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JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Tracy E. Rozela, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Du Page Countydenying her petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of her driver's license, pursuant tosection 11--501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 (West 2002)),for driving under the influence of alcohol. We affirm.

FACTS

Only Sergeant Kevin Driscoll of the Naperville police department testified at the hearing ondefendant's petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. Driscoll had been a police officerfor 19 years and was trained in the use of field tests for intoxication and in the use of portable breathtests (PBTs). Driscoll had been trained as an instructor in the use of field sobriety tests and wascertified as a breathalyzer operator.

At 12:54 a.m. on September 12, 2002, Driscoll was in his squad car at a gas station inNaperville. Defendant's car drove past him, and Driscoll estimated that her speed exceeded the 25-mile-per-hour limit. Driscoll activated his radar, which disclosed that defendant was traveling at 37miles per hour. Driscoll followed defendant's car and activated his emergency lights after observingit weave twice across the lane dividing line. Defendant turned right onto a street that ran one wayin the opposite direction. After defendant curbed her car, Driscoll approached and saw thatdefendant's eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Driscoll smelled a strong odor of alcohol on defendant'sbreath. Defendant explained that she drove erratically because she was unfamiliar with the area andshe was upset by a recent argument with her boyfriend. She admitted drinking a couple of beers ata local tavern that evening.

Driscoll administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The test involves evaluating sixpoints, and defendant failed at every point. However, defendant passed three other field sobrietytests: the one-leg stand test, the walk-and-turn test, and the recite-part-of-the-alphabet test. Defendant's successful completion of the three tests did not affect Driscoll's opinion that she wasunder the influence of alcohol. He believed that a failure of a sobriety test proves a person'sintoxication but successful completion of a test proves nothing.

On direct examination, defense counsel asked Driscoll whether he asked defendant to submitto a PBT. Driscoll testified that he had done so and that defendant complied. There was no evidencethat defendant's submission to the test was involuntary. On cross-examination, Driscoll testified thathe used a calibrated, certified Intoximeter Alcosensor III, which reported a blood-alcoholconcentration of .126. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the test results, and the courtoverruled the objection.

Driscoll testified that he arrested defendant for driving under the influence (DUI) andtransported her to the police station, where a breathalyzer test reported a blood-alcohol concentrationof .109. The Secretary of State suspended defendant's driving privileges for three months.

The trial court found Driscoll's testimony credible and concluded that defendant had notestablished a prima facie case for rescission of the suspension of her driving privileges. Emphasizingthat defendant had a right to refuse to take the PBT without penalty, the court stated that Driscollwas authorized to use the test as a tool to further investigate his reasonable suspicion that defendanthad operated a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court denied the petition to rescindthe suspension but issued a judicial driving permit for defendant to travel to work and school. Defendant's timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In her brief, defendant mistakenly states that this court has jurisdiction to consider her appealunder Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). Rule 604(a)(1) applies only toappeals filed by the State. However, a trial court's decision to grant or deny a petition to rescind asummary suspension is treated as a final order in a civil matter, which is appealable under SupremeCourt Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303). People v. O'Connor, 313 Ill. App. 3d 134, 136 (2000). Therefore, we have jurisdiction to review the denial of the petition to rescind.

On appeal, defendant argues that (1) section 11--501.5(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS5/11--501.5(a) (West 2002)), which authorizes PBTs is unconstitutional; (2) Officer Driscoll lackedreasonable suspicion to ask defendant to submit to the PBT; and (3) the results of the test wereinadmissible because the State failed to establish an adequate foundation. Defendant based herpetition to rescind on the assertion that there were no reasonable grounds to arrest her for DUI. See625 ILCS 5/2--118.1(b) (West 2002). We initially note that an arrest requires "reasonable grounds"or "probable cause," but a traffic stop requires only "reasonable suspicion," which is a distinctlydifferent term. People v. Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3d 34, 39 (2001).

A hearing on a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of driving privileges isa civil proceeding. The petitioner has the burden of providing a prima facie case for the rescission. People v. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 289, 294-95 (1996). The burden then shifts to the prosecution to presentevidence justifying the suspension. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 295. In the fourth amendment context, adefendant may shift the burden to the prosecution by showing that "he was doing nothing unusual tojustify the intrusion by the police at the time of the stop." People v. Drewes, 278 Ill. App. 3d 786,788 (1996). In weighing the evidence before it, the trial court is charged with passing on thecredibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Generally, the trial court'sdecision will not be disturbed unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 295. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where an oppositeconclusion is clearly evident from the record. People v. Hood, 265 Ill. App. 3d 232, 241 (1994).However, when the trial court's determination is based on the review of written documents, and doesnot involve a determination of the credibility of witnesses, a reviewing court considers de novo allthe issues that determine whether the defendant has met his burden of proof. See People v.Hockenberry, 316 Ill. App. 3d 752, 755-56 (2000).

The State contends that, because the trial court assessed Driscoll's credibility before entering judgment, we should reverse the court's ruling only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant responds that a de novo standard of review applies. We defer to the trial court's findingsof fact regarding Driscoll's credibility, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against themanifest weight of the evidence. See Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 38. To the extent that the trial court'sruling involves questions of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. See Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3dat 38-39 ("we will review de novo the ultimate questions of whether reasonable suspicion justifiedthe stop and whether probable cause (or 'reasonable grounds') justified the arrest").

Defendant initially contends that section 11--501.5(a) of the Vehicle Code, which authorizesportable breath testing, is unconstitutional because it "allows police to obtain a breath sample withoutprobable cause." The State argues that (1) the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment does notapply to statutory summary suspension proceedings because they are civil rather than criminal and(2) defendant waived any fourth amendment claim when she consented to the PBT under the statute. Defendant responds that the State waived these defenses by failing to raise them in the trial court. The waiver rule is binding on the parties but not on this court (see People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d319, 323 (1997)), and defendant has had the opportunity to answer the State's arguments. In theinterest of justice, we decide the constitutional issue after considering each party's research andargument.

A statute is presumed constitutional. The party challenging the statute bears the burden ofdemonstrating its invalidity. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). A court has a duty toconstrue a statute in a manner that upholds its constitutionality if it can reasonably be done, and anydoubt must be resolved in favor of the statute's validity. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 418. The questionof a statute's constitutionality is subject to de novo review. People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526(2001).

In People v. Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d 897 (1991), this court reversed the denial of a petitionto rescind the statutory summary suspension of the defendant's driver's license. As in this case, thepetition raised the issue of " '[w]hether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe thatsuch person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway while underthe influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof.' " Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 904,quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95