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Defendant, Tony Pratcher, was charged with one count each ofunlawful possession with the intent to deliver more than 1 gram butless than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine (count I) (720ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2000)), unlawful possession with theintent to deliver more than 30 grams but not more than 500 grams ofcannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2000)), unlawful possession ofless than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine (720 ILCS570/402(c) (West 2000)), and possession of more than 30 grams butnot more than 500 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West2000)). Following a stipulated bench trial, defendant was foundguilty of all the charges except count I. Defendant appeals andcontends that the trial court erred in denying his motion tosuppress evidence. For the reasons that follow, we agree andreverse the trial court's ruling.

Defendant responded to the charges against him by filing amotion to suppress evidence. At a hearing on the motion, the Statecalled as a witness Kirk Henderson, a sergeant with the Zion policedepartment. Henderson testified that on June 7, 2000, about 5:30p.m., he was on duty in a fully marked squad car that was beingdriven by his partner, Lieutenant Dumyahn. Henderson observed a car driving northbound down the center of the road in the 2800block of Gilead Street, a two-lane, north-south residential streetin Zion. Henderson later observed the car moving northboundcompletely in the southbound lane of Gilead Street. Henderson toldDumyahn that they should stop the car. The squad car pursued thecar and caught up with it. Dumyahn then activated the squad car'semergency lights. The car traveled about two more blocks and madeat least one turn before it stopped in an alley. Defendant was thedriver and sole occupant of the car.

As defendant's car came to a stop, Henderson observeddefendant stick his hand into a compartment between the car'svisors. Henderson was unable to determine whether defendant hadanything in his hand when he removed it from the compartment.

Henderson then observed defendant open the driver's door tohis car and begin to exit the car. Henderson quickly exited thesquad car and moved toward defendant's car while giving defendantverbal commands to remain in the car. Defendant complied withHenderson's commands and sat back down in his car leaving thedriver's door open.

As he approached defendant's car, Henderson observed defendantquickly put his right hand down toward the center console areabetween the front seats of the car and stick his hand into acompartment there. Upon reaching the open driver's door ofdefendant's car, Henderson told defendant the reason for the stopand requested defendant's driver's license and insurance card. After receiving these items, Henderson asked the police dispatcherto check the validity of the license and to check for outstandingwarrants on defendant.

While waiting for the dispatcher's response, defendantremained seated in his car. Henderson was standing between theopen driver's door and defendant. From that vantage point,Henderson observed defendant rapidly pivot and lean forward in thedriver's seat several times as if he was trying to exit the car. Henderson also observed defendant thrust himself toward the frontpassenger floorboard of the car as if trying to grab somethingthere. When defendant did this, his body obstructed Henderson'sview.

The dispatcher informed Henderson that defendant's driver'slicense was not suspended or revoked and that there were nooutstanding warrants on defendant. Henderson then asked defendantto step out of the car and put his hands on the roof of the car sothat Henderson could pat down defendant. Henderson testified thathe made this request to determine whether defendant was carrying aweapon. On cross-examination, Henderson acknowledged that he wasalso concerned that defendant might be attempting to concealcontraband. Defendant complied with Henderson's request.

Henderson conducted a pat-down search of defendant's clothing. Upon reaching defendant's left front pants pocket, from the outsideof the pocket and through defendant's clothing, Henderson felt whathe believed was a quantity of cannabis in the pocket. Hendersonexplained that he believed that what he felt in defendant's pocketwas cannabis because "it was tightly compressed, soft, pliable. Itappeared contained because I wasn't able to spread it out." Henderson testified that, during the more than eight years that hehad been conducting traffic stops, he had come into contact withcannabis over 100 times and had felt cannabis in someone's pocketat least 20 times. Henderson acknowledged that he was not able todetermine through defendant's clothing whether what he felt indefendant's pocket contained any seeds or stems.

After feeling the object in defendant's pocket, Hendersonasked defendant what it was. Defendant replied, " 'My Stuff.' " Henderson then asked defendant if he, Henderson, could take theitem out of defendant's pocket. Defendant replied that he wouldtake the item out of his pocket himself. After rummaging around inhis pocket, defendant pulled out an item that he clenched tightlyin his fist. Henderson subsequently determined that the item indefendant's fist was a plastic bag containing a quantity ofsuspected cannabis. Henderson then arrested defendant. Hendersonalso later issued traffic citations to defendant for driving downthe center of the road.

