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The State charged defendant, Daniel G. Roake, with two countsof unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d)(West 2000)). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the contents ofcertain tape recordings. The trial court denied the motion in partand granted it in part. As to the part it granted, the courtdetermined that the oral application procedure that the police usedin seeking approval for the use of an eavesdropping device failedto satisfy any of the procedures mandated by article 108A of theCode of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108A--1 et seq.(West 2000)), the statute governing judicial supervision of the useof eavesdropping devices where there is a consenting party (theeavesdropping statute). The State appeals and contends that theapplication procedure that the police used was appropriate underthe statute's emergency procedures. For the reasons that follow,we agree and reverse the suppression order.

At a hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant calledRobert Maloney as a witness. Maloney, a Naperville policedetective assigned to drug investigations, testified that he wasinvolved in the investigation of a subject named John Groll. Grollwas suspected of delivering a controlled substance known asecstasy. Pursuant to his investigation of Groll, Maloney generatedthree overhear applications and obtained three overhear orderspursuant to the eavesdropping statute. The orders authorizedoverhears of conversations between Maloney, Groll, and unknownothers. The orders authorized the overhears for periods from May30, 2000, through June 9, 2000; from June 9, 2000, through June 19,2000; and from June 19, 2000, through June 29, 2000.

During the course of his investigation of Groll, Maloney madeseveral undercover purchases of ecstasy from Groll. One of thesepurchases occurred on June 8, 2000. The June 8 purchase wasoverheard and recorded. While the June 8 transaction wasoccurring, defendant drove his car alongside Maloney and Groll andsaid something that was overheard and tape-recorded. Maloneyacknowledged that Groll had told him before the purchase thatassociates of Groll would be nearby during the purchase. Maloneydenied that he had ever heard defendant's name prior to theconversation overheard on June 8.

Maloney further testified that on June 22, 2000, pursuant toa warrant, the police arrested Groll for the unlawful delivery of91 ecstasy pills. The arrest occurred at 6:23 p.m. Groll wastaken to the Naperville police department, where other officersinterviewed him. Around 7:30 p.m., the officers told Maloney thatGroll was willing to cooperate and wear a wire to recordconversations that would occur between Groll and his sources. Groll told the police that he was expecting calls on his cell phonefrom defendant and an individual named Dan Tierney; that defendantand Tierney had supplied him with the 91 ecstasy pills; and thatthey would be calling him to make arrangements to get the money heowed them for the pills.

Maloney further testified that after the police learned thatGroll would cooperate with them and wear a wire they "tried gettingan emergency or amended order of overhear." This was done whenanother police officer, Sergeant Guerreri, contacted Joe Ruggiero,an assistant State's Attorney, Joseph E. Birkett, the State'sAttorney, and Judge Richard A. Lucas, a circuit court judge. Maloney was later informed that in a conference call between theseindividuals Judge Lucas "approved the emergency amended portion ofthe overhear [order]." Maloney testified that he had begunpreparing a written application for an overhear order "but due totime constraints when Mr. Roake wanted his money and the time whenGroll was supposed to drop it off, we did not have enough time toget that done." The State stipulated that on June 22, 2000, thepolice did not submit a written application for authority tooverhear conversations involving defendant.

Maloney further testified that there were two overhears ofdefendant on June 22, 2000. There was a telephone overhear at 9:04p.m. and an in-person overhear at 10:33 p.m. In the telephoneoverhear, Groll spoke with defendant on the telephone while apolice officer placed his ear close to the telephone and listenedto the conversation. The in-person overhear involved conversationsbetween Groll and defendant that occurred after the telephoneoverhear when Groll met with defendant and gave defendant the moneyfor the 91 ecstasy pills and when defendant returned afterobtaining additional pills and delivered the pills to Groll. Defendant was then arrested.

The next day, June 23, 2000, pursuant to a writtenapplication, Maloney obtained a written overhear order from JudgeLucas. The written application was admitted into evidence as partof defendant's exhibit "D." The application is entitled"APPLICATION FOR ORDER AMENDING AUTHORIZED USE OF EAVESDROPPINGDEVICE." In the application, Maloney referred to attached copiesof at least two of the previous overhear orders that he hadobtained with respect to his investigation of Groll; outlined hisprior dealings with Groll that culminated in Groll's arrest;described his prior involvement with defendant; described Groll'sagreement to cooperate with the police with respect to defendantwho was described as one of Groll's sources; and noted the effortsof the police on June 22, 2000, to obtain an overhear order withrespect to defendant. The application sought the amendment of anunspecified overhear order to show Groll as a consenting party andto show defendant as an additional person to be overheard

The order that Judge Lucas signed on June 23, 2000, statedthat the Naperville police contacted him on June 22 at about 8:45p.m., that the police informed him of the facts and circumstancesof the investigation as set out in the application, and that heapproved an amendment to an unspecified previous order to allowGroll as an additional consenting party and defendant as anadditional person to be overheard. The order also stated that,upon examination of the application, Judge Lucas found that Grolland Mahoney consented to the use of an eavesdropping device andwillingly participated in the overheard conversations; that therewas reasonable cause to believe that the other partiesparticipating in the conversations were committing, had committed,or were about to commit a felony offense; and that there wasreasonable cause to believe that particular conversationsconcerning the felony offense or offenses would be obtained throughthe use of an eavesdropping device.

