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JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises from the dismissal of the amended complaint filed by plaintiff, ToddRandich, against defendants, Pirtano Construction Company, Inc. (Pirtano) and Utility Constructors,Inc. (Utility), alleging negligence and willful and wanton misconduct. We affirm in part, reverse inpart, and remand.

The trial court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint under section 2--619(a)(9) of the Codeof Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 2000)). Accordingly, the well-pleadedfacts from the amended complaint are accepted as true. Zimmerman v. Fasco Mills Co., 302 Ill. App.3d 308, 311 (1998). The following recitation of the facts is based on the pleadings and the trialcourt's order.

Defendants are construction contractors. On April 29, 1999, they were working for WesternCable Communications (Western) installing underground television cable along a public utilityeasement granted to Western at the Wespark housing subdivision in Romeoville. Defendants'employees laid the cable underground through the use of a directional boring machine. In the processof boring into the ground, defendants' employees punctured a natural gas main.

Northern Illinois Gas Company (NICOR) employees and members of the Lockport FireProtection District (LFPD) were dispatched to the scene to contend with the gas leak and ensuresafety. Plaintiff, an emergency medical technician (EMT), was one of the members of the LFPD sentto the scene.

Plaintiff was in the vicinity of the leaking gas when it was ignited by an unknown sourcewithin the housing development. A resulting explosion and fire completely destroyed two houses anddamaged several others. More important, several NICOR employees and members of the LFPD wereinjured. Plaintiff was among the members of the LFPD who were injured in the explosion, sustaining"serious and permanent injuries."

On November 14, 2001, plaintiff filed his amended complaint alleging negligence and willfuland wanton misconduct on the part of defendants. Specifically, plaintiff's negligence claim allegesthat defendants failed to (1) investigate and ascertain the precise location of underground gas mainsin the vicinity where they were operating the directional boring machine; (2) properly expose the gasmain by hand digging before boring into the ground; and (3) arrange with NICOR in advance to turnoff the gas prior to digging. Plaintiff's claim of willful and wanton misconduct basically sets forth thesame factual allegations as the negligence claim, but adds that defendants acted with actualknowledge that a gas main was located within the utility easement where defendants were conductingtheir drilling activities.

In response, defendants filed a motion to dismiss under section 2--619(a)(9) of the Code (735ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 2000)). The court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff's claimsagainst defendants on the ground that the fireman's rule prohibited plaintiff's cause of action. Plaintiffalso alleged negligence on the part of NICOR. However, NICOR was not a party to the motion todismiss. Thus, the court dismissed only the claims against Pirtano and Utility and further found thatthere was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the dismissal order. Thereafter, plaintifffiled a timely notice of appeal under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), which allowsappeals from final judgments that do not dispose of the entire proceeding.

On appeal, plaintiff asserts that defendants cannot avail themselves of the fireman's rulebecause (1) the rule does not bar actions based on willful and wanton misconduct; (2) defendants arenot considered owners or occupiers of Western's utility easement; (3) public policy and thedevelopment of the deliberate encounter doctrine abrogate the fireman's rule; and (4) the applicationof the rule violates plaintiff's equal protection rights. .

As an initial matter, section 2--619(a)(9) allows involuntary dismissal where "the claimasserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of ordefeating the claim." 735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 2000). Accordingly, defendants admit the legalsufficiency of plaintiff's amended complaint but assert that the fireman's rule defeats plaintiff's claims. See Zimmerman, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 311. Our standard of review of a section 2--619 dismissal is denovo. Zimmerman, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 311.

The fireman's rule limits the extent to which firefighters or other public officers are allowedto recover for injuries incurred when, in an emergency, they enter upon an owner's or occupier'sproperty in discharge of their duty. McShane v. Chicago Investment Corp., 235 Ill. App. 3d 860, 864(1992). It provides that "an owner or occupier of land must exercise reasonable care to preventinjury to firemen that might result from a cause independent of the fire, but has no duty to preventinjury resulting from the fire itself." Vroegh v. J&M Forklift, 165 Ill. 2d 523, 527 (1995). Thus, therule limits a fireman's right to recover for injuries arising out of the fire itself. McShane, 235 Ill. App.3d at 865.