The testimony of Steven Dumyahn, a Zion police lieutenant,generally corroborated Henderson's testimony regarding the stop ofdefendant's car. After the stop, Dumyahn exited the squad car andstood at the rear passenger side of defendant's car. Dumyahncorroborated Henderson's testimony as to defendant's initialmovements indicating an intent to exit his car; Henderson's shoutedcommands for defendant to stay in the car; and defendant's quickmovements toward the center and right floorboard areas of the car. Dumyahn did not observe defendant reach into the area between thevisors of the car.

After defendant was arrested, Dumyahn searched the frontpassenger side of defendant's car. Under the front seats towardthe center of defendant's car, Dumyahn found a plastic grocery bagthat contained a large plastic freezer bag with a "large quantity"of a green leafy substance. The shopping bag also containedseveral smaller plastic bags. Some of the smaller bags alsocontained a green leafy substance. Under the center armrest,Dumyahn found a hand-held scale.

Following the hearing, the trial court denied defendant'smotion to suppress evidence. The court later conducted astipulated bench trial and found defendant not guilty of count Iand guilty of the other three charges. The trial courtsubsequently denied defendant's motion for a new trial andsentenced defendant to probation for a period of 24 months with 9months of periodic imprisonment, 175 hours of public service, andvarious conditions, fines, costs, and fees. Defendant's timelynotice of appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred indenying his motion to suppress evidence because (1) the police werenot justified in conducting a pat-down search of defendant afterlearning that defendant had a valid driver's license and that therewere no outstanding warrants for defendant, and (2) even if thepat-down search was proper, the police exceeded the permitted scopeof the search. Because we can resolve the appeal on the scopeissue, we need not address the validity issue.

We initially note our standard of review. Traditionally, whena trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence involvedfactual determinations and credibility assessments, a reviewingcourt would reverse a trial court's ultimate ruling only if it wasmanifestly erroneous. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 430-31(2001). However, de novo review is appropriate where neither thefacts nor the credibility of the witnesses is disputed. People v.Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 201 (2001).

Here, neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnessesis disputed. We will therefore review de novo the question ofdefendant's legal challenge to the denial of his motion tosuppress. See Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431.

Citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed. 2d334, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993), and People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d211 (1995), defendant contends that Henderson's pat-down searchexceeded the permitted scope of such a search. Defendant arguesthat Henderson's search was constitutionally invalid becauseHenderson went beyond the permitted scope of the pat-down searchwhen, upon feeling the object in defendant's left front pantspocket, Henderson squeezed, slid, and otherwise manipulated thecontents of the pocket through defendant's clothing.

The State responds that the proper application of theprinciples enunciated in Dickerson and Mitchell shows thatHenderson's search of defendant did not exceed the scope permittedfor a pat-down search. The State argues that, based on hisexperience, Henderson was able to sufficiently recognize that theobject that he felt through defendant's clothing was cannabis andthat Henderson therefore had probable cause to request defendant toremove the object from his pocket.

In Dickerson, a police officer observed the defendant walk outof a known "crack house." After spotting the officer's squad carand making eye contact with an officer, the defendant abruptly cameto a halt and began walking in the opposite direction. The police then stopped the defendant and ordered him to submit to a pat-downsearch. The search did not reveal any weapons. However, theofficer conducting the search felt a small lump in the front pocketof the defendant's nylon jacket. The officer testified that, afterexamining the object with his fingers, the object " 'slid and itfelt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane.' " Dickerson,508 U.S. at 369, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 341, 113 S. Ct. at 2133. Afterreaching into the defendant's pocket and retrieving a small plasticbag containing a lump of suspected crack cocaine, the officerarrested the defendant.

In Dickerson, the Supreme Court reviewed the principles setout in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868(1968), that allow a warrantless investigative stop. The Courtreiterated that the purpose of the limited search permitted duringa Terry stop was to determine whether the person searched wascarrying a weapon, not to discover evidence of a crime. Consequently, a Terry search is strictly limited to only what isnecessary for the discovery of weapons that might harm the officer. If the search goes beyond those limits, "it is no longer validunder Terry and its fruits will be suppressed." Dickerson, 508U.S. at 373, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 113 S. Ct. at 2136.

