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JUSTICE RAPP delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Roy Rekosh, Thomas Rekosh, David Rekosh, and Ronald Rekosh,appeal from the trial court's order granting the motions to dismiss ofdefendants, June Parks; Arlington Cemetery, Inc., d/b/a Elm Lawn Cemetery Corporation (Cemetery); andGeils Funeral Home (Funeral Home). Plaintiffscontend that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing their claim for negligentinfliction of emotional distress; (2) dismissing their claim for intentionalinfliction of emotional distress; (3) dismissing their claim for interferencewith the right of the next of kin to possession and preservation of the body ofthe deceased; (4) failing to recognize an implied private cause of action underthe Crematory Regulation Act (Act) (410 ILCS 18/1 et seq. (West 1998)); and (5)failing to recognize an implied private cause of action under the FuneralDirectors and Embalmers Licensing Code (Code) (225 ILCS 41/1--1 et seq. (West1998)).

This case comes before us after the trial court granted defendants' motionsto dismiss. In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a court mustaccept as true the well-pleaded allegations of fact contained in the complaintand construe all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. SeeAbbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, 187 Ill. 2d 386, 388 (1999).

In plaintiffs' third amended complaint (complaint), plaintiffs charged allthree defendants with negligent infliction of emotional distress in count I;intentional infliction of emotional distress in count II; and interference withthe right of the next of kin to possession and preservation of the body of thedeceased in count III. Plaintiffs also claimed a violation of the CrematoryRegulation Act by the Cemetery in count IV, and a violation of the FuneralDirectors and Embalmers Licensing Code by the Funeral Home in count V.

Plaintiffs' complaint stated that plaintiffs are the sons of Eugene H.Rekosh, who died October 13, 1997. Defendant June Parks was married to Eugenefor 17 years until they were divorced on December 12, 1996, and is not the motherof plaintiffs. On April 8, 1997, Eugene purportedly executed a will, whichdisinherited plaintiffs, named June Parks as executor, and bequeathed all of hisproperty to her. Plaintiffs claimed to have enjoyed a warm, affectionate, andnatural relationship with their father prior to his death.

Plaintiffs alleged that, shortly after Eugene's death, June Parks met withagents of the Funeral Home and the Cemetery and falsely represented that she wasthe spouse of Eugene Rekosh. June Parks made arrangements for Eugene's body tobe cremated and for his remains to be returned to her. Neither the Funeral Homenor the Cemetery properly secured a cremation authorization form as required bythe Act.

The Act provides that a crematory shall not cremate human remains until ithas received, inter alia, a cremation authorization form signed by an authorizingagent. 410 ILCS 18/20(a)(1) (West 1998). The Act lists the persons who mayserve as the authorizing agent, which include, in order of priority, thesurviving spouse, unless the deceased authorized his or her own cremationpursuant to the Act or the executor is acting pursuant to decedent's writtendirections; the decedent's surviving adult children; the decedent's survivingparent; and the next of kin under the laws of descent and distribution. 410 ILCS18/15(a) (West 1998).

The cremation authorization form is missing information required by theAct, including the relationship of the authorizing agent to the deceased; writtenconfirmation by the authorizing agent that he has notified the other adultchildren; the manner in which the final disposition of the cremated remains isto take place, if known; and the name of the person authorized to receive thecremated remains. The cremation authorization form contains the signature ofplaintiff Ronald Rekosh as authorizing agent. Ronald Rekosh's purportedsignature was witnessed by a Mr. Geils, an agent or employee of the Funeral Home. Plaintiffs claim that Ronald Rekosh did not sign the cremation authorizationform. After the cremation, either the Funeral Home or the Cemetery gave JuneParks the remains, which she dumped in her backyard without notifying plaintiffsor securing their permission. Plaintiffs allege that they had intended to burytheir father's body and were violently opposed to cremation. As a result ofdefendants' actions, plaintiffs claim to have been deprived of their right tomake burial decisions and grieve their father's death. Plaintiffs claim severeand permanent emotional harm and injury.

Defendants filed motions to dismiss. The trial court granted defendants'motions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs timelyappealed.

