


TERRY ALAN SALTE and CHARLENE
SALTE,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

YMCA OF METROPOLITAN CHICAGO
FOUNDATION,

          Defendant-Appellee.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Lake County.



No. 03--L--19


Honorable
John R. Goshgarian,
Judge, Presiding.



JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Terry Alan Salte and Charlene Salte, filed a complaint for negligence and loss ofconsortium against defendant, YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago Foundation. Defendant moved todismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735ILCS 5/2--615 (West 2002)). The trial court granted the motion and plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Plaintiffs' complaint contained the following allegations. Defendant owned and operated ahealth club and extended memberships to the public for a fee. On April 29, 2003, Terry, a memberof the club, was exercising on one of defendant's treadmills. At that time, defendant had on its staffa paramedic who was nearby assisting another member of the club on a different fitness machine. While using the treadmill, Terry suffered a cardiac arrest. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Terry'scardiac arrest was a predictable and reasonably foreseeable event. Plaintiffs alleged that defendanthad a duty to equip its "paramedics and athletic or fitness trainers" with cardiac defibrillators, whichplaintiffs alleged were inexpensive, easy to use, and readily available. Defendant did not have anydefibrillators on its premises. Plaintiffs alleged that, as a direct and proximate result of defendant'snegligent failure to equip its facility and paramedics with a defibrillator, Terry remained in cardiacarrest for eight minutes until the county paramedics arrived. Plaintiffs alleged that this delay led tohis brain suffering an anoxic event, which in turn led to physical and emotional damages.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code. Defendantargued that it was under no duty to have a defibrillator on its premises. The court granted the motionand plaintiffs appeal. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that (1) defendant had a duty to equip its paramedicwith a defibrillator; (2) defendant voluntarily undertook the duty to equip its paramedic with adefibrillator; and (3) defendant's reference to a defibrillator as a "sophisticated medical device" in itsmotion to dismiss was improper. We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section2--615 of the Code. Green v. Trinity International University, 344 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1085 (2003).

A. Duty to Equip Paramedic With a Defibrillator

Plaintiffs first argue that defendant had a duty to equip its paramedic with a defibrillator. "Tostate a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care,that defendant breached that duty, and that plaintiff suffered an injury proximately caused by thebreach." Godee v. Illinois Youth Soccer Ass'n, 327 Ill. App. 3d 695, 697 (2002). Whether a dutyexists is a question of law. Godee, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 697.

Initially, we note that plaintiffs' complaint alleges that defendant had a duty to have adefibrillator on its premises for use by the paramedics on its staff. Plaintiffs do not explicitly allegethat defendant had a duty to use a defibrillator on Terry. However, because complaints are to beliberally construed, we read plaintiffs' complaint to include the allegation that defendant had a dutyto use a defibrillator on Terry. See Lloyd v. County of Du Page, 303 Ill. App. 3d 544, 552 (1999)(courts are to construe pleadings liberally to do substantial justice between the parties). Construedin this way, the complaint alleges that defendant had a duty to have a defibrillator on its premises andthat defendant had a duty to use such a defibrillator in an attempt to rescue or aid Terry.

"Our common law generally imposes no duty to rescue an injured stranger upon one who didnot cause the injury in the first instance." Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 232(1996). "A duty to take some affirmative action to aid another may arise, however, where a specialrelationship exists between the parties." Rhodes, 172 Ill. 2d at 232. The Restatement (Second) ofTorts (the Restatement) provides:

"(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action (a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and (b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.

***

(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty tomembers of the public who enter in response to his invitation." Restatement (Second) ofTorts