During arguments following the suppression hearing, the trialcourt asked the State if it was arguing that the procedure thepolice followed fell under the emergency section of theeavesdropping statute. The State responded that it was not arguingunder the emergency section of the statute and added:

"If we had said this was an emergency and we went -- and itwould have been a lot easier to say this was an emergency, youcould bet everything you have that [defendant's attorney]would be arguing today that this wasn't an emergency situationbecause we could have got judicial approval. Every time youget an emergency eavesdrop, that's the defense's argument. Sowhat we try to do is to get a judicial approval so that wedon't have to hear that argument. So we did get judicialapproval. Now we're here arguing this wasn't an emergency andthat we're conceding the fact because -- and they are usingthe fact that we actually went to a judge first as a reason totry to suppress this evidence, which is absolutely backwards. Here we are trying to get a judge involved beforehand, andit's being used against us."

After taking the matter under advisement, the trial courtdenied defendant's motion to suppress with respect to theconversation of defendant that was overheard on June 8, 2000. Thatpart of the trial court's ruling is not before us in this appeal. As was later clarified, the trial court granted the motion tosuppress with respect to the conversations of defendant that wereoverheard both over the telephone and in person on June 22, 2000.

The State filed a timely motion to reconsider arguing that theprocedure the police used should be deemed appropriate under theemergency provisions of the eavesdropping statute. The trial courtdenied the motion to reconsider. The State's timely notice ofappeal and certificate of impairment followed.

On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred insuppressing the June 22 overhears. The State argues, as it didbelow, that the procedure the police used should be deemedappropriate under the emergency provisions of the eavesdroppingstatute. Defendant responds that, for various reasons includinghis interpretation of the eavesdropping statute's emergencyprovisions, the situation that occurred on June 22 was not anemergency. Defendant also argues that, even if the situation couldbe deemed an emergency, the trial court's ruling was correctbecause the police failed to comply with the requirements of theemergency provisions of the statute.

We initially address defendant's argument that the situationwas not an emergency because the police were in possession ofinformation as early as June 14, 2000, that an overhear orderspecifically targeting defendant was necessary. Defendant basesthis argument on the information in the written application thatMaloney submitted to Judge Lucas on June 23. After reviewing thisinformation, we conclude that the information available to thepolice prior to June 22 was not sufficient for the police to haveobtained judicial approval for an overhear involving defendant. Accordingly, defendant's argument is unavailing.

We next address the parties' dispute as to whether the June 22situation was an emergency under the eavesdropping statute. Thisdispute involves a question of statutory construction.

The primary rule in statutory construction is to ascertain andgive effect to the legislature's intent. To determine thelegislature's intent, courts should first look to the language ofthe statute and accord the language its plain and commonlyunderstood meaning. A court must not read into the plain languageexceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did notintend. People v. Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d 28, 39 (2002). Statutoryconstruction is a question of law. People v. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d108, 118 (2002). Consequently, we employ a de novo standard ofreview with respect to an issue of statutory construction. Peopleex rel. Devine v. $30,700.00 United States Currency, 199 Ill. 2d142, 148-49 (2002).

The eavesdropping statute that is in question here applies tosituations, such as the situation in this case, where one of theparties to a conversation consents to the monitoring of theconversation. 725 ILCS 5/108A--1 (West 2000). The eavesdroppingstatute provides that every application for an order authorizing orsubsequently approving the use of an eavesdropping device must bein writing. 725 ILCS 5/108A--3 (West 2000).

With respect to emergency situations, section 108A--6 of theeavesdropping statute provides:

"Emergency Exception to Procedures. (a) Notwithstandingany other provisions of this Article, any investigative or lawenforcement officer, upon approval of a State's Attorney, orwithout it if a reasonable effort has been made to contact theappropriate State's Attorney, may use an eavesdropping devicein an emergency situation as defined in this Section. Suchuse must be in accordance with the provisions of this Sectionand may be allowed only where the officer reasonably believesthat an order permitting the use of the device would issuewere there a prior hearing.

An emergency situation exists when, without previousnotice to the law enforcement officer sufficient to obtainprior judicial approval, the conversation to be overheard orrecorded will occur within a short period of time, the use ofthe device is necessary for the protection of the lawenforcement officer or it will occur in a situation involvinga clear and present danger of imminent death or great bodilyharm to persons resulting from: (1) a kidnapping or theholding of a hostage by force or the threat of the imminentuse of force; or (2) the occupation by force or the threat ofthe imminent use of force of any premises, place, vehicle,vessel or aircraft.

(b) In all such cases, an application for an orderapproving the previous or continuing use of an eavesdroppingdevice must be made within 48 hours of the commencement ofsuch use. In the absence of such an order, or upon itsdenial, any continuing use shall immediately terminate.

In order to approve such emergency use, the judge mustmake a determination (1) that he would have granted an orderhad the information been before the court prior to the use ofthe device and (2) that there was an emergency situation asdefined in this Section." 725 ILCS 5/108A--6 (West 2000).

In this case, the parties disagree as to the properconstruction of the definition of an emergency situation in section108A--6. The State argues that the phrases in the definition thatinvolve (1) time constraints, (2) officer protection, and (3)danger of death or great bodily harm should be read disjunctively.Thus, under the State's construction, a situation that satisfiesany one of the phrases should be regarded as an emergencysituation. Defendant takes the position that, in light of thecommonly understood meaning of the term "emergency," the phrasesshould be interpreted to define an emergency situation as one thatinvolves the time constraints of the first phrase and also involveseither of the other phrases.

The plain language of the statute supports the State'sargument. A series of words or phrases with the last member of theseries separated by the word "or" implies that all the members ofthe series should be read in the disjunctive. 2A N. Singer,Sutherland on Statutory Construction