In Dickerson, the Court determined that a police officerconducting a Terry search may properly seize nonthreateningcontraband detected during a protective pat-down search as long asthe search remains within the limits required by Terry. Indescribing these limits, the Court stated that "[i]f a policeofficer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels anobject whose contour or mass makes its identity immediatelyapparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacybeyond that already authorized by the officer's search forweapons." Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 346, 113 S.Ct. at 2137. In applying these principles, the Court agreed withthe Minnesota Supreme Court, which had concluded that the officerexceeded the limits of a permissible Terry stop. The Courtcommented that the continued exploration of the defendant's pocketby the officer after he concluded that the pocket did not containa weapon was unrelated to the sole justification of a Terry search,i.e., the protection of the police and others. Dickerson, 508 U.S.at 378, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 347, 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39.

In Mitchell, a police officer conducted a pat-down search ofthe defendant after concluding that the car that the defendant hadbeen driving may have been stolen and after observing drugparaphernalia inside the car. During the search, the officer feltan object inside the defendant's shirt pocket. To the officer, the object felt like a piece of rock inside a small Baggie. Theofficer reached inside the pocket, pulled the object out, concludedthat the object was rock cocaine, and arrested the defendant fordrug possession.

In Mitchell, our supreme court first held that the "plaintouch" doctrine described in Dickerson does not violate article I,section 6, of the Illinois Constitution. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at222. The court then adopted the reasoning in Dickerson. Mitchell,165 Ill. 2d at 225. In elaborating on the reliability of tactileperceptions, the court stated:

"When objects have a distinctive and consistent shape that anofficer has been trained to detect and that officer has hadprevious experience in detecting such objects, his tactileperceptions can provide him with the same recognition that hissight would have provided. [Citations.] We caution that theofficer's belief must be objectively reasonable, in light ofhis past experience and training, and capable ofverification." Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 227.

The court added that the "plain touch" doctrine "does not permitthe search to exceed the initial intrusion. As soon as the officeris satisfied that an object is not a weapon, a further search todetermine the nature or identity of the object is impermissible." Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 228.

In applying these principles, the Mitchell court found thatthe requirements for seizure under the "plain touch" doctrine weremet and that the officer's seizure of the object was thereforeproper. In response to the defendant's argument that it was notpossible for the officer to have immediately identified the object,the court stated

"Given that [Officer] King observed the drug paraphernalia onthe seat of the car, he likely suspected that drugs werepresent, either on defendant's person or in the vehicle. Thus, it is conceivable that King's prior police experiencewith drugs, coupled with his observation of drug paraphernaliaon the seat and his tactile perceptions of the object indefendant's pocket, enabled his ready tactile identificationof the object." Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 231.

In this case, we believe that the facts are closer to those inDickerson than those in Mitchell. Here, unlike in Mitchell,Officer Henderson did not observe any drug paraphernalia indefendant's car before he conducted the pat-down search ofdefendant. Furthermore, Henderson testified that when he felt theobject in defendant's pocket he knew it was not a weapon. Henderson also testified that he believed the object was cannabisbecause "it was tightly compressed, soft, pliable. It appearedcontained because I wasn't able to spread it out." This suggeststhat after Henderson had concluded that there were no weapons indefendant's pocket he nonetheless continued his search of thepocket's contents to determine the nature of the object that hefelt. Consequently, Henderson's search went beyond the permissiblelimits for such a search under Dickerson and Mitchell.

Because we decide this case on the scope issue, we emphasizethat our decision does not encroach on an officer's ability toprotect himself in the field. The Supreme Court recognized inTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868,(1968), that, aside from "the governmental interest ininvestigating crime," a police officer has "the more immediateinterest *** in taking steps to assure himself that the person withwhom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him." Terry, 392 U.S. at23, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 907, 88 S. Ct. at 1881. "Certainly it would beunreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risksin the performance of their duties," the Court observed. Terry,392 U.S. at 23, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 907, 88 S. Ct. at 1881.

Because Henderson's search exceeded the permitted scope of apat-down search under the "plain touch" doctrine, the trial courterred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order that denieddefendant's motion to suppress and remand the cause for furtherproceedings consistent with this disposition.

Reversed and remanded.

GEIGER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.