The first issue in this case is whether the fireman's rule bars a cause of action based on willfuland wanton misconduct. In Illinois, there is conflicting authority on this issue. Where a legalquestion has been the subject of decisions with varying results, we will carefully examine what hasbeen said by courts on the subject. Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 135 (1969).

The fireman's rule is a creature of case law, and thus the pertinent case law must be analyzedto understand and properly apply the rule. Zimmerman, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 312. Originally, thefireman's rule developed under the English common law during the existence of the feudal system oflandownership. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 413 (1960). Under this system, a firefighter waslabeled as a licensee to whom the owner or occupant owed no greater duty than to refrain from theinfliction of willful or intentional injury. Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 413-14. In Illinois, the supreme court inGibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 189 (1892), adopted this English common-law rule.

Later, in Dini, our supreme court reshaped the fireman's rule to address what had beencharacterized as a barbaric formulation of the rule. Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 414. In Dini, an inadequatelyconstructed wooden staircase in the defendant's building collapsed and resulted in injury to severalfirefighters. Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 412. Our supreme court rejected the common-law rule labelingfiremen as licensees, finding it to be an illogical anachronism, originating in a vastly different socialorder, and pock-marked by judicial refinements. Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 416. Instead, recognizing thatfiremen confer on landowners economic and other benefits that form a basis for imposing thecommon-law duty of reasonable care, the court held:

"[A]n action should lie against a landowner for failure to exercise reasonable care inthe maintenance of his property resulting in the injury or death of a fireman rightfully on thepremises, fighting the fire at a place where he might reasonably be expected to be." Dini, 20Ill. 2d at 416-17.

Then, in Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 Ill. 2d 103 (1976), the supreme courtrefined the reasonable care standard set forth in Dini. In Washington, firemen were seriously injuredin the process of extinguishing a car fire at a service station. Washington, 66 Ill. 2d at 104. Thecourt was faced with the issue of whether the "liability of a possessor of land for injuries to a firemanextends to acts of negligence which cause a fire." Washington, 66 Ill. 2d at 105. In response, thecourt held that "while a landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to maintain his property so as toprevent injury occurring to a fireman from a cause independent of the fire he is not liable fornegligence in causing the fire itself." Washington, 66 Ill. 2d at 108. Thus, from Washington, thecurrent form of Illinois's version of the fireman's rule was born. It permits a firefighter to recover forinjuries that result from an act unrelated to the specific reason he was summoned to the scene, butnot for negligent acts that caused the emergency. This then leads to the issue of whether a firemancan recover for willful and wanton misconduct that causes an emergency.

As stated above, under the common-law version of the fireman's rule, as adopted in Gibson,a plaintiff could recover for the infliction of willful or intentional injury. See Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 416. In Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., 255 Ill. App. 494 (1930), the court affirmed a judgment in favor of anadministratrix of an estate of a fireman killed when a building exploded as a proximate result of thedefendant's willful and wanton misconduct. The court recognized the principle that an owner oroccupier of property is liable for willful and wanton misconduct to a firefighter in discharge of hisduty. Bandosz, 255 Ill. App. 494.

In 1975, one year before the supreme court's decision in Washington was released, theAppellate Court, Third District, in Marquart v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. Co., 30 Ill. App. 3d431, 432 (1975), addressed a situation in which a firefighter sued to recover for injuries incurredwhile fighting a fire that began with the explosion of a railroad car containing liquified propane gas. There, the court stated that "a fireman may recover where the injuries were caused by the willful andwanton misconduct of the owner or occupant of premises where the fire occurred." Marquart, 30Ill. App. 3d at 434.

Contrary to the position taken in Bandosz and Marquart, in Luetje v. Corsini, 126 Ill. App.3d 74 (1984), the Appellate Court, First District, held that a homeowner was not liable for willful andwanton misconduct where a firefighter alleged that "certain wilful and wanton misconduct on the partof defendants in the maintenance of their building caused the fire in question and that, as a result ofthe fire, a chimney collapsed, causing injury to plaintiff." Luetje, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 78. The courtnoted that the supreme court's ruling in Washington distinguished between negligent acts that maycause an emergency situation and independent acts of negligence. Luetje, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 79. From this, the court in Luetje reasoned that the nature of a defendant's conduct is not determinativeof the issue of landowner liability to an injured firefighter. Luetje, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 79. Thus, thecourt concluded that it was irrelevant whether the plaintiff's injuries stemmed from negligent acts orwillful and wanton misconduct. Luetje, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 79. If the defendant's alleged wrongdoingrelated to the cause of the emergency, the plaintiff was barred from recovering under the fireman'srule. Luetje, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 79. In making this logical leap from the holding in Washington,which addressed only a claim of negligence, Luetje relied on Young v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. Co., 46 Ill. App. 3d 167 (1977). Luetje, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 79. The Appellate Court, FirstDistrict, later affirmed this position in Coglianese v. Mark Twain Ltd. Partnership, 171 Ill. App. 3d1, 6 (1988).

