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No. 2--01--0235

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

A jury convicted defendant, Rickey Quezada, of first-degreemurder (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1) (West 1998)). The circuit court ofKane County sentenced defendant to 45 years in prison. Defendantargues on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motionto suppress his confession; and (2) he received ineffectiveassistance of counsel.

BACKGROUND

On February 11, 1999, 14-year-old Hugo Rodriguez was shot andkilled in a classroom at Ombudsman Educational Services in Elgin, theschool that both he and defendant attended. Defendant, who was 15years old, was arrested for Rodriguez's murder on February 16, 1999,in Wheeling. After being taken to the Elgin police station,defendant made a taped statement in which he confessed to shootingRodriguez. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress inwhich he contended that his confession was not voluntary because thepolice failed to immediately notify his parents of his arrest and theyouth officer assigned to him did not adequately protect hisinterests.

A. Evidence Relating to Defendant's Confession

At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, several Elginpolice officers testified about contacts they had with defendantprior to his arrest for Rodriguez's murder. Officer Thomas Clancytestified that he arrested defendant on March 30, 1998, for unlawfuluse of a weapon. When defendant was asked for the phone number ofone of his parents, he provided his father's phone number. OfficerSean Rafferty interviewed defendant in connection with the March 30arrest. At that time, Rafferty advised defendant of his Mirandarights and his right to have a parent with him during questioning. Defendant's father, Nicholas Quezada (Nicholas), came to the stationbut was not present during defendant's interrogation.

Officer Jeffrey Adam testified that on June 22, 1998, he hadcontact with defendant regarding a probation violation. At thattime, defendant indicated that he was living with his father. Adamarrested defendant on October 13, 1998, for unlawful possession ofcannabis. Defendant told Adam then that he lived with his mother.

Four Elgin police officers testified regarding the events ofFebruary 16, 1999. Detective Jesse Padron testified that, in thelate morning of February 16, 1999, he and Detective Chris Troiolawent to the home of defendant's mother, Carolyn Quezada (Carolyn), tosee if she had any information as to defendant's whereabouts. Carolyn did not know where defendant was and had not seen him for thepast five days. She indicated that defendant lived with her but went back and forth between her residence and his father's residence.

Later that day, Padron and several other detectives went to anapartment complex in Wheeling where they found defendant and arrestedhim at 9:57 p.m. One of the detectives, James Lullo, was a juvenileofficer. Troiola asked Lullo to accompany him and the otherdetectives to act as defendant's juvenile officer. Upon defendant'sarrest, Lullo advised him that he was a juvenile officer and that ifdefendant had any questions he should ask him. Padron, Troiola, andLullo drove defendant back to Elgin. When they were in the squadcar, Troiola advised defendant that they had a murder warrant forhim. Padron told defendant that he was going to be tried as an adultand that this was a very serious case. He also told defendant thatthey would talk to him about the charges when they got to the policestation. Padron testified that they did not discuss the case duringthe ride back to Elgin. Defendant's demeanor was calm during thistime.

The detectives and defendant arrived at the Elgin police stationsometime before 11 p.m. Padron and Lullo accompanied defendant tothe interview room. Lullo advised defendant that he was a juvenileofficer and would be present during the interview. Lullo tolddefendant that he needed to contact defendant's legal guardian. Defendant told Lullo to call his father. Lullo asked anotherdetective, Leigh Rawson, to contact defendant's father.

Approximately 10 to 15 minutes after Rawson called defendant'sfather, Lullo read defendant his Miranda rights and the interviewbegan. Detective Troiola was also present for the interview. Padronstated that he interviewed defendant for approximately 15 minutesbefore they began taping. Neither of defendant's parents came to thepolice department during the interview process.

Padron described the interview as normal, calm, andnonconfrontational. Defendant was easygoing and calm. When theofficers asked defendant a question he did not want to answer,defendant told the officers that he did not wish to answer thequestion. When the interview was over, defendant asked the officersto play back the tape so he could hear it.

On cross-examination, Padron testified that when he spoke todefendant's mother she told him that defendant lived with her but that he also stayed with his father. Padron further testified thatprior to the interview Lullo told him that defendant's father hadbeen contacted and said he was not coming to the station. Padron didnot tell defendant that his father was not coming. He did not knowwhether Lullo so advised defendant. In the recorded interview, defendant acknowledged that he had been advised of his Miranda rightsand his right to have his mother present and had agreed to speak tothe officers without his mother or an attorney being present.

