People v. Reedy
Case Date: 03/11/1998
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-96-0101
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No. 2--96--0101 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 95--CF--2160 ) GARY REEDY, ) Honorable ) Raymond J. McKoski, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Gary Reedy, was convicted by a jury of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12--4.2(a)(1) (West 1996)) and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Under the "truth-in- sentencing" provisions of section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections, defendant is eligible to receive no more than 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of his sentence. 730 ILCS 5/3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) (West 1996). On appeal, defendant argues that the truth-in-sentencing provisions of section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) are unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable. In support, defendant first contends that Public Act 89--404 (Public Act 89--404, eff. August 20, 1995), in which the legislature enacted section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii), violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, 8(d)). Defendant also argues that section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) violates the equal protection clause (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, 1; Ill Const. 1970, art. I, 2) by treating similarly situated offenders in a dissimilar manner. In response, the State first contends that defendant may not challenge section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)'s constitutionality on direct appeal. Alternatively, the State argues that section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) is constitutional. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with defendant that the legislature enacted section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) in violation of the single subject rule. I. DIRECT APPEAL The State initially argues that defendant may not challenge section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)'s constitutionality on direct appeal. In support, the State cites the opinion in People v. Watford, No. 3-- 96--0315 (December 2, 1997), of the Appellate Court, Third District. In Watford, the defendant raised the same issue that defendant raises in this appeal, namely, whether section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)'s truth-in-sentencing provisions are constitutional. The court concluded, without any citation to authority, that a defendant subject to truth-in-sentencing legislation cannot challenge the constitutionality of that legislation on direct appeal. Watford, slip op. at 1-2. Watford explained that, because the responsibility for enforcing the truth-in-sentencing laws lies with the Department of Corrections and not with the trial court, those laws are "not intended to be a condition of the defendant's sentence," have "no legal effect on the sentencing proceeding," and are "a matter outside the scope of the sentencing proceedings." Watford, slip op. at 2-4. Consequently, to challenge the constitutionality of the truth-in-sentencing laws, a defendant first must wait for the Department of Corrections to calculate his good-time credit. Watford, slip op. at 4. The defendant then may file a habeas corpus, mandamus, or declaratory judgment action alleging that the Department of Corrections is calculating his credit improperly. Watford, slip op. at 4. We are not persuaded by Watford. In Illinois, a criminal defendant possesses the right to appeal directly from any sentence imposed for a felony conviction. 730 ILCS 5/5--5--4.1 (West 1996). Illinois courts have long recognized that good-time credit is a part of every sentence. See, e.g., People ex rel. Colletti v. Pate, 31 Ill. 2d 354, 357 (1964) (good time is "a part of every sentence"); People v. Baptist, 284 Ill. App. 3d 382, 387 (1996) ("compliance with conditions for awarding good-time credit is one of the terms of the original sentence"). Indeed, this court has held on numerous occasions that, because good-time credit is " inherent in every sentence of imprisonment, " a sentencing court may consider the possibility of good-time credit when fashioning a defendant's sentence. See People v. Fetter, 227 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1009 (1992); People v. Clankie, 180 Ill. App. 3d 726, 733 (1989); People v. Torgeson, 132 Ill. App. 3d 384, 389 (1985). If the nexus between good-time credit and the defendant's sentence allows the trial court to factor in the former when imposing the latter, it likewise allows a defendant to question the validity of the former on direct appeal of the latter. Moreover, even if good-time credit were not "inherent in every sentence of imprisonment" as a general matter, it is inherent in every sentence subject to the truth-in-sentencing laws. Section 5/5--4--1(c--2) of the Unified Code of Corrections compels the trial court at the defendant's sentencing hearing to (1) inform the public that the defendant is subject to section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)'s truth-in-sentencing provisions, and (2) based upon the application of those provisions, advise the public of "the actual period of time this defendant is likely to spend in prison as a result of this sentence." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5--4--1(c--2) (West 1996). Significantly, section 5--4--1(c--2) is itself part of the truth-in-sentencing legislation enacted by Public Act 89--404. Thus, by its own terms, the truth-in-sentencing act injects itself into a defendant's sentencing hearing. We therefore cannot agree with Watford's conclusion that the truth-in-sentencing act has "no legal effect on the sentencing proceeding" and is "a matter outside the scope of the sentencing proceedings." Watford, slip op. at 3- 4. Accordingly, contrary to Watford, we hold that a defendant subject to section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)'s truth-in-sentencing provisions may challenge the constitutionality of those provisions on direct appeal. We therefore proceed to the merits of defendant's appeal. II. THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE We next address defendant's contention that section 3--6-- 3(a)(2)(ii) is unconstitutional because it was enacted in violation of the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, 