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PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Defendant, Robert Schaefer, was charged with driving under theinfluence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(2) (West 2000)),driving while his license was suspended (625 ILCS 5/6--303(a) (West2000)), and improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11--709(a) (West2000)). The Secretary of State suspended defendant's drivingprivileges, and he petitioned the trial court to rescind thesuspension. During the hearing on the petition to rescind thesuspension, the trial court granted the State's motion for adirected finding and denied defendant's petition to rescind hissuspension. Defendant timely appealed. On appeal, defendantcontends that the suspension issued in this case should berescinded because the arresting officer was outside hisjurisdiction when he arrested defendant and thus lacked anystatutory authority to arrest defendant. We affirm.

At the hearing on defendant's petition to rescind thesuspension, Officer John Matuga testified that he was working as anItasca police officer on October 29, 2001. At approximately 12:30a.m., he was driving south on Rohlwing Road near the intersectionof Rohlwing and Hollywood Avenue, which is in Du Page County. Atthat time, Matuga observed a white Cadillac pass him travelingnorth on Rohlwing. Matuga recognized that the driver wasdefendant, who he believed had a suspended license. Matugamaneuvered a U-turn and proceeded to follow the vehicle travelingnorth on Rohlwing.

As Matuga was following the vehicle, he saw the vehicle swerveand cross over the left-lane marker near the intersection ofRohlwing and Hollywood. The officer observed the vehicle's wheelscross over the left-lane marker approximately 12 inches. As Matugacontinued to follow the vehicle, he contacted dispatch and askeddispatch to inform him about the status of defendant's drivingprivileges. Matuga also testified that he could have stopped thevehicle when he observed it cross over the left-lane marker.

Matuga further testified that the vehicles proceeded to passthe intersection of Rohlwing and Devon Avenue, which is theboundary line between Itasca and Elk Grove Village. Elk GroveVillage is in Cook County. When the vehicles approached theintersection of Biesterfield Road and Rohlwing, which is in CookCounty, Matuga confirmed that defendant was operating the vehicle. At approximately the same time, Matuga received a call fromdispatch informing him that defendant's driving privileges weresuspended. Matuga effectuated a stop of the vehicle, approacheddefendant, and observed that defendant appeared to be intoxicated. The officer had defendant perform several field sobriety tests,many of which defendant failed. Matuga arrested defendant for DUI,driving while his license was suspended, and improper lane usage.

Defendant's testimony was consistent with Matuga's testimonyin almost all relevant respects. However, defendant denied that hecrossed over the left-lane marker.

The State moved for a directed finding, and the trial courtcontinued the case, taking the motion under advisement. The trialcourt stated that Matuga had reasonable grounds to believe thatdefendant committed improper lane usage in Du Page County. Thetrial court also noted, with reference to the charge of drivingwith a suspended license, that Matuga was not certain thatdefendant was driving the vehicle until defendant was in CookCounty. The trial court continued the case to determine whetherMatuga had jurisdiction to arrest defendant in Cook County.

At a later court date, the trial court granted the State'smotion for a directed finding and denied defendant's petition torescind his suspension. The trial court found that Matuga was avery credible witness. The trial court found that, as Matuga wasfollowing defendant, Matuga observed lane violations, theninvestigated. The officer was also investigating whether defendantwas driving the vehicle and whether his driving privileges weresuspended. The trial court further found that there was statutoryauthority for Matuga to arrest defendant in Cook County, and itfound that Matuga had probable cause justifying defendant's arrest. The trial court denied defendant's petition to rescind thesuspension of defendant's driving privileges and ordered theSecretary of State to continue the suspension of defendant'sdriving privileges. Defendant moved to reconsider, and the trialcourt denied the motion. Defendant timely appeals the trialcourt's denial of his petition to rescind his suspension.

Defendant contends that the trial court's ruling was againstthe manifest weight of the evidence. He argues that his suspensionmust be rescinded because Matuga was not within his jurisdictionwhen he arrested defendant, and there was no statutory authorityfor Matuga to make the arrest outside of Du Page County. Defendantargues that Matuga had no authority pursuant to section 107--4(a--3)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) (725ILCS 5/107--4(a--3)(1) (West 2000)) because Matuga did not knowwhether an offense was committed within the officer's jurisdiction.

Generally, the judgment on a petition to rescind a statutorysummary suspension will be reversed only if it was manifestlyerroneous. People v. Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3d 34, 38 (2001). Adecision is manifestly erroneous if it is palpably erroneous andwholly unwarranted, or arbitrary, unreasonable, and not based onthe evidence. People v. Leach, 245 Ill. App. 3d 644, 655 (1993).

Section 107--4(a--3)(1) of the Code provides as follows:

"Any peace officer *** may make arrests in anyjurisdiction within this State if: (1) the officer is engagedin the investigation of an offense that occurred in theofficer's primary jurisdiction and *** the arrest is madepursuant to that investigation[.]" 725 ILCS 5/107--4(a--3)(1)(West 2000).

Here, according to the record and the trial court's findings,Matuga arrested defendant for, among other things, improper laneusage. This offense occurred in Du Page County, and Matuga clearlyhad the authority to arrest defendant in Cook County for trafficviolations that occurred within Du Page County. See People v.Owen, 323 Ill. App. 3d 653, 657 (2001) (noting that an officer hasthe authority to arrest a defendant in a neighboring county foroffenses that occurred within the officer's jurisdiction). Defendant's claim that improper lane usage is a minor infractionthat could not support the eventual arrest has no bearing on thiscase. See Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 40 (holding that a driver'ssingle momentary crossing of the center line is a sufficient basisfor a stop).

Moreover, the facts establish that Matuga was conducting aninvestigation of offenses that originated in Du Page County,namely, improper lane usage and driving while his license was suspended. The eventual arrest in Cook County was made pursuant tothat investigation. Section 107--4(a--3)(1) of the Code imposes norequirement that an officer must conclusively know that an offensehas been committed before the officer may follow a driver outside

the officer's jurisdiction and arrest the driver for offenses thatoccurred within the officer's jurisdiction. Rather, the statutespecifically provides that an officer may make an arrest outside the officer's jurisdiction if the officer is investigating whetheran offense occurred within the officer's jurisdiction. See 725ILCS 5/107--4(a--3)(1) (West 2000). Given the facts presented inthis case, we hold that Matuga had authority to arrest defendant inCook County for violations occurring in Du Page County.

Our determination that Matuga had authority pursuant tosection 107--4(a--3)(1) of the Code to arrest defendant in CookCounty obviates the need to address defendant's other argumentsregarding Matuga's authority as a private citizen to arrestdefendant in Cook County.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court ofDu Page County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.