We begin by noting that the trial court's order states no basis for thedismissal of plaintiffs' claims, and transcripts of the proceedings were notprovided. An order that sustains a motion to dismiss without specifying thegrounds upon which it is based places before the reviewing court each issueraised by the motion. Mid-Town Petroleum, Inc. v. Dine, 72 Ill. App. 3d 296,298-99 (1979).

Although brought pursuant to three different sections of the Code of CivilProcedure, defendants' motions to dismiss were all based upon plaintiffs'failure to state causes of action upon which relief can be granted, which areproperly brought pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/2--615 (West 1998)). We must examine whether the allegations of thecomplaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, aresufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Abbasi,187 Ill. 2d at 391. A motion brought under section 2--615 admits as true allwell-pleaded facts, but not conclusions of law or factual conclusions that areunsupported by allegations of specific facts. Lagen v. Balcor Co., 274 Ill. App.3d 11, 16 (1995). A cause of action will not be dismissed on the pleadingsunless it clearly appears that there is no set of facts that can be proved thatwill entitle the plaintiff to recover. Abbasi, 187 Ill. 2d at 391. Our reviewof an order of dismissal is de novo. Abbasi, 187 Ill. 2d at 391.

Prior to 1983, the "impact rule" was applied in cases of negligentinfliction of emotional distress. A plaintiff could recover for the physicalinjury that developed because of emotional distress only if he received eitherphysical injury or some impact to his person at the occurrence of the negligentconduct that caused the emotional distress. Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 413(1898). In Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 555 (1983), oursupreme court recognized a limited exception to the "impact rule" known as the"zone of physical danger rule." The "zone of physical danger rule" requires thatthe bystander must have been in such proximity to the accident that injured thedirect victim that there was a high risk to himself of physical impact. Rickey,98 Ill. 2d at 555. The bystander must also show physical injury or illnessresulting from the emotional distress caused by the defendant's negligence. Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 555.

Plaintiffs concede that the allegations in count I are insufficient tostate a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However,plaintiffs urge this court to expand the recovery available for this tort underthe special circumstances of the negligent mishandling of a corpse by carving outan exception to the "impact rule" of Braun and the "zone of physical danger rule"announced in Rickey.

We decline this opportunity to expand upon present law and conclude thatplaintiffs' cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress isforeclosed by our supreme court's decisions in Braun and Rickey. See Courtneyv. St. Joseph Hospital, 149 Ill. App. 3d 397, 403 (1986). Therefore, count I ofplaintiffs' complaint was properly dismissed as to each defendant for failure tostate a cause of action.

The next claim brought against all three defendants and dismissed by thetrial court was for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In order tostate a cause of action for this tort, a party must allege facts to establishthat (1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendanteither intended that his conduct should inflict severe emotional distress or knewthat there was a high probability that his conduct would cause severe emotionaldistress; and (3) the defendant's conduct in fact caused severe emotionaldistress. Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 392 (1994).

Plaintiffs contend that they have made sufficient factual allegations tostate a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' allegations are merely conclusions of lawunsupported by facts. On review, we decide whether plaintiffs' complaint allegessufficient facts to support each element of the cause of action as to eachdefendant. Lagen, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 16.

Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress will exist onlyif defendant's conduct was so outrageous in character and extreme in degree asto go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66Ill. 2d 85, 90 (1976). Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is judged onan objective standard based on all of the facts and circumstances of a particularcase. Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at 392. We will examine each defendant's alleged conductseparately.

We first address the outrageousness of June Parks's alleged conduct. Afactor relevant in determining whether conduct is extreme or outrageous is thedefendant's awareness that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotionaldistress because of a physical or mental condition or peculiarity. Doe, 161 Ill.2d at 393. June Parks was aware that her former husband had four sons and, atleast as alleged, she knew plaintiffs had a warm and affectionate relationshipwith their father. It may be inferred that June Parks was aware that plaintiffswere particularly susceptible to the emotional distress that would result fromthe cremation of their father's body and the disposal of his remains withouttheir knowledge, consent, or participation.