Rawson testified that he called defendant's father, Nicholas, atLullo's request. A "younger female" answered the phone. AfterRawson identified himself and asked for Nicholas, another female goton the phone and asked what he wanted. Nicholas then got on thephone and Rawson advised him that defendant was at the Elgin policedepartment on a murder warrant. Nicholas asked whether defendantturned himself in and where the police found him. Rawson toldNicholas that he had the right to come to the station and speak todefendant. Nicholas said, "Thank you, officer," and hung up thephone. Rawson then told Lullo that he had notified defendant'sfather, and it did not sound like he was coming to the station.

Rawson testified that he is a juvenile officer. The Elginpolice department's procedure with respect to notifying a juvenile'sparents was to contact a parent as soon as possible after arriving atany facility with a juvenile in custody. Rawson testified that hecalled defendant's father at approximately 10:55 p.m.

Detective Troiola testified that, prior to defendant's arrest,the police did not have a clear understanding as to where defendantlived. They had some reports that he lived with his father andothers that he lived with his mother.

Troiola testified that defendant was arrested at 9:57 p.m. Theride from Wheeling to Elgin took approximately 30 to 40 minutes. Defendant appeared unconcerned about his situation. He never criedor appeared nervous. Troiola's version of the events surroundingdefendant's arrest and interview was substantially the same as thatof Detective Padron. Troiola recalled that Detective Lullo readdefendant his Miranda rights from a printed card and added at the endthat defendant had the right to have one or both of his parentspresent while he was being questioned. Defendant waived those rightsin Troiola's presence. Troiola testified that after the interviewwas over defendant asked him to play back portions of the tape. Defendant indicated that he wanted to make sure he did not sayanything that would inculpate his friends.

Detective Lullo testified that, when acting in his capacity asa juvenile officer, his duties in an interview situation are toprotect the juvenile's rights, make sure he is protected from anyundue physical harm or emotional stress, and explain the proceedings,if necessary. Lullo stated that, after arriving at the policestation with defendant, he asked defendant for the name of his "legalresponsible parent." Defendant said, "Call my dad," and gave Lullohis father's phone number. Later, Lullo told defendant that hisfather had been notified of his arrest, but he did not know whetherdefendant's father was coming to the station.

When Padron and Troiola came into the interview room, Lullo tolddefendant that they were the case investigators and, if defendant didnot understand anything they asked him, he should ask Lullo torephrase the question. Lullo also told him that he would advise himof his Miranda rights. Lullo read defendant his Miranda rights froma printed card. In addition, he told defendant that he had the rightto have a parent or guardian present during questioning. Defendantsaid that he understood all of his rights and wanted to waive them. Lullo stated that the untaped portion of the interview lastedapproximately one hour. They took a break and returned for the tapedinterview. Defendant was confident and calm during the interview. When defendant told the officers that he did not want to answercertain questions, the officers did not press him to answer them.

On cross-examination, Lullo testified that he also assisted inthe interview by asking specific questions related to defendant'sgang involvement. Lullo did so because the other detectivesconducting the interview did not know a lot about gangs. Lullo is agang specialist who has been qualified as an expert to testify incourt about gang activity. When Lullo began questioning defendant,he had already confessed to his involvement in the murder.

Defendant called his mother, Carolyn, as his first witness. Shetestified that, when the police visited her home prior to defendant'sarrest, she gave them her home and work phone numbers. However, thepolice did not call her after they arrested defendant. Sometimeduring the late evening of February 16 or early morning of February17, Carolyn received a phone call at work from her daughter, Tina,who told her that defendant had been arrested. Carolyn went home andcalled the Elgin police department. She testified that she spoke tothe officer who arrested defendant and asked him if she could talk todefendant. The officer told her that defendant had been transferredto St. Charles.

Carolyn further testified that defendant was in specialeducation programs when he was in elementary school. According todefendant's most recent progress report, he was reading at a sixth-grade level. Carolyn stated that she would always have to repeatherself when she gave defendant directions.

