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The defendant, Willie B. Sanders, was indicted on two countsof first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996))in connection with the death of Jacqueline D. Trammell-Anderson(the victim). Prior to trial, the State filed a series of motionsin limine seeking to exclude the defendant from offering evidenceof the victim's violent behavior between 1977 and 1996. The trialcourt granted some of the motions, denied others, and denied othersin part. The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealsfrom the trial court's ruling.

On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim's violent behavior because theState was prepared to concede that the victim was the firstaggressor. Alternatively, assuming some of the evidence wasadmissible, the State contends that the trial court should havelimited the evidence sought to be admitted.

At the outset, the State, anticipating a challenge to thiscourt's jurisdiction, contends that the denial of certain of itsmotions in limine impaired its prosecution of the murder chargesagainst the defendant and had the substantive effect of dismissingthe charges of first degree murder. We disagree and dismiss theState's appeal.

Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1))restricts the State's right to appeal in criminal cases to foursituations. Under the rule, the State may appeal only from anorder or judgment that has the substantive effect of (1) dismissinga charge for any of the grounds enumerated in section 114--1 of theCode of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114--1 (West 1996));(2) arresting judgment because of a defective indictment,information, or complaint; (3) quashing an arrest or searchwarrant; or (4) suppressing evidence. People v. Truitt, 175 Ill.2d 148, 151 (1997).

The State suggests the fact that the prosecutor filed acertificate of impairment renders the trial court's orderappealable. In Truitt, our supreme court rejected the State'spremise that the certification forecloses any further assessment ofa suppression order by the reviewing court and renders the orderautomatically appealable. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d at 152. While itshould not second-guess a prosecutor's good-faith evaluation of theeffect of a suppression order on his case, the reviewing court mustfirst determine whether a pretrial evidentiary ruling constitutesa suppression order within the meaning of Rule 604(a)(1). Truitt,175 Ill. 2d at 152. In the case before us, the trial court did notdismiss the charges against the defendant. Therefore, regardlessof the certificate of impairment, we must determine, first, if thetrial court's denial of the motions in limine had the "substantiveeffect" of dismissing the first degree murder charges against thedefendant.

The State's position may be summed up as follows: theadmission of evidence that the victim had a 22-year history ofviolent behavior prevents the State from prosecuting the defendantfor first degree murder. The State relies on several cases insupport of the above theory.

In People v. DeJesus, 127 Ill. 2d 486 (1989), the defendantwas tried as an adult, but the trial court ruled that she should besentenced under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act)(now 705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq. (West 1996)). The supreme courtrecognized that the State has an interest in seeking prosecutionunder the criminal laws based upon the different dispositionalalternatives available under the Unified Code of Corrections (now730 ILCS 5/1--1--1 et seq. (West 1996)) and the Juvenile Court Act. Since the court's ruling terminated the criminal prosecution, theState had a right to appeal pursuant to Rule 604(a)(1). DeJesus,127 Ill. 2d at 496.

In People v. Tellez, 295 Ill. App. 3d 639 (1998), theinformation charging the defendant with neglect of a disabledperson specified that it was a Class 3 felony. The trial courtstruck the "Class 3 felony" language from the indictment and ruledthat the offense was a business or petty offense. The State fileda certificate of impairment and appealed the trial court's ruling.In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal, this courtheld that the State could appeal because the substantive effect ofthe trial court's action was to dismiss a Class 3 felony charge andto replace it with a petty offense charge. Tellez, 295 Ill. App.3d at 641.

Finally, in People v. Marty, 241 Ill. App. 3d 266 (1993),following the declaration of a mistrial, the trial court dismissedthe criminal charges against the defendant with prejudice, and theState appealed. The reviewing court denied the defendant's motionto dismiss, holding that the State's right of appeal was notlimited to those orders specifically listed in section 114--1 andthat, since the State had the right to appeal a judgment the effectof which resulted in the dismissal of a charge, the trial court'sdismissal of the charges in this case was appealable by the State.Marty, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 268-69.

None of these cases provide support for the State's theory. In Marty, for example, the charges against the defendant were infact dismissed. Therefore, the jurisdictional basis for theState's appeal was clear. In Tellez, the trial court's actionprevented the State from trying the defendant on a felony, whichwould carry far greater consequences for the defendant than woulda petty or business offense charge. Similarly, in DeJesus, thetrial court's ruling that the defendant be sentenced as a juvenilerather than an adult effectively terminated the criminalprosecution because of the different sentencing alternatives underthe Juvenile Court Act and the Unified Code of Corrections.

In the present case, while the evidence of the victim'shistory of violent behavior may increase the difficulty the Statemay encounter ultimately in convincing the jury that the defendantcommitted first degree murder in the killing of the victim, it doesnot amount to the dismissal of the first degree murder charges.Unlike the above cases, the trial court's ruling on the motions inlimine did not prevent the State from trying the defendant on firstdegree murder charges. The ruling does not prevent or hinder theState from proving each and every element of the offense of firstdegree murder. The victim's history of violent behavior isrelevant evidence a defendant may avail himself of when he raisesthe theory of self-defense. See People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194,200 (1984) (when the theory of self-defense is raised, the victim'saggressive and violent character is relevant to show who was theaggressor, and the defendant may show it by appropriate evidence,regardless of when he learned of it).

We find the State's reliance on this court's decisions inPeople v. Smith, 248 Ill. App. 3d 351 (1993), and People v.Hatfield, 161 Ill. App. 3d 401 (1987), to be equally misplaced.Based on language from both cases, the State argues that the onlyrequirement to render the order appealable is that the ruling"substantially" impairs the ability of the State to prosecute thecrime. See Smith, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 356-57; Hatfield, 161 Ill.App. 3d at 405-06. However, both of those cases involved ordersthat this court found, in effect, suppressed evidence. Under Rule604(a)(1), orders suppressing evidence may be appealed by theState. The instant case involves neither an order suppressingevidence nor a dismissal order. As we stated earlier, before weaccept the State's certification that the order appealed fromimpairs its ability to prosecute the case, we must determine,first, if the order has the effect of dismissing the case. In thiscase, we have found that it does not.

We conclude, therefore, that since the trial court's orderdenying and denying in part the State's motions in limine was notan order the effect of which was to dismiss the first degree murdercharges against the defendant, the State may not appeal from thatorder.

Therefore, we dismiss the state's appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

BOWMAN, P.J., and HUTCHINSON, J., concur.