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No. 2--05--0331
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
BILLY ROBBINS, ) Appeal from the Circuit ) Court of Kane County. Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 02--LK--178 ) ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, ) Honorable ) F. Keith Brown, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff, Billy Robbins, filed a suit against defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, allegingbreach of an insurance contract. The dispute arose when defendant refused to pay a claim for firedamage to plaintiff's residence. Defendant alleged that plaintiff intentionally set the fire. Defendantpropounded a number of requests to admit pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 216 (134 Ill. 2d R. 216),to which plaintiff did not adequately respond. On this basis, the trial court granted summaryjudgment in favor of defendant and awarded defendant $414,881.59 on its counterclaim. Thecounterclaim alleged fraud under section 46--5 of the Criminal Code of 1961, which provides for civildamages in cases of insurance fraud (720 ILCS 5/46--5 (West 2000)). For the reasons that follow,we affirm. On September 10, 2001, a fire occurred at plaintiff's residence during the period in whichplaintiff was insured by defendant. Plaintiff was home alone at the time. Defendant investigated thefire and came to the opinion that it was intentionally set. Several expert witnesses supporteddefendant's position. However, plaintiff could produce expert witnesses who believed that the firemight have been caused by old, faulty wiring within plaintiff's house or by an electrical "arcing event." In granting summary judgment, the trial court specifically found that "but for Plaintiff's admissionsin response to Defendant's Rule 216 Request, an issue of fact would exist." The requests for admissions that formed the basis of the grant of summary judgment werepropounded by defendant on October 18, 2004. Plaintiff's attorney had been granted leave towithdraw from the case about two months prior to this date, and plaintiff was unrepresented at thetime. Notably, the requests contained the following: (1) that the fire was intentionally set; (2) thatplaintiff intentionally set the fire; (3) that plaintiff misrepresented his involvement in setting the firewhen he submitted his claim; (4) that the fire was not caused by a malfunction or defect in theelectrical systems of the property, fixtures on the property, or personal property on the property; and(5) that the fire was not caused by an electrical event, involving arcing or otherwise. Plaintiff responded to the requests for admissions within the 28 days allowed by Rule 216 (see134 Ill. 2d R. 216). Plaintiff filed a general response to the requests, stating that it was false that thefire was intentionally set by him. He also filed specific responses to defendant's particular requests;however, the responses contained a number of defects. First, plaintiff filed a response on November3 that contained typewritten admissions and denials of defendant's requests. However, plaintiff alsohandwrote admissions and denials next to the typewritten responses, two of which contradicted thetypewritten responses. Specifically, the sixth request stated that the fire was not caused by amalfunction or defect in the electrical system of any item of personal property located in plaintiff'sresidence. The typewritten response denied this allegation, but the handwritten response admittedit. The seventh request asked plaintiff to admit that the fire was not caused by a defect or malfunctionin the electrical system of any fixture. Again, the typewritten response was a denial, while thehandwritten one was an admission. Thus, the responses to these allegations were ambiguous andcannot truly be deemed denials. Plaintiff asserts that the handwritten responses were simply mistakes,and, on December 16, well after the 28-day period for response had passed, he filed correctedresponses to the requests. A further problem exists. None of the responses to the requests, includingthe one filed on December 16, were sworn to, as required by Rule 216(c). 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(c). Supreme Court Rule 216(a) provides that any party "may serve on any other party a writtenrequest for the admission by the latter of the truth of any specified relevant fact set forth in therequest." 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(a). The rule continues: "Each of the matters of fact *** is admitted unless, within 28 days after servicethereof, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting theadmission either (1) a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of which admissionis requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny thosematters or (2) written objections on the ground that some or all of the requested admissionsare privileged or irrelevant or that the request is otherwise improper in whole or in part." 134Ill. 2d R. 216(c). Quite simply, the failure to respond to a request for admission results in the admission of the factscontained in the request. Walker v. Valor Insurance Co., 314 Ill. App. 3d 55, 61 (2000). Such anadmission may properly form the basis of a grant of summary judgment. Glasco v. Marony, 347 Ill.App. 3d 1069, 1074 (2004). A party having admitted a fact under Rule 216 may not later deny it attrial. In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d 417, 424 (1987). Indeed, an admission made pursuant to the ruleis considered a judicial admission and is thus incontrovertible, even at the summary judgment stage. Moy v. Ng, 341 Ill. App. 3d 984, 988 (2003); see also Ellis v. American Family Mutual InsuranceCo., 322 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1010 (2001) ("Admissions pursuant to requests to admit constitutejudicial admissions, which are binding upon the party making them; they may not be controverted attrial or in a motion for summary judgment"). In this case, however, defendant did not fail to respond completely; rather, his first responsedid not comply with Rule 216. Therefore, we must assess the effect of an imperfect response to arequest to admit. Regarding plaintiff's mistake in handwriting admissions contrary to the typeddenials in his response to the requests, plaintiff asserts that the trial court should have let him eitherexplain the handwritten additions or should have ignored them and let the typewritten portions stand. The former request misses the point. If considered, plaintiff's additions result in ambiguity underwhich the requests are neither admitted nor denied. Rule 216 mandates that anything not denied isdeemed admitted. 