On cross-examination, Carolyn acknowledged that although she hadphysical custody of defendant he had lived with his father forseveral periods over the years and had regular communication withhim. According to defendant's last progress report, he was makingsatisfactory progress in all of his school subjects.

Defendant's sister, Maria Veronica Quezada (Maria), testifiedthat she was living with her father, Nicholas, at the time defendantwas arrested. She answered the phone call from the Elgin policedepartment. According to her, it was after 11 p.m. when the callcame. Her father was sleeping at the time. The officer asked tospeak to "Nick." Maria woke up her father and gave him the phone. After Nicholas hung up the phone, Maria asked him if he was going tothe police station. He replied that he was not, because defendanthad already been taken somewhere else. Maria testified that she thentold her sister, Tina, to call their mother and tell her "that theyhad Rickey, for her to go down there."

Nicholas testified that he could not recall the name of theofficer who called him. The officer said that his son was incustody. Nicholas asked him where they found defendant. The officertold him that defendant was charged with murder. Nicholas did notrecall the officer telling him that he had the right to be with hisson at the police station. He never said that he was not coming tothe station. When asked why he did not go to the police station,Nicholas answered, "I really don't remember, but when they called me,it was about 11:30 or quarter to 12:00, and they really didn't say,you know, come to the police station, all they said is they had myson in custody."

Following the hearing, the court found that defendant's fatherwas notified in a timely manner. The court noted that the officersprobably should have contacted defendant's mother as well, but, underthe circumstances, the officers complied with the law. The courtfurther found that the interview was calm and nonconfrontational andthat defendant was not threatened or subjected to coercive tactics. The court did rule, however, that Detective Lullo's questioning ofdefendant should be viewed with heightened scrutiny because of hisposition as a youth officer who was supposed to be protectingdefendant's interests. Consequently, the court granted the motion tosuppress with respect to defendant's responses to Lullo's questionsregarding gang involvement, but denied the motion to suppress as tothe remainder of defendant's statements.

B. Trial

In her opening statement, defense counsel did not present atheory as to why the jury should find defendant not guilty. Rather,she said, "When I get up at the end of the evidence, * * * I willgive you an explanation as to why I believe you should find RickeyQuezada not guilty, and I ask you in that regard, although you don'thave that explanation yet because I can't give it to you yet, tolisten carefully to his statement, the statement he gave to thepolice when he was arrested on this offense."

The State's first witness, Tommilyn Grady, testified that she isa teacher at Ombudsman Educational Services in Elgin, which is analternative education program. They had a morning session and anafternoon session. The victim and defendant were students in theafternoon session. Defendant was not present when class began on thedate of the shooting.

At approximately 12:25 p.m., a person walked through theclassroom door and began firing a gun. Grady described the person asmale, approximately 5 feet 10 inches to 6 feet tall, with a medium tostocky build. The individual wore a navy blue sweatshirt with thehood pulled up, dark pants, and a bandana over his face. The shooterstood three or four feet from Rodriguez, who was seated at his desk,and fired five or six shots at him. After the initial shot,Rodriguez attempted to move away but the shooter continued to fire athim.

Grady described defendant's appearance as "medium to tall inheight and stocky build, dark complexion and hair." She testifiedthat the shooter rolled his shoulder when he walked, which wassimilar to the way she had seen defendant walk. Grady stated thatshe was able to see the eye area of the shooter's face. His eyeswere dark and his skin was dark. The person was not African-American. On cross-examination, Grady testified that she saw thefirst three shots fired, and then got under her desk.

Robert Piercy testified that he was a teacher at OmbudsmanEducational Services on the day of the shooting. At the time theshooter entered the classroom, Piercy was seated at his desk on theopposite side of the room from the doorway. Piercy described theshooter as a male, 5 feet 7 inches to 5 feet 8 inches tall, andweighing about 190 pounds. He wore a blue hooded sweatshirt, bluesweat pants, and a blue bandana over his face. Piercy saw theshooter point his gun at Rodriguez and start shooting. Rodriguezstood up and attempted to move away. Piercy ducked underneath hisdesk. He heard six or seven gunshots in total. After the shooting,he got out from underneath the desk and saw through the window theform of a person running toward the west.

On cross-examination, Piercy stated that he could not determinethe race of the shooter. He did not see the last two shots fired. He did not recognize the shooter.