8(d)). A. BACKGROUND Section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii), in its current form, was enacted on August 20, 1995, as part of Public Act 89--404. Prior to Public Act 89--404's enactment, a person convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm was eligible to receive one day of good conduct credit for each day of service in prison. See 730 ILCS 5/3--6-- 3(a)(2)(West 1994). Effective August 20, 1995, Public Act 89--404 amended section 3--6--3(a)(2) to state that a person convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm is eligible to receive only 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of his sentence. In this case, the trial court sentenced defendant under the amended version of section 3--6--3(a)(2) (730 ILCS 5/3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) (West 1996)). Defendant's primary argument in this appeal is that Public Act 89--404 violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution. The single subject rule governs the method by which legislation is enacted. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 503 (1997). Therefore, before analyzing whether Public Act 89--404 complies with the single subject rule, we will examine both the procedural history and the substance of that Act. See Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 503. 1. Procedural History Public Act 89--404 began its life on March 3, 1995, as Senate Bill 1187. Entitled "A Bill for an Act concerning the insanity defense," Senate Bill 1187 originally (1) increased the burden of proof for a defendant asserting the insanity defense, (2) redefined the term "insanity," and (3) revised the procedures governing petitions for the transfer or release of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. On April 25, 1995, the Senate passed the Bill without amendment. When it reached the House of Representatives, Senate Bill 1187 experienced considerable growth through a series of amendments. In one of its amendments, the House deleted the Bill's entire text and started from scratch. No longer confined to the insanity defense, Senate Bill 1187 now also addressed such topics as (1) the duties and jurisdiction of local law enforcement officials, (2) asset forfeiture proceedings arising from drug offenses, (3) truth-in- sentencing, and (4) the perfection and attachment of hospital liens. Recognizing that the Bill's original title no longer was accurate, the House renamed Senate Bill 1187 "An Act in relation to governmental matters, amending named Acts." The House passed Senate Bill 1187 with these amendments and sent it back to the Senate. On May 24, 1995, the Senate considered and debated Senate Bill 1187 in its amended form. Unlike the debate that preceded the Senate's April 25, 1995, vote, this debate did not in any way address the Bill's insanity defense provisions. Instead, the debate was confined solely to the Bill's truth-in-sentencing provisions. At the close of the debate, the Senate voted on and passed Senate Bill 1187 as amended by the House. On June 22, 1995, Senate Bill 1187 was sent to Governor Edgar for signature. On August 20, 1995, Governor Edgar approved the Bill and signed it into law as Public Act 89--404. 2. Substantive Provisions In its enacted form, Public Act 89--404 contains 10 sections covering an impressive array of subjects. Section 5 amends the Counties Code to redefine the sheriff's duties as "conservator of the peace." Similarly, section 10 amends the Illinois Municipal Code to redefine the local police department's duties as "peace officers." Section 15 amends the Criminal Code of 1961 to (1) increase the burden of proof for a defendant asserting the insanity defense and (2) redefine the term "insanity." Section 20 amends the Cannabis Control Act to provide for a new distribution of the proceeds from an asset forfeiture sale conducted pursuant to that Act. Section 25 amends the Illinois Controlled Substances Act to (1) allow multiple convictions and sentences for persons who violate that Act with respect to more than one type of controlled substance, (2) define each violation of that Act as a separate offense, (3) impose sentencing guidelines for persons convicted of violating that Act, and (4) provide for a new distribution of the proceeds from an asset forfeiture sale conducted pursuant to that Act. Section 30 amends the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to (1) define the term "law enforcement agency" and (2) expand a police officer's power to make arrests outside of his or her jurisdiction. Section 35 amends the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act by deleting the requirement that judicial in rem proceedings be held by the court and without a jury. Section 40 amends the Unified Code of Corrections to (1) revise the rules and regulations governing good conduct credit and early release, (2) create the Illinois Truth-in-Sentencing Commission, (3) redefine the term "insanity," (4) revise the procedures governing petitions for the transfer or release of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity, and (5) create new procedures for certain sentencing hearings. Section 45 amends the Code of Civil Procedure to state that the homestead exemption does not apply to property subject to certain drug asset forfeiture proceedings. Section 50 amends the Hospital Lien Act to (1) create a new title for that Act, (2) include within that Act all hospitals operated by a unit of local government, and (3) revise the procedures for the perfection and attachment of hospital liens. In sum, Public Act 89--404 addresses at least five legislative subjects and amends nine statutory codes covering both civil and criminal matters. B. GOVERNING LAW Found in Article IV, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the single subject rule provides, in pertinent part: "Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, 8(d). Because the single subject rule is a substantive, rather than a procedural, requirement for the passage of bills, an alleged violation of the rule is subject to judicial review. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 514. In a recent decision, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that the single subject rule serves two purposes. First, the rule exists to prevent the passage of legislation that, standing alone, could not muster the votes necessary for passage. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 514; see also Geja's Caf |