134 Ill. 2d R. 216. The latter argument runs contrary to the way documents arenormally interpreted. See Bolchazy v. Chicago Investment Group, 109 Ill. App. 3d 426, 431-32(1982) (handwritten portion of a contract prevails over typewritten portions). More fundamentally, plaintiff's response was not sworn to, as required by the plain languageof Rule 216(c). 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(c) (requiring a "a sworn statement denying specifically the mattersof which admission is requested"). A response that is not sworn to by a party does not comply withRule 216. Moy, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 990. Indeed, this court has recently held that "[a] responsedenying the facts that is neither timely nor sworn fails to comply with the rule." Tires 'N Tracks, Inc.v. Dominic Fiordirosa Construction Co., 331 Ill. App. 3d 87, 91 (2002). Thus, plaintiff's unswornresponse to defendant's requests for admissions is plainly inadequate under Rule 216 and does notserve as a denial of any of the requested admissions. Accordingly, those facts set forth in defendant'srequests for admissions are deemed admitted. See P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184Ill. 2d 224, 239 (1998). Plaintiff attempts to avoid this result by appealing to the discretion possessed by trial courtsto deviate from the 28-day time limit. Supreme Court Rule 183 does allow a court to "for goodcause shown *** extend the time for filing any pleading or the doing of any act which is required bythe rules to be done within a limited period, either before or after the expiration of the time." 134 Ill.2d R. 183. Plaintiff, however, fails to show good cause for allowing a late, conforming response tobe served upon defendant. Absent such a showing, plaintiff's request must be denied. See Bright v.Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 209 (1995) ("Although Rule 183 does give judges discretion to allowresponses to be served beyond the 28-day time limit, that discretion does not come into play underthe rule unless the responding party can first show good cause for the extension"); Harris Bank St.Charles v. Weber, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1083 (1998) ("A trial court has the discretion to permit aparty to file a response to a request for admission of facts after the 28-day time limit but only if theparty has shown 'good cause' for an extension of time" (emphasis added)). Case law clearlyestablishes that "good cause" is not simply mistake, inadvertence, or neglect. Glasco, 347 Ill. App.3d at 1073. Nor is it an absence of prejudice to the opposing party. Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 209. As mistake, inadvertence, and neglect are not valid bases for a finding of good cause,plaintiff's claim that he mistakenly admitted, in handwriting, requests six and seven provided no basisfor the trial court to exercise its discretion and allow an untimely but conforming response. Plaintiffcontends that, as "a man of limited education and no understanding of the process or itsconsequences," his failure to comply with Rule 216 should be excused. He goes on to argue that thetrial court "ought to have given consideration to the fact that the Request to Admit and compliancewith the rule is highly technical and that [plaintiff's] answer was prepared at a point in time when hewas pro se." While we sympathize with plaintiff's position, the fact that plaintiff was proceeding prose at the time also provided no basis for the trial court to exercise its discretion and allow anadditional response, nor does it provide a basis for us to reverse the trial court's decision. It is well established that parties proceeding pro se must follow all of the rules of procedureto which attorneys are held. Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 528 (2001); People v.Vilces, 321 Ill. App. 3d 937, 940 (2001); Athens v. Prousis, 190 Ill. App. 3d 349, 356 (1989). Alitigant is not entitled to the application of a more lenient standard simply because he or she is notrepresented by counsel. In re A.H., 215 Ill. App. 3d 522, 529-30 (1991); Harvey v. Carponelli, 117Ill. App. 3d 448, 450-51 (1983). This rule is necessary, for, without it, litigation involvingunrepresented parties would frequently grind to a halt, as courts undid mistakes made by pro selitigants. Thus, that the rule involved here is somewhat technical, that plaintiff was unrepresented atthe time, and that he may not have fully understood the rule are irrelevant. As he was controlling hisown case at the time, it was his responsibility to read Rule 216 and insure that he understood it. Insum, plaintiff has not set forth any basis that would allow a finding of good cause for the purpose ofRule 183. Plaintiff, in his reply brief, makes one final plea: "The question is whether we are seeking justice. Whether the Plaintiff was acting pro se or whether he had an attorney, Rule 216 ought not to be interpreted as a trap. Particularly,where the Plaintiff was pro se, if the purpose of [Rule] 216 is a trap then it ought to beinterpreted so that the unwary are to be advised of the trap upon which they are about tostep." Plaintiff's final point raises concerns of equity and fundamental fairness with which we are notunsympathetic. However, we are bound to follow the rules of our supreme court as well as itsprecedent. That precedent requires the result reached by the trial court. See P.R.S. International,Inc., 184 Ill. 2d at 238-39. Hence, these concerns are better directed to the supreme court. We donote that Rule 216 and the cases interpreting it clearly set forth the procedure to be followed and theconsequences for not following it, so plaintiff's intimation that a clearer interpretation of the rule isnecessary is ill founded. In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County. Givenplaintiff's admissions under Rule 216, summary judgment for defendant was proper. Affirmed. CALLUM and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur. |