The police recovered a blue bandana from a yard near the school.

They also collected seven .45-caliber spent shell casings inside theschool room and four fired copper-jacketed bullets. Three firedcopper-jacketed bullets were recovered from the victim's body. Thevictim did not have any weapons on his person.

Forensic scientist Russell McLain testified that the bullets andcasings recovered from the scene were consistent with being firedfrom a Glock .45-caliber firearm.

Dr. Brian Mitchell testified that he performed the autopsy onthe victim. He had seven entrance wounds in his head, back,buttocks, and arm. The shot to the victim's head was fired at closerange. On cross-examination, Dr. Mitchell testified that the victimhad a monitor bracelet attached to his ankle.

Irma Hernandez testified that she lives at 561 North WestonAvenue in Elgin, which is near Ombudsman Educational Services. Onthe date of the shooting at approximately 12:15 p.m., she was lookingout her kitchen window and saw a young person walking in the street. He turned toward her house and went across her driveway. She wentoutside and yelled at him, "Why are you going through my driveway?" Hernandez identified the person she saw as defendant. Later thatday, a police officer came to her house and she identified aphotograph of defendant.

On cross-examination, Hernandez testified that when she wentoutside her house she only saw defendant from the back. He waswearing a baseball cap and was 5 feet or 5 feet 6 inches tall.

Forensic scientist Julie Glasner, an expert in DNA analysis,testified that she tested DNA material taken from the blue bandanarecovered by the police against defendant's blood sample andconcluded that there was a mixture of DNA from at least threeindividuals on the bandana. Defendant could not be excluded as apossible contributor for the particular stain. She further concludedthat approximately one in five black individuals, one in fourHispanic individuals, and one in five white individuals could not beexcluded as contributors. On cross-examination, Glasner concededthat she did not have the ability to point to the specific person whocontributed to the stain.

Detective Jeffrey Adam of the Elgin police department testifiedas an expert on the subject of street gangs. Adam testified thatdefendant was a member of the Spanish Gangster Disciples. The victimwas a member of a rival gang, the Insane Deuces. Adam furthertestified that the date of the shooting, February 11, was known as"Deuce Killer Day." On cross-examination, Adam testified that he hadarrested the victim twice for unlawful use of a weapon.

Joseph Bobak testified that he manages a gun shop inCarpentersville. The day after the shooting, two Hispanicindividuals came into the shop. One of the individuals, whom Bobakidentified as defendant, wore a black leather jacket. He wanted tolook at a Glock handgun. Bobak denied his request to see the gun.

Detective Lullo testified regarding defendant's arrest andsubsequent interview. Lullo's testimony in this regard wassubstantially the same as that which he gave in the suppressionhearing. In addition, he testified that defendant related during questioning that, three days before the shooting, the victim had tolddefendant that "he was coming for him." Defendant interpreted thisto mean that the victim planned to do him harm. Defendant said thathe used a .45-caliber Glock to shoot the victim and that he had firedapproximately seven rounds. After the shooting, defendant ranthrough some back yards and got into a friend's red car. Defendantstated that he took the gun he used to Navy Pier and threw it in LakeMichigan. He further stated that he had been wearing a baseball capbut it had blown off of his head while he was running.

In his taped statement, which was entered into evidence andplayed for the jury, defendant confessed to firing seven rounds atthe victim with a Glock .45 handgun. He also admitted to being amember of the Spanish Gangster Disciples. He believed that thevictim was "a Deuce." After the victim told defendant, "I'm coming,"defendant believed his life was in danger. He believed the victimhad seen the tattoos on defendant's arm and therefore knew defendantbelonged to a gang.

Defendant called his mother as his first witness. She testifiedthat she had never seen defendant wear a black leather jacket. Asfar as she knew, he had never owned a black leather jacket.

Detective Adam testified that he arrested the victim on December30, 1997, for the unlawful possession of a weapon, armed violence,and the unlawful possession of a controlled substance. On October 6,1998, he arrested the victim again for the unlawful use of a weapon.

In her closing argument, defense counsel asked the jury to finddefendant guilty of second-degree murder instead of first-degreemurder, because he had acted in self defense. The jury convicteddefendant of one count of first-degree murder. Defendant filed amotion for a new trial, which the court denied. The court sentenceddefendant to 45 years in prison and denied defendant's motion toreconsider sentence.