We decline to follow the position taken by the court in Luetje for several reasons. First,Luetje misconstrues the cases it uses to support its position. Luetje states that the court in Youngdismissed the plaintiff's willful and wanton misconduct claim because the allegations related solely tothe cause of the fire. Luetje, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 79. Rather, the court in Young actually dismissedthe plaintiff's willful and wanton misconduct claim because the allegations in the complaint relatedonly "to acts of negligence" and fell "short of stating a cause of action on wilful and wantonmisconduct." Young, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 169.

Moreover, we reject Luetje's contention that it was the intention of the supreme court inWashington to erect a wall separating recovery for willful and wanton misconduct betweenindependent causes of harm and acts that cause the emergency itself. The court in Washington stated:"The question presented by this appeal is whether the liability of a possessor of land for injuries toa fireman extends to acts of negligence which cause the fire." (Emphasis added.) Washington, 66 Ill.2d at 105. In reaching its holding, Washington relied on appellate court cases interpreting Dini. Washington, 66 Ill. 2d at 108. The court noted that the position taken in these cases was the sameas that taken in virtually every other jurisdiction in which the question had been considered. Washington, 66 Ill. 2d at 108. The court in Marquart also considered the same appellate decisionsas the supreme court in Washington and stated that the "recent decisions in cases where a firemansought to recover for injuries received while fighting a fire have all been actions based on negligence,and do not purport to change the rule which permits recovery based on wilful and wantonmisconduct." Marquart, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 434. We think that the supreme court in Washingtonmerely intended to articulate the current state of the law relating to the fireman's rule and negligenceactions. If the supreme court had intended to create an absolute separation between actions causallyconnected to an emergency and independent actions, it would have been a simple matter to articulatethe rule in such a broad fashion. Rather, we conclude that the holding in Washington did not createa bar to claims of willful and wanton misconduct when they relate to the cause of the emergency.

This expression of the fireman's rule comports with the purpose of the rule as articulated bythe supreme court and recognizes that the current trend in the law favors amelioration of the harsheffects of the rule. In Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141 (1978), the supreme court held that thefireman's rule does not protect a defendant from a products liability action. The court observed thepublic policy considerations that shaped the fireman's rule in Illinois. Court, 72 Ill. 2d at 148. Itstated that "[s]ince most fires occur because of the negligence of the landowner or occupier, it wasbelieved that the imposition of a duty to prevent fires from occurring or spreading on a person'spremise would place an unreasonable burden upon the person who owned or occupied improvedland." (Emphasis added.) Court, 72 Ill. 2d at 148. However, this public policy consideration tendedto undermine the duty of reasonable care placed upon a landowner or occupier. Court, 72 Ill. 2d at148. "A compromise was reached with regard to firemen, recognizing that the risk of harm from fireis inherent in a fireman's occupation." Court, 72 Ill. 2d at 148.

As the purpose of the fireman's rule was expressed in Court, the supreme court struck abalance by recognizing that the negligent acts of landowners or occupiers are often the cause of firesand that it is the public function of firemen to absorb the risk of injury stemming from those negligentacts. However, the supreme court has never stated that it is the duty of firemen to absorb the riskcreated by the willful and wanton misconduct of landowners or occupiers. In fact, as far back asGibson, the supreme court stated that a fireman could recover for the infliction of willful orintentional injury. See Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 416. We also note that, under the Local Governmental andGovernmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/5--106 (West 2000)), while a firefighteris insulated from liability for his or her negligent acts, a fireman is liable for his or her own acts ofwillful and wanton misconduct committed while acting within the scope of employment.

Furthermore, among other jurisdictions we have surveyed that have adopted the fireman'srule, most articulate it in the same fashion as our supreme court in Washington. See 62 Am. Jur. 2dPremises Liability