As plaintiffs point out, "[c]remation of a corpse against the wishes of thenext of kin, if done maliciously, out of ill will or spite, likewise could beconduct sufficiently outrageous to support that element of the tort." Kelso v.Watson, 204 Ill. App. 3d 727, 730 (1990). We believe that a reasonable personwho enjoyed a warm, affectionate, and natural relationship with a parent wouldresent someone who, upon that parent's death, by means of a forgery, illegallycremated the body and disposed of the remains in a backyard without his knowledgeor consent. We believe that the alleged conduct may reasonably be regarded asextreme and outrageous, and therefore we find that the first element of the causeof action against defendant June Parks is satisfied.

We next address the outrageousness of the Funeral Home's alleged conduct. Plaintiffs allege that the Funeral Home's extreme and outrageous conductconsisted of its failure to secure the proper cremation authorization requiredby statute, witnessing a forged signature on the cremation authorization form,and releasing the decedent's remains to June Parks, a person the Funeral Homeknew was not authorized to receive the remains.

It can be inferred that, at some point during the transaction with JuneParks, the Funeral Home became aware that she was not the decedent's wife becauseshe could not serve as the authorizing agent for the cremation. Knowing that,the Funeral Home, by its agent, is alleged to have witnessed the purportedsignature of plaintiff Ronald Rekosh, who did not sign that document. When theFuneral Home witnessed the signature of Ronald Rekosh, it became aware that therewas someone with the same last name as the decedent who could legally authorizethe cremation and who therefore had a right and a duty with respect to thedisposition of the body. Knowing these things, the Funeral Home proceeded withthe cremation and gave the remains to June Parks.

The Funeral Home, at a minimum, was aware that June Parks was not able toserve as authorizing agent and that there was at least one person, Ronald Rekosh,who could. Surely, the Funeral Home understands and appreciates that the nextof kin of the decedent are particularly susceptible to emotional distress. Afuneral home's facilitation of a cremation that is not legally authorized,knowing that there are next of kin who are potentially unaware of the death orthe arrangements and perhaps have objections, may reasonably be regarded asconduct so outrageous in character and extreme in degree as to go beyond allpossible bounds of decency. We find that there are sufficient facts alleged toestablish extreme and outrageous conduct by the Funeral Home, and therefore thefirst element of the cause of action against defendant Funeral Home is satisfied.

The alleged extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of defendantCemetery is the cremation of the decedent's body in spite of an incomplete anddeficient cremation authorization form and then the conveying of the remains toJune Parks, an unauthorized person. We find that the allegation of extreme andoutrageous conduct by the Cemetery is conclusional. Unlike the allegationsagainst June Parks and the Funeral Home, the Cemetery's alleged conduct, althoughtechnically illegal, was not extreme and outrageous. The cremation authorizationform does not on its face suggest that there was any lack of authority for thecremation of the decedent's body. In fact, it is signed by Ronald Rekosh, a manwith the same last name as the decedent, and is witnessed by an employee of theFuneral Home that was handling the arrangements. While the allegations againstJune Parks and the Funeral Home show a knowledge that the cremation was notauthorized and a blatant disregard for plaintiffs' rights and duties, there isno allegation that the Cemetery was aware that the cremation was unauthorized. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing count II of plaintiffs'complaint against defendant Cemetery.

We now examine the alleged intent of defendants June Parks and the FuneralHome. The second element required to state a claim for the intentionalinfliction of emotional distress is that the defendant either intended that hisor her conduct should inflict severe emotional distress or knew there was a highprobability that his or her conduct would cause severe emotional distress. Doe,161 Ill. 2d at 392. This element has been sufficiently pleaded in plaintiffs'complaint against defendants June Parks and the Funeral Home. The complaint'sallegations as to defendants June Parks and the Funeral Home demonstrate theirknowledge that there was a high probability that their conduct would causeplaintiffs severe emotional distress.

The third element that must be alleged is that defendants' conduct in factcaused plaintiffs severe emotional distress. The emotional distress suffered bythe plaintiff must be such that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. Public Finance Corp., 66 Ill. 2d at 90. " '[T]he extreme and outrageouscharacter of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that thedistress has existed.' " Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at 396, quoting Restatement (Second)of Torts