ANALYSIS

Defendant's first argument on appeal is that the trial courterroneously denied his motion to suppress the statements he made topolice following his arrest. Defendant contends that his confessionwas not voluntary and his waiver of his Miranda rights was notknowingly and intelligently made. Defendant bases his argument onthe following grounds: following defendant's arrest, the Elgin policedepartment did not immediately contact his father and did not contacthis mother at all; and Detective Lullo, the youth officer assigned todefendant, failed to fully advise defendant of his rights andinterrogated him during questioning rather than protecting hisinterests.

In In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000), our supreme courtenunciated a two-step approach for reviewing a trial court'sdetermination that a confession was voluntary. First, the reviewingcourt determines whether any of the trial court's factual findingsare at issue. If the defendant challenges the trial court's findingsof fact, the reviewing court gives those findings great deference andwill reverse them only if they are against the manifest weight of theevidence. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50. Second, the reviewing courtapplies a de novo standard of review to the ultimate legal questionof whether the confession was voluntary. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50. When neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is atissue, the reviewing court conducts a strictly de novo review. People v. McDaniel, 326 Ill. App. 3d 771, 780 (2001).

When determining whether a confession was voluntary, we mustdecide whether the defendant "made the statement freely, voluntarily,and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether thedefendant's will was overcome at the time he or she confessed." People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996). We must look at thetotality of the circumstances, including the defendant's age,intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, andphysical condition at the time of questioning; the legality andduration of the detention; the duration of the questioning; and anyphysical or mental abuse by police, including the existence ofthreats or promises. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54. No single factor isdispositive. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54.

The supreme court has characterized the taking of a juvenile'sconfession as a "sensitive concern" (People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470,476 (1977)), in which the court must take great care to assure thatthe confession was neither coerced nor " 'the product of ignorance ofrights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.' " People v.Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,55, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 561, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1458 (1967). This concernhas generated an additional factor for courts to consider, namely,whether the juvenile had an opportunity to consult with a concernedadult interested in his welfare either before or during theinterrogation. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 55. In addition, section 5--405of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5--405 (West2000)) requires a law enforcement officer who arrests a minor to"immediately make a reasonable attempt to notify the parent or otherperson legally responsible for the minor's care or the person withwhom the minor resides that the minor has been arrested and where heor she is being held."

Following the suppression hearing in this case, the trial court made the following findings of fact. After defendant's arrest inWheeling, he and the arresting officers arrived at the Elgin policestation at approximately 11 p.m. Detective Lullo, the youth officer,was present during the ride to the police station and while at thestation. When Lullo asked defendant the name of his "legalresponsible parent," defendant instructed him to call his father andgave him a phone number to call. Detective Rawson called the numberand gave defendant's father the basic information regarding his son.Defendant's father asked a couple of questions, then hung up thephone. Rawson interpreted the father's response to mean that he wasnot coming to the station. Lullo told defendant that his father hadbeen notified and he did not know whether his father was coming tothe station. Defendant was advised of his rights in an adequatemanner considering his age, educational level, and experience withthe police and the court. Defendant's responses indicated that heunderstood his rights and chose to waive them. The court furtherfound that the tone of the interview was calm and nonconfrontational. Defendant was not deprived of any necessities, nor did the policethreaten him or make him any promises. The court did not findcredible the testimony of defendant's sister to the effect thatdefendant's father said that he was not going to the station becausedefendant had already been taken elsewhere.

The only factual finding defendant appears to challenge is thetrial court's determination that defendant possessed the mentalcapacity necessary to understand his rights and what it meant towaive them. While the court did not specifically address this issue,it found that defendant understood his rights and chose to waivethem. Implicit in that finding is that defendant possessedsufficient mental capacity to comprehend his rights and the conceptof waiver.

Relying on the facts that he had been a special educationstudent while in elementary school and only read at a sixth-gradelevel at the time of his confession, defendant challenges the court'sfinding. However, nowhere in the record is there any evidence tosuggest that defendant actually was incapable of understanding hisMiranda rights as explained to him by Detective Lullo. Moreover,defendant's inability to read above a sixth-grade level does not meanthat he could not understand Lullo's oral explanation of his rights. Similarly, the fact that defendant had been enrolled in specialeducation classes in elementary school does not inescapably lead tothe conclusion that, at age 15, he could not understand his rights. By all indications, defendant comprehended what the police told himregarding his Miranda rights and his decision whether to waive thoserights. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that defendantunderstood his rights was not contrary to the manifest weight of theevidence.

Next, we consider the ultimate question of whether defendant'sconfession was voluntary considering the totality of thecircumstances. Defendant contends, in part, that his confession wasnot voluntary because the arresting officer did not contact one ofhis parents immediately after his arrest but instead waited untildefendant had been transported from Wheeling to the Elgin policestation, approximately one hour after the arrest.

Section 5--405 requires a law enforcement officer who arrests aminor with a warrant to "immediately make a reasonable attempt tonotify the parent or other person legally responsible for the minor'scare or the person with whom the minor resides that the minor hasbeen arrested and where he or she is being held." 705 ILCS 405/5--405 (West 1998). Our research has revealed no case law addressingthe "immediate notification" requirement. We agree with defendantthat, by waiting one hour after his arrest to notify his father, thepolice did not satisfy the requirements of section 5--405.

In this context, "immediately" means "without interval of time,"or "without delay." Webster's Third New International Dictionary1129 (1993). The purpose of requiring officers to immediately makea reasonable attempt to notify a concerned adult of a juvenile'sarrest is "to allow, where possible, the concerned adult to conferand counsel with the juvenile before interrogation and confession." (Emphasis in original.) People v. Montanez, 273 Ill. App. 3d 844,850 (1995). Here, the police waited approximately one hour from thetime they arrested defendant before calling his father. Under thecircumstances of this case, we cannot say that the police notifieddefendant's father "without delay." Nothing prevented the arrestingofficers from calling the station while they were en route and askingone of their fellow officers to contact defendant's father. Thiswould have given defendant's father the opportunity to come to thestation and speak with his son prior to his interrogation andconfession. The fact that he chose not to do so does not affect thearresting officers' obligation to comply with the statute'snotification requirement.

Contrary to the State's argument, the fact that the arrestingofficers refrained from questioning defendant during the ride toElgin does not remedy the failure to immediately notify one ofdefendant's parents. Even though the Elgin police took steps toprotect defendant's rights, we must emphasize the importance ofstrictly complying with section 5--405. The police do not have thesame concern for a juvenile's welfare that a parent or other legallyresponsible adult would have. Moreover, under the State's position,the police could hold a juvenile indefinitely without notifying aparent of his arrest so long as they did not question the juvenile. Such a situation would clearly violate the intent of section 5--405.

Our holding that the Elgin police violated section 5--405 bywaiting one hour after defendant's arrest to notify his father shouldnot be construed to mean that the passage of one hour between ajuvenile's arrest and the attempt to notify a parent will alwaysconstitute a violation of section 5--405. There could be scenariosin which the circumstances would prevent the police from being ableto immediately notify a juvenile's parents. This is not such asituation, however. We cannot consider the Elgin police department'snotification of defendant's father to have been "immediate" whenample opportunity existed to notify him earlier.

That being said, the failure to immediately notify defendant'sfather of the arrest does not render the confession inadmissible. See G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 55. It is well established thatnoncompliance with section 5--405 is but one factor for the court toconsider when looking at the totality of the circumstances. G.O.,191 Ill. 2d at 55. We have examined the totality of thecircumstances and conclude that defendant's confession was voluntary. He was informed of his constitutional rights and indicated that heunderstood them. He had been arrested before and thus had experiencedealing with the police. He was not under any sort of duress priorto or during his questioning. A youth officer was with defendant atall relevant times and had advised him to ask for an explanation ifhe did not understand anything he was told. There was no indicationthat defendant's confession had been coerced or that his will hadbeen overcome in any way.

We reject defendant's arguments that the failure to notify hismother and Detective Lullo's participation in the interrogationtainted his confession. Section 5--405 does not require the policeto notify both parents (705 ILCS 405/5--405(1) (West 1998)) and wewill not expand the scope of the statute by reading such arequirement into it. With respect to Detective Lullo, who was actingas a youth officer, we agree with the trial court that it isproblematic when an officer who is supposed to protect a juvenile'srights participates in the interrogation by asking the juvenile forpotentially incriminating information. The safer course of actionwould be for the youth officer to refrain from asking the juvenileany questions about the offense for which the juvenile was arrested. Here, however, the trial court cured any problem by granting themotion to suppress as to any statements defendant made in response toDetective Lullo's questions.

Relying on the same arguments, defendant also contends that hedid not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. Whether a minor knowingly and intelligently waives his or her rightsdepends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case,including the minor's age, background, experience, and conduct. Inre W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 328 (1995). The court must consider theminor's mental capacity, but evidence of mental deficiency alone doesnot render a statement unintelligent. W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 328.

In the case before us, the evidence showed that defendant hadbeen enrolled in special education classes when he was in elementaryschool. At the time of the shooting, he was enrolled in analternative education program. In 1998, the year before theshooting, defendant was earning As and Bs in his classes. His mostrecent progress report indicated that he was making satisfactoryprogress at school and was reading at a sixth-grade level. DetectiveLullo testified that defendant had no difficulty communicating withthe officers and he understood everything that occurred. Lulloexplained all of defendant's rights to him and asked him if heunderstood each right. There was no evidence whatsoever thatdefendant did not understand the explanation of his rights or theconcept of waiver. He was not under the influence of drugs oralcohol at the time of his questioning. In addition, defendant hadbeen arrested before and had experience dealing with the police. Hetook special care not to implicate anyone but himself in the crime,refusing to answer certain questions and asking to hear the tapeafter he had finished his statement. Defendant thus displayed afamiliarity with and a certain degree of control over theinterrogation process that belie his assertion that he was incapableof making a knowing and intelligent waiver. For all of thesereasons, we conclude that defendant's waiver of his constitutionalrights was both knowing and intelligent.

Defendant's next contention is that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant asserts that (1) remarkshis counsel made during her opening statement were prejudicial tohim, (2) his attorney did not present a cohesive defense, (3) hisattorney failed to object to testimony that the date of the shootingwas "Deuce Killer Day," and (4) his attorney failed to object toevidence regarding defendant's refusal to answer questions during histaped statement.

A defendant who alleges the ineffective assistance of counselmust satisfy both prongs of the two-part test enunciated by theSupreme Court. The defendant must show that (1) his counsel'sperformance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and(2) he was prejudiced by his counsel's errors. Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct.2052, 2064 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525-26(1984). In order to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant mustestablish that there was a reasonable probability that the result ofthe proceeding would have been different but for counsel's errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at2064; Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 525. A court need not determinewhether counsel's performance was deficient before examining theprejudice suffered if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectivenessclaim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice. Strickland, 466U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069; Albanese, 104Ill. 2d at 527.

Here, we need not analyze defense counsel's performance becausethe evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. The shootingtook place in the school that both defendant and the victim attended. Defendant did not attend class on the day of the shooting. Defendant's teachers testified that the shooter's gait and buildresembled those of defendant. Irma Hernandez placed defendant in theneighborhood of the school shortly after the shooting took place. Detective Adam, an expert on gangs, testified that defendant and thevictim were members of rival gangs. Officers Lullo and Troiolatestified that defendant confessed to them that he had killedRodriguez. Most importantly, defendant made a taped confession inwhich he admitted to entering the school with his face covered andshooting Rodriguez seven times with a Glock .45-caliber handgun.

Defendant's argument that his counsel's errors diminished the strength of his self-defense theory is not persuasive. The onlyevidence defendant presented on this defense was that the victim hadearlier been arrested for unlawful possession of a weapon and, threedays before the shooting, had said to defendant, "I'm coming foryou." A person is justified in the use of force when and to theextent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary todefend himself against the imminent use of unlawful force. 720 ILCS5/7--1 (West 1998). A person is justified in using force that isintended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if hereasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminentdeath or great bodily harm to himself. 720 ILCS 5/7--1 (West 1998). In the present case, there was absolutely no evidence that would have allowed the jury to conclude that defendant reasonably believed hewas in danger of imminent death or great bodily harm from the victim,who was unarmed and seated in a classroom when defendant shot himseven times. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that defensecounsel committed the errors of which defendant complains, there wasno reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would havebeen different but for those errors.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of KaneCounty.

Affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and GEIGER, J., concur.